

VOLUME VII

SEPTEMBER, 1928

NUMBER 1

SOCIAL FORCES

A Scientific Medium of Social Study and Interpretation

BEHAVIOR AND MECHANISM BY C. JUDSON HERRICK

SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE BY FLOYD N. HOUSE

FARMER LEADERS IN THE UNITED STATES by PITIRIM A. SOROKIN
and CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN

THE PROBLEMS OF AN EMPIRICAL SOCIOLOGY by WILSON D. WALLACE

PRESENT TENDENCIES IN RURAL SOCIOLOGY BY W. C. WATERMAN
THE INTELLIGENCE OF CHILDREN IN DEPENDENT FAMILIES BY

R. CLYDE WHITE
COMMUNITY CENTERS OF ADULT EDUCATION IN ENGLAND¹ BY

RACE PREJUDICE: FRANCE AND ENGLAND BY RICHARD T. LAPIERRE THE FAMILY AS A UNIT OF SURVIVAL — W. C. T.

THE FAMILY AS A UNIT OF SURVIVAL BY WARREN S. THOMPSON
OTHER ARTICLES AND BOOK REVIEWS

TER ARTICLES AND BOOK REVIEWS BY I. V. SMITH, GLADYS MURPHY GRAHAM, GEORGE A. LUNDBERG, ARTHUR H. ESTABROOK, MERTON K. CAMERON, NELS ANDERSON, CECIL C. NORTH, W. S. BITTNER, RUTH ALLISON HUDNUT, W. S. TURNER, KENNETH M. GOULD, RALPH AND MILDRED FISHER, SEESA E. ELDREDGE, FRANK T. CARLTON, L. L. BERNARD, ERNEST R. GROVES, LEROY E. BOWMAN, READ BAIN, JOSEPH HYDE PRATT, SYDNEY D. FRISSELL, H. G. DUNCAN

\$1.00 A COPY

\$4.00 A YEAR

SEPTEMBER, 1928

VOLUME VII, No. 1

SOCIAL FORCES

A Scientific Medium of Social Study and Interpretation

EDITORS

HOWARD W. ODUM, *Managing Editor*

ERNEST R. GROVES

KATHARINE JOCHER

JESSE F. STEINER

L. L. BERNARD

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

WILL W. ALEXANDER, *Committee on Inter-Racial Cooperation, Atlanta*
HARRY E. BARNES, *Smith College, Northampton*
LEE BIDGOOD, *University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa*
BURR BLACKBURN, *Georgia Council of Social Agencies, Atlanta*
EMORY S. BOGARDUS, *University of Southern California, Los Angeles*
LEROY BOWMAN, *Columbia University, New York*
E. C. BRANSON, *University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill*
E. C. BROOKS, *North Carolina State College of A. & E., Raleigh*
L. M. BRISTOL, *University of Florida, Gainesville*
ERNEST W. BURGESS, *University of Chicago, Chicago*
DUDLEY D. CARROLL, *University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill*
MOLLIE RAY CARROLL, *Goucher College, Baltimore*
JEROME DAVIS, *Yale University, New Haven*
JAMES FORD, *Harvard University, Cambridge*
WILSON GEE, *University of Virginia, Charlottesville*
JOHN L. GILLIN, *University of Wisconsin, Madison*
J. G. deR. HAMILTON, *University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill*
WALTON H. HAMILTON, *Yale University, New Haven*
FRANK H. HANKINS, *Smith College, Northampton*
GLENN JOHNSON, *North Carolina College for Women, Greensboro*
KATE BURR JOHNSON, *Commissioner of Public Welfare, North Carolina, Raleigh*
BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, *North Carolina College for Women, Greensboro*
E. T. KRUEGER, *Vanderbilt University, Nashville*
EDWARD C. LINDEMAN, *Research Specialist, New York*
OWEN R. LOVEJOY, *National Child Labor Committee, New York*
WILLIAM F. OGBURN, *University of Chicago, Chicago*
CARL TAYLOR, *North Carolina State College of A. & E., Raleigh*
W. D. WATHERFORD, *Southern Y. M. C. A. College, Nashville*
G. CROFT WILLIAMS, *University of South Carolina, Columbia*
L. R. WILSON, *University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill*
G. P. WYCKOFF, *Tulane University, New Orleans*

Published Quarterly

SEPTEMBER, DECEMBER, MARCH, JUNE

For THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS

By THE WILLIAMS & WILKINS COMPANY

Communications for the Editors, and all manuscripts, should be addressed to THE EDITORS, SOCIAL FORCES, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. Business communications should be addressed to The Williams & Wilkins Company, Baltimore, Md.





SOCIAL FORCES

CONTENTS FOR SEPTEMBER, 1928

CONTRIBUTED ARTICLES

	<i>Page</i>
BEHAVIOR AND MECHANISM.....	C. Judson Herrick 1
SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.....	Floyd N. House 11
PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES....	T. V. Smith 17
THE LOGICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES....	Gladys Murphy Graham 24
FARMER LEADERS IN THE UNITED STATES Pitirim A. Sorokin and Carle C. Zimmerman	33

DEPARTMENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS

TEACHING AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.....	46
"The Problems of an Empirical Sociology," <i>Wilson D. Wallis</i> ; Present Tendencies in Rural Sociology, <i>W. C. Waterman</i> ; The Content of Radio Programs, <i>George A. Lundberg</i> .	
PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK.....	61
The Intelligence of Children in Dependent Families, <i>R. Clyde White</i> ; The Pauper Idiot in Kentucky, <i>Arthur H. Estabrook</i> ; Some Neglected Aspects of the Problem of Poverty, <i>Merton K. Cameron</i> .	
COMMUNITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD.....	84
Community Centers of Adult Education in England, <i>Basil A. Yeaxlee</i> ; The Slum: A Project for Study, <i>Nels Anderson</i> ; The Community Fund and the Community, <i>Cecil C. North</i> ; The Relation of the Local Community to the Principal Factors of Public Opinion, <i>W. S. Bittner</i> .	
RACE, CULTURAL GROUPS, SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION.....	102
Race Prejudice: France and England, <i>Richard T. LaPiere</i> ; Sex Inferiority, <i>Ruth Allison Hudnut</i> ; The Negro and the Changing South, <i>W. S. Turner</i> .	
GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP.....	120
Cinepatriotism, <i>Kenneth M. Gould</i> ; The Labor Turnover of the United States Congress, <i>Ralph and Mildred Fletcher</i> , Community Organization and Citizenship, <i>Seba Eldridge</i> .	
SOCIAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIPS.....	141
The Family as a Unit of Survival, <i>Warren S. Thompson</i> ; Welfare and Profit Making, <i>Frank T. Carlton</i> .	
LIBRARY AND WORKSHOP.....	152
Book Reviews, <i>L. L. Bernard, Ernest R. Groves, Floyd N. House, LeRoy E. Bowman, Read Bain, Joseph Hyde Pratt, Sydney D. Frissell, H. G. Duncan</i> . New Books Received.	

(In writing to advertisers, please mention the journal—it helps.)

THE SOCIAL SERVICE MONOGRAPHS

CITY PLANNING FOR GIRLS

By HENRIETTA ADDITON

Miss Additon discusses the old question "Why do girls go wrong?" from new points of view as a result of this survey of the work done with girls by the social agencies of Philadelphia.

\$1.25, postpaid \$1.35

THE YOUNG CRIPPLE AND HIS JOB

By MARION HATHWAY

This informative study presents the difficulties faced by young crippled people in finding congenial employment as a specialized problem in education, vocational training, and industrial adjustment.

\$1.25, postpaid \$1.35

THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO

By ARTHUR L. BEELEY

This study is unique in combining the legalistic, the behavioristic, and the ad-

ministrative points of view in the handling of a very important problem.

\$2.00, postpaid \$2.10

SELECTED MEDICAL SOCIAL CASE RECORDS

By SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE

It has often been pointed out that the scarcity of teaching material is one of the very real difficulties confronting the schools of social work in their attempt to build up a sound professional curriculum. The publication of this book with its excellent case records will be useful not only to those engaged in medical social service but also to teachers and students in this field.

\$1.50, postpaid \$1.60

THE ILLINOIS ADOPTION LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION

By ELINOR NIMS

In this study Dr. Nims has analyzed the situation in Illinois with reference to the use of the adoption procedure authorized under the laws of the state.

\$1.50, postpaid \$1.60

HANDBOOK OF RURAL SOCIAL RESOURCES—1928

Edited by Benson Y. Landis

This book, the second of the Handbooks of Rural Social Resources published, brings the subject up to date. It is an invaluable reference work for the rural workers, social workers, churchmen, teachers.

\$2.00, postpaid \$2.10

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5773 Ellis Avenue

Chicago

(In writing to advertisers, please mention the journal—it helps.)

SOCIAL FORCES

September, 1928

BEHAVIOR AND MECHANISM¹

C. JUDSON HERRICK

THE modern period of biology began with the recognition that vital processes are natural events, not acts of the caprice of some supernatural spirit or ghostly presence. Today qualified biologists, with very few exceptions, accept this doctrine without reserve and devote themselves to the task of finding out just how the activities of living bodies are related with those of inorganic nature from which we derive our sustenance and our vital energies.

This does not mean that the behavior of living bodies is just like that of dead machines; but it does mean that everything that goes on in a living body is related in an orderly way, that is in causal sequences, with the events of the world in which that body lives. The laws of biology are not those of physics and chemistry, but they are congruous with them and the rules of these relationships are rapidly being discovered and recorded.

In the study of human nature how far can we go with the methods of natural science? The human body has come to be what it is by a natural process of evolu-

tion that has taken many millions of years. The behavior patterns of this body have, of course, grown up parallel with the development of the bodily mechanisms that behave. This body does many things that no other animal body can do. It clears land of forest and plants it to wheat. It builds machines to plant and harvest the wheat. It grinds the wheat and makes bread of the flour. It markets the wheat, the flour and the bread by complicated systems of transportation, finance and speculation. It creates works of art and enjoys them. It develops ideals of present and future conduct and character.

There are mental factors in all of these distinctively human activities, and these factors are inextricably interwoven with all problems of human behavior. Can we write a natural history of this mental aspect of human conduct as well as of the physical and physiological aspects?

A man engages in agriculture or manufacturing or commerce because in this way he can satisfy some of his needs or wants. His needs are very personal; his wants may be known to himself alone. But his conduct in satisfying these needs and wants is open to general inspection. This behavior we can study scientifically much

¹ The substance of this paper will appear in Volume III of the "New World Series," edited by Baker Brownell and published by D. Van Nostrand Company.

as we study the behavior of other animals. But what mentality there is back of this behavior we can get at only indirectly, by comparing the things that he does and says with what we do and say and what mental experiences we have while we are doing it.

This is not a very satisfactory basis for a science of psychology. But it is the best we have, so we shall have to put up with it and do the best we can with it.

This indeed is possible only if we can connect the mental life with the physiological life and also with the physical environment with which both body and mind must adjust in order to keep on working effectively. To be of any use to us in this enterprise the connection between mind, body and environment must be a real one, a connection of causal interrelationship, such as we find to prevail between the things and events of the physical world outside, between earth and sun, sea and land, vegetation and climate, money and purchasing power, supply and demand of commodities.

To keep our discussion within manageable limits let us state at the outset that psychology as the term is here used includes our conscious experience (that is, our awareness) in its entirety, and everything else that may help us to understand this consciousness. The psychologist, then, may use introspection; he may study the bodily mechanisms employed in thinking, fearing, getting angry and the like; he is interested in the whole field of animal and human behavior as the organic background of mental life and as part of its instrumentation; and he must study all of these things in relation to the physical, biological and social environment within which they have grown up and are now operating.

This is an ambitious program. Most psychologists at present seem to feel that

it is too big for them. They are right, of course. No one man can cultivate so wide and so diversified a field. It must be divided up into separate farms. And yet no one of these cultivators can get along without some commerce with the others. The science of psychology as a whole must in the end include the products of the labors of all of them.

Now coming back to our more general questions. Nature as we know it in science has been defined as the sum total of human experience. Natural science cannot deal with things of which nobody has ever had any experience, though it can recombine the experienced elements in original patterns, as in imagination and hypothesis. As fast as we get more experience our science enlarges.

The application of the scientific method to the study of natural phenomena involves: first, finding out as much as possible about natural things, how they are constructed and how they work. They operate according to rule and when we have learned these rules we have formulated the laws of nature. Second, the prediction of future events is possible as soon as we have learned the uniformities of natural processes, that is, the laws of nature. Third, some measure of control of the future course of events is possible when the two steps just mentioned have been taken.

When we know the laws in accordance with which natural events take place we can sometimes play one set of forces against another and so direct their further courses as we wish. We can make wind and water drive our mills, steam run our railroads, and sunlight take our photographs. Control of natural forces is the final achievement of science.

Now in learning to control the forces of nature we do not upset any natural laws, but we learn to conform our own be-

havior with these laws so as to direct the course of events to our own advantage. We cannot change the laws of gravitation, but we can make water run up-hill by opposing a stronger force to gravity.

In achieving this control of nature we have learned that there are many different kinds of mechanisms and that energy is manifested in as many forms as there are patterns of mechanism through which it works. Mechanical work, which we measure in foot-pounds or horsepower, is movements of masses of matter against resistance. Heat, which we measure in calories, is molecular movement. Light, electricity and magnetism are movements of electrons. And for each of these there is a definite unit of measurement. Diverse as these natural processes are, there is a well known quantitative relation between them and all are manifestations of energy in lawful patterns. They are mutually convertible into energy which is the common denominator of all of them.

It is clear, therefore that natural mechanisms are extremely diverse, and the different kinds of things that go on in nature are the dynamic expressions of the operations of these diverse mechanisms. We cannot measure them all with the same yardstick, but all of them can be measured somehow. All natural phenomena are interrelated, and the behavior of living bodies fits into this natural scheme in orderly fashion.

The physiologist regards the living body as a machine and it is his job to learn how it works. But it is not the same kind of machine as his motor car. It is made differently and it behaves differently. Many of the laws of natural dead mechanisms (river systems and the like) and of man-made machines reappear in living bodies, but they are combined in new patterns never seen in dead machines.

The reason why animal behavior in

general and especially human behavior seems so lawless and is so hard to predict and control is simply that we have not yet learned enough about the laws of biology. As fast as these laws are discovered the behavior embraced by them is seen to follow in causal sequence, like other natural events.

Mechanistic biology does not claim that all animal behavior can be expressed in the formulas of inorganic physics and chemistry; it does believe that all living phenomena belong to the same natural order as these and are causally related with them. What a machine does depends on how it is constructed and the situation in which it operates. A locomotive is no good without its track. An airplane dispenses with the track or any roadbed because it is differently built. A living bird can do some things that an airplane cannot (lay and hatch a clutch of eggs, for instance) because it is built differently. Some vital functions are unique and are never seen except in living bodies. They are nevertheless just as truly mechanistic, that is, causally related, as are those of a gyroscope or a wireless telephone, which are also unique.

Because living bodies are machines working in accordance with natural laws we can modify or control their behavior, to some degree, as soon as our biological knowledge is adequate. Some of this knowledge has been gained by practical experience and some by very technical scientific procedures.

A horse can be trained to the harness or saddle; faster race horses or heavier draft horses may be bred from inferior stock by well known rules of heredity. Special breeds of men can be produced in the same way any time that a sufficient number of people want to try it. We know perfectly well how to do it but it will probably be a long time before the experiment

will actually be tried on a large scale with adequate scientific technique.

Most of the mechanisms of the human body are not fundamentally different from those of other animals; but some of them, especially in the brain, are different and peculiar to mankind. Human biology, accordingly, is a valid and practicable science just in proportion as the mechanisms of our bodies and of our social organization can be understood and human behavior interpreted as the operation of these mechanisms. Part of this program is already far advanced.

As long as we are in good health we know how to use our bodies practically in earning our living and getting on in the world without knowing much about these scientific matters just as one may learn to run his motor car without bothering himself with the engineering principles of its design and construction. And yet, since mechanics and doctors are not always handy when we need them, we find that we get on better the more we know about the construction, operation and care of our cars and of our own bodies.

Human behavior, however, is complicated by the fact that we know what we are about while we are behaving, and we have no evidence that a river or an automobile does this. This awareness of what we are doing is a very troublesome feature of human conduct, and the science of human behavior would be so much simpler if we could leave this factor out of the reckoning that many biologists and even some psychologists are tempted to ignore it altogether and say that the mechanisms of human life would run along just the same if we were unconscious automata.

The chief trouble with this idea is that it does not seem to be true. In practice our conscious experiences, our emotions, our sensations, our memories, our

thoughts, our hopes and fears, do play real parts in shaping our conduct. It is popularly believed that this is so, and this belief is scientifically sound. No verbal hocus-pocus, no metaphysical dialectic, no appeals to disembodied spirits or other mystical explanations, can nullify our practical experience that our thoughts and our emotions do control our conduct, to some extent at least.

But the attempt to articulate the conscious components of human behavior with the natural system of causally related objective phenomena is beset with very special difficulties, and many naturalists and philosophers have given up the attempt to do so. They regard consciousness as belonging to a spiritual realm incommensurable with natural causal sequences and hence independent of our formulations of the laws of nature. This hypothesis does not seem to fit the facts of our experience, for, as we have seen, our conscious life and our physiological life do operate in unison and in causal interrelationship. Changes in the body (fatigue, intoxications, etc.) do affect the mind and the mind does act through the body and so influence behavior.

The popular forms of spiritism leave mind out of the natural system as disembodied process and hence inaccessible by the available methods of natural science. This throws our program of scientific study into bankruptcy just where we need it most, in our analysis of human conduct. It accords better with present scientific evidence to take (as a working hypothesis) a radically mechanistic view and regard our minds as functions of our bodies and more specifically of the cerebral cortex. On this view the study of conscious processes introspectively and the study of objective behavior are merely different ways of approaching the natural history of man.

This functional view does not solve the philosophical problems of the relation of mind and body, but it is adequate for the scientific and practical study of problems of human behavior. The case is somewhat similar to that of gravitation. We know what the force of gravity does but we do not know the actual mechanism. Nor do we know the ultimate cause of any natural phenomenon or the final explanation of the relation between any substance and its properties. We take these things as given in experience and adjust our behavior and our scientific hypotheses to them as best we can.

Obviously there are all sorts of mechanisms with all sorts of properties or behavior. Of some of these things we have objective experience, and the indications are that our subjective experience is one of the ways of working of a very special kind of mechanism found within our own bodies. We can thus articulate the whole of introspective psychology with a mechanistic biological science, though this involves some change in our traditional conceptions of mechanism.

Some changes of this sort have already taken place. It used to be customary, and still is in some quarters, for biologists to assume a special vital force, an "entelechy," or some other mystical principle to account for the very peculiar properties of living bodies. Most biologists now find such hypotheses unnecessary. It is simpler and in better accord with the known facts to say that vital forces are natural forces which differ from those of any dead mechanisms just because living substance is a different kind of mechanism.

In just the same way we may say that the energies of the mind which exert a regulatory control over conduct are functions of a very special kind of living mechanism found in the cerebral cortex. Brain power differs from muscular power

just because brains are differently constructed from muscles. In short, if we enlarge our conception of mechanism to embrace the whole of the human body and all of its operations, including the conscious acts, we have the only practicable scientific basis for a comprehensive study of human conduct.

If, then, our conscious experience does knit in with the rest of our living in this practical way, consciousness is not an epiphenomenon, a by-product, or any other sort of a negligible factor in human biology. Such conceptions and the philosophical doctrine known as parallelism are unintelligible and unnecessary.

Presumably a conscious act is a natural event; and since we cannot handle disembodied functions in biology, we are led to look for the organs that perform the functions that we experience as feeling, thinking, wishing, and the like.

We have not far to go in this quest. The facts are at hand for an approximate answer to our question. It is clear that the eyes are part of the apparatus of seeing, the ears of hearing, and some of the viscera participate in emotional experience. The evidence is equally good, and of exactly the same sort, that the cerebral cortex, that gray external layer that makes up about half the total weight of the brain, is the specific organ of thought.

True, we do not know exactly how the brain thinks. Nor do we know how the retina of the eye translates luminous vibrations into nervous impulses and transmits them to the brain, nor exactly how a muscle contracts. But we know as definitely as we know anything in biology that each of these organs does perform the function mentioned. We know grossly what the mechanism of thinking is, though we do not know as much as we would like about the minute structure of the organs of thought or how

they work. We actually have more knowledge about these things than most people appreciate, and this knowledge is growing very fast.

The hoary question, How is the mind related to the body? is not an insoluble riddle. We shall find the answer by keeping at it and improving our scientific technique. We may regard it as already settled biologically that the mind is a function of the body, and of particular parts of it whose structural arrangements are already tolerably well known. Or, to put it in another way, the brain is a part of the body some of whose activities are unconscious and some are conscious. Thinking is this part of the body functioning in specific ways.

We have made a great gain, for now we can study objective human behavior and the subjective experience of the individual who is behaving as one vital process; we can converge upon the problems of conduct with all of the technical procedures of both objective psychology and introspective psychology; and we know where to look to find the exact mechanisms that are behaving in both objective and subjective fields.

This is the common biological method. The anatomist examines the structure of animal organs, the physiologist finds out by experiment how these organs work, and then we have the whole story before us as soon as we can put these organs and functions in their places in the body as a whole. Now the cure of disease is possible, and the normal working of the organs can be controlled in a variety of ways.

After the functions have been correctly aligned with their appropriate organs we can use either one as index or symbol of the other. From the structure of a fossil skeleton of an animal that has been extinct a million years we can tell a great deal

about the habits of that animal. And conversely if a hitherto unknown species of fish is found by a competent naturalist he can, by observing its habits and external features, predict many details of the structure of the brain and later verify his predictions by dissection of the specimen.

So introspective psychology, objective psychology, and the study of the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system converge their activities upon the problems of human behavior to the end that we may learn how we behave and with what we behave. Better control of behavior will follow just as certainly as better control of your motor car follows a better understanding of its mechanisms and the laws of their operation.

On this functional view the whole range of human conduct and experience is open to investigation by naturalistic methods. The objective study of human behavior and human institutions and my own introspective experience are alike valuable ways of approach, for my conscious life is known to be organically related with my conduct.

Our actual behavior at any moment is the resultant of the interaction of two factors: first, our innate organization—the reflexes, instincts and temperamental dispositions with which we were born; and second, the modifications of these innate factors effected by our postnatal experience—our education, what we have learned.

This is the familiar contrast between heredity and environment. Both factors are always present, for environment can act only on the hereditary organization given. Both of these factors can be controlled, to some extent, as fast as we learn how to do it and decide what we want to do—heredity with difficulty and very slowly by eugenic matings and en-

vironment easily and very rapidly by personal effort and social organization. We have so far made but little progress in the first field, but control of the environment through applications of science to agriculture, business, education and cultural ideals is the technique of modern civilization.

Progress in the elaboration of the physical equipment for more diversified and comfortable living has indeed gone on so rapidly of late as to be a real danger unless progress in our spiritual ideals keeps pace with it. A man of primitive or barbarous impulses and ideals, if supplied with all of the apparatus at present available in industry, science and war, is merely a more efficient barbarian and he becomes a very dangerous member of society. We must find some means of ensuring progress in peoples' personal and social ideals—what they want to do, to acquire and to become—or civilization perishes.

This is now the most acute problem of human biology, the most practical question before students of human behavior. Through the applications of science to industry we have the technique of control of environment pretty well in hand. Further improvements in this field are sure to go on apace. But what about those improvements in human nature that are vitally necessary if we would avoid destruction by the very instruments of our scientific achievements?

Can we really change human nature? Some change seems to be absolutely necessary in the present standards of vast numbers of our people, standards of personal, social and national responsibility and ideals of conduct if we would avoid the destruction of our culture by war, by greed, and by uncontrolled self-determination. Can this be done?

The pessimism now so wide-spread in thoughtful circles seems to be based on the traditional conception that our

spiritual values inhere in some mystical entity of a ghostly realm whose acts are capricious, lawless, and remote from the material world where human conduct finds its expression. Naturally we can hope to influence such a mystical agent only by equally unsubstantial means. Thousands of years of metaphysical dialectic and moral precept, supported by all the weight of entrenched religious authority have signally failed to re-form the common human nature of large numbers of our most "advanced" communities. Why?

Because human life does not work in a vacuum. Our overt behavior is a very material expression of the action of a material body upon a physical world. The motivation is in part readily traceable to organic reactions whose mechanisms are well known—reflexes, visceral and glandular activities, etc.—and in part to wishes, desires, motives, purposes and ideals whose organic mechanisms are not so fully understood.

But these so-called spiritual activities are not disembodied functions working *in vacuo*. Radically mechanistic biology does not discard them as irrelevant, nor does it appeal to mystical non-physical categories. It recognizes our spiritual motivation, in common with all the rest of our conscious experience, as the natural function of specific organs—in this case the cerebral cortex and other parts of the body physiologically related with it.

There is a well known mechanism for all of our conscious experience, including our most refined spiritual values. This is part of our bodily organization, and of course it works in accordance with biological laws, the same as the rest of the body. It is not the same kind of a mechanism as an airplane or a reflex arc, and so of course it performs a different kind of function.

Man is an animal, and mechanistic

biology cannot be accepted even as a working hypothesis unless it can embrace the whole of human life, physiological, psychological, esthetic, moral. If these last components of our personalities must be excluded, if our scheme breaks down at the finish, as many mechanists seem to believe, then the whole fabric crumbles. The trouble with these naïve mechanists is that they have too primitive a notion of mechanism.

We have stressed the differences between various kinds of natural mechanisms and the things that they do. These natural mechanisms are in constant flux. Our sidereal universe and everything in it are undergoing evolutionary change. These changes are orderly, not lawless or haphazard; and with every change a new pattern of mechanism appears. We naturalists do not go outside the natural cosmos in our search for the causes of the emergence of these new patterns. Metaphysicians may do as they like about this, and we have no quarrel with them. But as for us, we can deal only with phenomena of which we have experience.

We do have experience of the emergence of new patterns of mechanism and behavior. In the course of the evolution of the Mississippi River a delta appeared. This was a new thing which arose in accordance with well known laws. In the evolution of the vertebrates the cerebral cortex arose, a new pattern whose origin we are just now beginning to understand. In the evolution of the primates the associational apparatus of the cortex expanded enormously at the transition from brute to man, a pattern whose full significance we do not yet appreciate. And with the emergence of this last pattern came symbolic thinking, language, abstract ideas, moral sentiments, and all the furnishings of modern culture.

Each of these new patterns of structure

and function arose by natural process from something else already there. They were not made out of nothing. But they were really new, and the emergence of the new has nothing mystical about it. Emergent evolution is as mechanistic a process as the formation of a mountain range or the growth of a pumpkin seed. That is the way these mechanisms work. We don't know how they do it, but that they do it is an observed fact.

Now the human brain, with its marvelous mental functions of intelligence, imagination, reason, prediction of future events, and fabrication of ideals of personal character and national aspiration, is a creative agent in this process of natural emergent evolution. And it is an agency of very different kind from the geological forces at work in the growth of a river system or the physiological forces seen in the compounding and conditioning of reflexes. For each human mind can recombine the elements of experience in infinite variety of new designs. Imagination supplements knowledge and invention fabricates entirely new devices by rearranging familiar parts in original ways.

The individual person is constantly thinking new thoughts, reassembling his memories of past experience in new patterns in imagination and phantasy, inventing new ways of doing familiar things and putting old tools to new uses. Something new emerges with every excursion of a fertile mind. This novelty is the spice of life. Every act of creative imagination is an emergent, with natural antecedents and natural consequences, not the kindly gift of a beneficent brownie who lives outside of ourselves.

The climax of human creative power comes when the person forms an ideal of character which he consciously strives to attain. He may subject his body and his

mind to a rigorous course of training and in the end he acquires enlarged self-control and a personality which in some degree he has himself fabricated. He plans a career and a character and he fashions these by his own efforts by as natural a process as he employs when he designs and builds a mouse trap. When he thus consciously and purposefully participates in the shaping of his own character he may properly be said to exercise moral freedom in so far as this notion is susceptible of naturalistic treatment.²

These are all natural processes performed by natural mechanisms. The organs differ as do the functions performed. Our ideas of natural mechanisms are now enlarged to embrace all of human nature. Nothing is left over; there is no occasion for appeal to mysticism.

Now returning to the crucial problem of changing human nature, since the whole of human life and experience is a natural process, it is open to scientific study with reasonable hope of discovery of the laws of its operation and ultimately of at least some measure of control of these operations. It is, as we have said, merely a question of learning how to do it.

We already know how to do a great deal in this field. Actually human nature has changed very much during the few thousand years of which we have accurate records. Most of this change has taken place unwittingly, without deliberate intent of anybody. We can do it now much more rapidly by concerted social action in some definite direction whenever we want to.

How much of the secular change in human nature is due to stable modification of the germ plasm we do not know.

The question is not vitally important, for social control of the development of the individual personality is so easy, so effective and so stable that this is at present by far the most favorable line of attack upon the problem.

During the personal life of every one of us our own natures have changed profoundly from infancy to old age. The child is born with a given hereditary endowment which we must accept as it is. Whether good or bad it is now too late to change it. It is, however, within our power by parental training, schooling and numerous other hygienic and social agencies to determine in what kind of environment he will grow up, what kind of experience he will have, what sort of opportunities for physical, mental and moral culture are available to him.

All of these things are under social control and we can shape his development, within certain limits, as we like. Deprive him of proper food and he will grow up a rickety cripple. Deprive him of proper schools and he will be illiterate and incompetent. Instil only ideals of selfishness and self-indulgence and he will be a ne'er-do-well or a criminal. On the other hand, good education strives for the opposite results—and gets them.

These rules are not infallible, for our social controls are never perfect, and in any event there is always the variable factor of differences in innate endowment to reckon with. But this is the prime function of education—to shape the course of development of the bodies and minds of our youth, to change their inner natures by the cultivation of such desires, ambitions and ideals as are good for them.

We cannot change human nature by executive order or by enacting laws and putting the violators in jail. But we can change it by reshaping their desires, what they want and work for. This cultiva-

² In another work I have attempted a naturalistic treatment of human freedom: "Fatalism or Freedom," New York, Norton, 1926.

tion of true values is a slow process, but it can be done by proper educational and other social agencies. Adults, the same as children, do not always want what is good for them. Proper training in personal and social values is the only way to correct this.

When enough members of our civilized nations really do not want war and are willing to take the trouble to establish other machinery for the settlement of international differences, they will refuse to be stampeded into it by hysterical propaganda or infantile ideals of national aggrandizement. Wars cannot be avoided without this fundamental change in human nature, in the basic character of the people. Such changes are possible and indeed are now slowly going on in most highly cultured communities.

Changes in the hereditary structure of human nature brought about by eugenic practice are very stable. Those made in the personality by environmental (educational) measures endure only during a single lifetime. But this does not impair the efficiency of the social control, for the accumulated culture of our age is readily transmitted from generation to generation by the mechanism of social heredity, that is, by tradition and teaching. These changes too are very stable, though their persistence is brought about very differently from that of germinal heredity. Once a social convention, a taboo, or a pattern of thought or behavior is thoroughly wrought into the social life of a people its persistence is so great that practically we cannot distinguish these individually acquired traits from characteristics handed down by germinal heredity. The effect endures for better or worse. Social heredity in some cases seems to be nearly as conservative as germinal heredity.

Social control through proper educa-

tion, building up better ideals of personal character and conduct, transformation of selfish and antisocial impulses into altruistic motives, weaving these personal and social ideals into the stable fabric of our social organization, the mores of our people—these are practical enterprises, and in them lies the hope of further progress in the evolution of human nature and human society.

In conclusion, the living mechanism when viewed in its entirety is big enough and good enough to embrace the whole of human life, all of our behavior, all of our subjective experience, and our most refined spiritual values. These values are in no way degraded or impaired by the recognition that they inhere in our natural bodies and are colorful threads in the everlasting but ever changing fabric woven by the fates whom the ancients said control our destinies from Olympus but whom we now recognize as impersonations of our natural cosmos.

The finite mind can envisage only a fragment of this cosmos and it fain would complete the picture by peering beyond the visible horizon into the unknown. Now natural science can deal only with that of which we have experience and with recombinations of the elements of experience by logical processes in hypothesis. Art may recombine the elements of experience unhampered by logical conventions. Mysticism may ignore experience and people the unknown with spirits free from the limitations imposed in our natural order. Natural science has no ground for conflict with art or mysticism unless these enter its own domain and meddle with its proper duties, namely, the enlargement of experience and codifying it.

Our natural science is necessarily mechanistic because the only experiences with which it can deal are causally related and hence verifiable phenomena, and

these phenomena when adequately explored are all found to be the operations of some kind of mechanism—in the upshot various patterns of matter in motion. Now we do not yet know what matter is, nor the energy which activates it, so at present we rest our case here.

Some day science may go further in this direction. In the mean time we recall that each of the great epochs of the history of science was marked by bridging some gap in knowledge, formerly filled by myth or magic, with verifiable experience. The gap between matter and mind

has not yet been closed by satisfactory factual knowledge; accordingly mystical formulations are still current even in scientific circles. Our failure to solve this problem is probably due to lack of suitable technique. The mechanistic hypothesis here presented seems adequate to embrace all of our present experience; and it has the advantage over the mystical views that it opens the way for further scientific observation and experiment, a way forever closed to those who look to magic or the supernatural for the solution of scientific problems.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE¹

FLOYD N. HOUSE

HERE are two features of the history of social theory which may be related by more than a mere punning verbal tie, namely, the theory of social evolution and the evolution of social theories. If the two are causally interrelated, the matrix in which they are both embedded must be the fact of social change. Nothing is more certain than that the march of historical time is accompanied by continuous change in social life, a change, moreover, which is apparently always in one direction. History never repeats itself concretely and in detail, even if it be held to obey some general, cyclical law. This fact of continuous social change is a fact with which social scientists must reckon in their search for tenable generalizations.

Early conceptions of human geography had to be modified, first, to take account

of the increasing fund of geographic information, and, secondly, to give a place for the increasing power of societies to modify their environment. The earliest form of geographic knowledge was, in fact, essentially what we today call "news;" it consisted of the impressive, curious, or shocking tales which were remembered and retold from the accounts of travellers, plus a certain amount of systematized knowledge of trade routes and the like. The latter might be compared to the specialized news to be found on the inside pages of a modern newspaper—sporting news and market reports; it represented a more advanced stage in the development of knowledge. It was only with the progressive completion of the fund of information about the earth that was available to western peoples that some more systematic account, and eventually a more or less analytical treatment, of geographic data became possible.

Theories of population took shape in response to changing conditions of sub-

¹ A chapter from a forthcoming volume entitled, "The Range of Social Theory." The chapter has been slightly modified for the purpose of separate publication here.

sistence and the increasing emancipation of reflective thought concerning birth-rates from the influence of dogmatic, authoritarian theology. In fact, the study of the development of "population theory" throws light upon the development of the methods and viewpoint of natural science in the social studies generally. As long as the western world continued to be more or less static, being divided into relatively isolated "culture areas," social problems, in so far as they could be said to exist at all, could be met by the reiteration of the rules and interpretations contained in group custom and tradition. In the presence of such conditions the ordering and forbidding technique, as Thomas and Znaniecki have termed it, worked fairly well. But when the increase of commerce and communication brought divergent cultural practices and traditional rules of conduct into juxtaposition, some objective method of dealing with problems became necessary. This was really, in fact, just the way in which modern social science started. At one time in the history of the western world the question of population, if it was considered at all, was met by the iteration of the scriptural injunction, "Be fruitful and multiply," and by guarded allusions to the sin of Onan. When, however, the Industrial Revolution gave a new hope of improved standards of living to millions of people, and the commercial revolution broke down cultural isolation, the population problem and related question began to assume a new form and a new importance.

Similarly, ideas of race and nationality became systematized under the influence of the classificatory development in biology, but this phase of social theory has also been influenced in its evolution by the increasing frequency and extent of contacts

between members of different races and nationalities, and by the apparent intensification of inter-racial and international competition. Analogous instances of the relation of changes in social life to changes in social theory might be multiplied indefinitely. The theoretic conception of "assimilation" obviously could not be formed until the fact of assimilation could be observed in a large way. The development of public education, with its consequences in the shape of movement of individuals out of their "station in life," doubtless facilitated recognition of the difference between racial and cultural traits. Theoretic conceptions of community organization have had to be revised to take into account the development of modern metropolitan communities. Modern economic theory was scarcely possible until the extension of transportation and the improvement of methods of production made the elaborate subdivision of labor and the large-scale type of production possible, and extended the area of competition. It is in a changing *milieu* that the phenomena which social scientists seek to describe take place. There arises, therefore, a need of taking account of this phase of the problems in hand.

To meet the need thus created, social theorists have ventured upon various formulas intended to describe or to plot the general course of social evolution. But social theories, like everything else in this world, are apparently undergoing a continuous, irreversible change. Certain questions arise in this connection, for example, How closely is the development of social theory connected with the fact of social change? And is the quest for an abstract social science necessarily doomed in advance to failure? Must the generalizations and abstractions of social science be permanently limited by a principle of

relativity, since they must always be related to a changing reality? As a matter of fact, there has been a noticeable disposition on the part of the anthropologists to answer the last of these questions in the affirmative. No doubt the same attitude may be said to be generally characteristic of the professional historians; and something of the sort seems to be implied by the phrase "Historical School" as applied to a certain group of American anthropologists and to certain economists. Despairing of being able to establish any general truths or concepts which have any empirical value and which will not be invalidated by the continuing historical development of human society, these scholars have proposed to confine social science to the task of outlining purely historical trends or cycles, by reference to which the concrete particulars of given social happenings and situations may be made intelligible.² It may be added that "making social facts intelligible," from the historians' point of view, means showing "how they have come to be as they are," rather than accounting for them in terms of universal, timeless forces and processes.³ The latter, however, represents exactly the ambition of those who hope to see a natural science, or an abstract science, of society develop. We thus have an issue quite sharply defined, the issue as to the possibility or impossibility of achieving more and more accurate *timeless*, un-historical generalizations concerning social processes and social forces.

One way to meet the issue, if it can be met, is through the examination of the actual development, and the trend or trends of change, which the social sciences

exhibit. Obviously it would be possible to make out an indefinitely long list of developmental tendencies visible in the history—particularly the *recent* history—of the social studies. Space limitations, however, permit us only a few summary observations. In the first place, we may observe certain tendencies of change which are affecting primarily the *content* or *subject-matter* of the social studies. Some of these changes are obviously a reflection of the increase which continually takes place in the general fund of common human information. Thus for example we have noted a great increase in the bulk of concrete material handled by those interested in "human geography" and related problems, and there has been a similar accumulation of concrete studies by economists, economic historians, political scientists, and sociologists. Manifestly such an accumulation of published, more or less fully analyzed information and case material may be expected to go forward indefinitely. Other changes in the content or subject matter of the social studies reflect changes in the interests of social scientists, changes, that is, in the definition of problems, or in "methodology." These changes are in part the result of processes of development internal to the various social sciences, and in part the result of other, related sciences. August Comte, it will be recalled, pointed out that the problems of one science are the data of another, by which paradoxical statement he meant, one may infer, that the *findings* of one science, held by the devotees of that science merely as tentative results, as hypotheses to guide further research, are by the specialists of other fields accepted provisionally as information. The increasing attention paid to the study of "economic institutions" and to statistics and concrete case-records of business enter-

² Spengler, Oswald. *The Decline of the West*. Teggart, Frederick J., *Theory of History* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1925).

³ Teggart, *op. cit.*, 64-66, 74-75, 162-63, 171, 188.

prise, by contemporary economists, probably results in the main from a process of development which has gone on in the main *within* the field of economic science, due to "reflection" and experimentation by the economists themselves. On the other hand, the increasing proportion of space and time devoted to studies of personality based upon concrete case histories, and in particular upon the individuals' "own stories" taken as data susceptible of objective analysis, probably results mainly from the reaction of progress in psychology and psychiatry upon sociological methods and objectives. Certain recent tendencies in political science are possibly due in part to the same influence; this seems to be the case, for instance, with Lasswell's study of the propaganda techniques used in the World War.

Confining our inquiry now for the moment to other changes noticeable in the special field of sociology, we may note the progress of at least one other general type of changes which have, in some respects, a different significance from any that have been mentioned. Changes of this last sort are illustrated by (a) von Wiese's treatment of types of human relationships and Ross' discussion of social processes, (b) the University of Chicago studies in the "natural history" of the urban community, and (c) Durkheim's study of elementary religious phenomena. These several instances may appear to have little in common, but they are alike in this: they all tend to establish generalizations which, in the measure of their validity, appear to be independent of historical setting and change. It is developments of this last-mentioned sort that appear to indicate a movement of social science toward concepts and theories which are not in every respect subject to continuous revision because of their his-

torical relativity. Doubtless social scientists, if in their efforts they hew to the line of objectivity and empirical applicability, will in the future as in the past be compelled frequently to content themselves with generalizations of which they must say, "These are true for the conditions in which they were observed; whether they will hold in entirely different cultural situations remains to be seen."⁴ Still, we can observe in various phases of sociological thought a movement in the direction of a content which is more or less independent of historical setting. It is probable that similar tendencies could be shown to exist in economics and political science.

The form which such non-historical features of social science tend to assume, however, is that of generalizations regarding the *processes* or mechanisms by which social change is effected. Professor Teggart, who is himself very skeptical as to the possibilities of reaching generalizations in social science which will hold without reference to historical conditions and changes, has nevertheless made a very adequate statement of the scientific ideal of describing processes. Continuing a discussion in which he calls attention to the fact that social science is concerned with customs, he points out that this is in fact the avenue by which social science approaches the status held up by the natural or physical sciences as ideal, since the physicist's "natural law" is similar to a statement of custom; it is a description of the way things regularly act.

Considered more strictly, a scientific "law" is a formula, expressed in words or in symbols, describing the behavior of a selected group of phenomena; and scientific investigation is the effort to find out "how things act." The basic interest of science is in the

⁴ See *Suicide*, by Ruth Shonle Cavan (Chicago, 1928), for illustrations of this attitude on the part of a scientific investigator.

relations of things. The implication in all scientific inquiry is that things "work" or "act" with sufficient regularity to permit of this "working" being described. For convenience in discourse we may speak of these regular or customary modes of working as *processes*. Obviously it would tend to clarify thought if we were to employ the word "process," a term for the actual operation described, in place of the word "law," a term for the verbal description. . . .⁶

In support of his own critical attitude, Teggart makes a distinction between two kinds of descriptions of observed processes.

If . . . we compare the work of the different sciences, it will be found that all processes are not of one general type. Newton's law of gravitation and Darwin's theory of natural selection are alike in being descriptions of "how things work," but they do not refer to the same order of phenomena. The difference, indeed, is marked, for in experimenting with the action of falling bodies we consider data apart from any historical setting or circumstance . . . whereas, in the study of evolution, the theory of natural selection is one attempt to show how something new could have emerged in the course of time.⁸

This distinction is undoubtedly a significant one, taken with reference to its bearings upon certain problems of method. One may inquire, however, whether it is in point as a criticism of the universal validity of Darwin's theory of natural selection. Granted that Darwin conceived the theory as a solution of the problem of the emergence of "something new," the importance of that aspect of the Darwinian contribution to biological science should not be allowed to obscure the other point, that whenever a certain set of conditions, which he described, might occur, a certain *type* of result might be expected, namely, the survival of the fittest. Seen from that angle, the theory of natural selection may be so stated that it holds good quite independently of circumstances of time and place. In so far

as the Darwinian hypothesis of natural selection is a generalized description of a type of *process*, in just the sense in which Teggart has defined the term, its non-historical quality is apparent, and the fact that it will also explain how something new emerges from the interaction of existing factors is beside the point. For that matter, the "law of gravitation" may be used also to explain how something new emerges—a new topographical system, for example.

When we inquire more precisely into the rôle of the process concept in *social science*, we may observe that social theory has use for two fairly distinct types of theories of process, to explain some of the facts of social change. On the one hand, there are those theories of which the theory of natural selection is the prototype, that is, theories of societal selection, competition, conflict, accommodation, assimilation, diffusion, and the like. The general formula for theories or concepts of this type is that they explain social changes with reference to certain forms and types of social *interaction*; through the interaction of two or more given social factors—groups, individuals, attitudes, sentiments—a new social situation is created. The other type of theories of social process which are also useful for the explanation of social change is that type the foundation for which is to be found in Durkheim's discussion of "collective representations." These are, in other words, the theories which explain or describe the *process of valuation*—the process in which the members of social groups come to have certain ideas, visions, aims, purposes, or the like *in common*, and form common or collective attitudes with reference to them. The literature dealing with this type of "process" theory of social change is at present much less abundant than the literature dealing with the various proc-

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 158.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 163.

esses of interaction.⁷ It appears, however, that there is outlined here an important province for future sociological research and reflection. The theoretic problem of social valuation, in the sense in which the term is used here, is to be seen, also, as the logical and objective elaboration of the topic "social telesis," concerning which Lester F. Ward and Giddings have had so much to say, but with which they dealt, for the most part in a purely speculative or cursory fashion.⁸ Purposive or telic behavior is obviously one of the most important characteristics of the human species, both as regards the individual, and as regards the social, aspects of life. The mechanism by which purposive social action is carried out has, however, been subjected to comparatively little study. The study of social telesis, therefore, is probably just at the beginning of a new period of development, which may result in a much more objective and discriminating knowledge of the process of purposive social behavior than exists at present.

In a general discussion of the trend of development of the social sciences in its relation to the trend of social change, one tendency of recent social research deserves especial mention, namely, the development of what have been termed "background studies." The term has been developed by the department of sociology of the University of North Carolina, with particular reference to the study of the

particular cultural traits characteristic of Southern Negro, white mountaineer, and mill village groups. It is thus related primarily to a comparative and anthropological, rather than a historical, research precedent. What the use of the term in reference to the scheme of intensive and objective studies of types of culture seems to suggest, however, is an extension and refinement of the concept implied in familiar but relatively uncritical allusions to "historic backgrounds." Professor Odum of the University of North Carolina has the idea that it is necessary to have a systematic knowledge of the cultural *background* on which the social drama is played in any given society, before the more general concepts and hypotheses of social theory can be adequately applied or tested in their application to that society.⁹ This idea is a suggestive one, to say the least, and if valid, it ought apparently to have the same applicability in the task of theoretic research with materials separated in historic time, that it has in the study of coexistent but culturally heterogeneous social situations. The essential problem in either case is that of detecting and if possible measuring uniformities in the presence of differences. It is possible that professional historians and sociologists, economists, and political scientists may be able to coöperate in the future more effectively than they have done in the past, by the light of this distinction between the study of background and the study of universal forces and processes.

Some mention should be made, closing, of the relation between actual social change and the problem of the "methodology" of social science. This term has been used, to the great mystification of many readers, to refer to the technical vocabulary of a social science. The justification for the practice of calling

⁷ Undoubtedly there is social interaction in the process of collective valuation. For practical purposes of discussion, however, it has seemed desirable to use the term to characterize the first-mentioned type of process.

⁸ Ward's conception of social telesis runs through all of his general works. Giddings' recent conception of the problem is presented in a section of his *Scientific Study of Human Society* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, University of North Carolina Press, 1924), 140-170.

⁹ Outlined in a letter to the writer.

the vocabulary of a special science its "methodology" may not be discussed within the space here available. While we are dealing with the general subject of trends in social theory, however, some mention should be made of the trend of development in the terminology of the social sciences. So long as it does not prove possible to reduce the generalizations and abstractions of social theory to a mathematical form of expression, we are evidently dependent upon the technical vocabulary of the various special sciences in dealing with particular problems. There

is reason to believe that more than one capable social theorist has cherished the hope of establishing fundamental technical terms which might be valid and usable for all time to come. Since the researches of the social scientist must be carried on in a changing world, however, it is necessary to maintain contacts between the technical concepts of the specialist and the vernacular of everyday life, in which the materials to be studied are largely embodied. This is perhaps why the problem of "methodology" is, as Sumner said, "eternal."

PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

T. V. SMITH

IN a recent radio sermon a minister declared that there are three kinds of logic: inductive, deductive, and holy logic. Ethics, too, has historically been largely of the holy type. On the other extreme of course there has been also the plain barnyard variety of ethics. With counsels of perfection, on the holy side, and sheer maxims of prudence, on the workaday side, philosophical ethics has always had to come to terms. Hesitant before alternatives so sharply disjunctive, modern ethics has often resorted to the ancient wisdom: *when there is a difficulty, make a distinction*. This presentation concerns itself with some of the distinctions made and with their relations to the social sciences.

I

Idealism came to be almost undisputed master of the philosophic realm in the western world during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Certainly it had no serious competitor in America.

William T. Harris' organ, *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, initiated at St. Louis in 1867 and constituting the first exclusively metaphysical journal in the modern world, took as its motto the saying of Novalis—"Philosophy can bake no bread; but she can procure for us God, Freedom, and Immortality." If idealism could do all this, then must it; and so this philosophic discipline thought its duty undone until reality and ideality were indissolubly wedded. "The real is the spiritual," as Hegel authoritatively put it for the nineteenth century, "and the spiritual is the real." Whether reality were with the theologians conceived as personal and ethics as the will of God for men or with the philosophers more sophisticatedly conceived as an absolute system and ethics as the practical implications of the infinite,—Right, Duty, Ought were the basic concepts whereby ethics called men to live nobly *sub specie aeternitatis*. The good life consisted in the subordination of the lower to the higher; and

for the common man obedience was the beginning and the end of wisdom.

While the metaphysical moralists speculated, more or less *a priori*, the sociologists and anthropologists, stimulated by Darwin's insight, supported often by Christian funds, and protected always by robust imperialism, were learning something at first hand about simpler peoples. What they learned constituted an ethical scandal. They learned that the more primitive the people, the more categorical the moral imperatives. If you would see duty in all its sacred certainty, observe the savages: they reflect not neither do they inquire, and yet Kant in all his moral certainty was not as dutiful as one of these. Civilization appeared as a moral disintegrative: it seemed to dissolve dogmatism, beget incertitude, and flower into sinful toleration.

Sumner made much of this motif available and intelligible in his *Folkways*. In the light of his collected data it was easy to see, almost impossible not to see, that conscience was the husky voice of hoary custom instead of the voice of reason intelligently guiding conduct. Philosophers might have been spared the pain of taking this lesson from scientists had they used their long-standing opportunity to see that the moral implication of Descartes' famous *dubito ergo sum* is that he who doubts not is fossilized already. Mankind itself might have already learned the lesson from democracy had not modern democracy been in large part a political disguise for ethical authoritarianism.

Sumner's work in America was paralleled in England by Westermarck's masterly book, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*. Westermarck saw that back of custom lay not reason, as the lawyers of the common law assumed, but impulse, emotion. Action proceeds from the inner urgency called desire; and ways

of acting that satisfy desire of somebody at some time get, through devices that need not be here delineated, empowered with the sacrosanct pretension to satisfy all desire at all times. Forgetting their humble origin, they acquire such authority as to condemn as wrong whatever desires they do not satisfy. Early education serves as the tool through which external authority gets internalized as conscience; and the effective means of satisfying the desire of favored classes functions to frustrate the desire of the underprivileged masses. Established interests operating through the elders indoctrinate the young with conscience to shame indigenous aspirations with the cry of sin. Westermarck's genealogy of all moral ideas in terms of emotion made accessible and more acceptable Hume's fearsome belief that reason is and ought to be the slave of passion.

Once this matter had been authoritatively brought to the fore, it was found possible to get the backing of a substantial tradition. Hume had not been alone in giving man's emotional nature an honored place in moral theory. Indeed there culminated in the ethical utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill a long line of philosophic insight reaching all the way back to Epicurus, if not indeed to Socrates, which had taught that pleasure or happiness or some other affective experience is at the bottom of the whole moral life. English theory during the eighteenth century had been especially strong in emphasizing the rôle of sympathy in morality. Mill managed to separate from theological encumbrances the emphasis upon sympathy and to ally with it the older Greek and Roman emphasis upon pleasure, making thus a secular ethics that found its basic good in individual satisfaction but that was also sensitive to the need of socializing this good by wise

education and humane political and economic institutions. There was thus provided through his insight a possible means of internalizing the "external sanctions" of Bentham, and conscience sworn by Mill to pleasure could become the guardian of interests-on-the-grow rather than of vested interests. This compatibility of utilitarianism with social fluidity is clearly seen in the influence of the utilitarians upon prison reform, suffrage, jurisprudence. All this tradition could be revived from the idealistic inundation released by Hegel, Bradley, Green and others, when once the prestige of emotional experience was re-established by anthropologists and sociologists and psychologists upon empirical ground. A rich legacy it was, once uncovered and brightened up from its desuetude.

There was, however, something lacking in the tradition. Idealism had insight that utilitarianism needed. Sociology had contributions to make to it. In spite of Mill's heroic efforts to socialize it, hedonism remained more atomistic and individualistic than the twentieth century could accept. Scientific insight had established Aristotle's famous dictum on stronger grounds than that of Aristotle's *ipse dixit*. In discrediting conscience as the voice of eternal reason, social scientists had discovered that men are naturally so social that they can take over from a group in the form of conscience what will actually inhibit their own desires. The idealists had on philosophic grounds made so emphatic the organic theory of the state that no one could with clear mind revert to the contractual notion or to its ethical equivalent, stark individualism. Meantime the developing sociological jurisprudence was reversing Maine's famous law of legal process and was insisting through Roscoe Pound and others that progress is from contract to relations.

Before utilitarianism could be acceptable to contemporary ethicists it needed in some adequate measure to assimilate these proffered contributions. It had done well as far as it had gone: it substituted intelligence for conscience; it substituted satisfaction for duty; it substituted a hedonic calculus for the categorical imperative. What was needed was not some artificial combination of duty and pleasure. What was needed was a new logic that would explain reason as ordinary intelligence and intelligence as in some convincing sense a function of man's emotional life.

II

Twenty years ago Professor Tufts began the joint *Ethics* which he and Dewey wrote, by emphasizing the necessity of the genetic method in ethical investigations if ethics were to relate itself to the social sciences and to life. Dewey ended the joint enterprise by giving a radical reinterpretation of reason itself and its function in the moral life: the reasonable act becomes the generous act. The precise method whereby this needed rapprochement of idealism and utilitarianism was made, whereby the ethics of the stars—right, duty—and the ethics of the dust—good, pleasure—came to terms, may be conceived destructively or constructively, depending upon the point of view. Seen from the fixed stars, one may view the process with alarm; from the ground, one may point to it with pride. Let us oscillate in the narrative so as at last to make the story one rather than two. Looked at from above, the picture is dramatic: personifications shrink to ideals, and ideals to ideas, and ideas shake hands with humble wants.

The philosophic clue to the process of radical demolition lies in the historic discovery that such concepts as reality are not descriptive but honorific terms.

Plato long ago gathered all reality into his Ideas; and when his attention was called by Parmenides, the logician, to the fact that he, in all consistency, must have at least one ideal Mud to complete his scheme, Plato quickly repudiated the existence of any such scandalous Idea. He had skimmed the cream from life, like the aristocrat that he was, and then denied reality to anything but the cream. The ethical motivation here is unmistakable. After sufficient repetition of Plato's rationalization, it became possible for even laymen to see that philosophers mean by reality what they wish were actual rather than what they find to be so. And this once clearly seen, explanation of such a persistent ethical stereotype as had intrigued great minds from Plato to Hegel was in order. No other field for explanation exists for the scientific mind than the struggle of existence out of which have come all human phenomena.

Historically man's life has been a dreary story of lacks, of pressing wants, of unsatisfied desires. Now, the basic trait of the human animal is that given a lack, he supplies it with a fancy. If emotional satisfaction is denied, the object or experience that would satisfy arises as an idea: hungry, one dreams of food; socially isolated under the pressure of glandular growth, one conjures up in imagination Ideal Maidens or Prince Charmings; pinched by penury, one fabricates scenes of golden grandeur. That man acts thus is a commonplace; but it is perhaps not quite such a commonplace to say that all our sciences and 'ologies are but the several deposits made at successive levels by the human imagination in its restless flight from nagging want.

What the various human disciplines most needed for their unification was the centralizing of imagination so as through its dynamic nature to make continuous all

manifestations of intelligence from blind impulse to abstract reason. The functional psychology grafted on evolutionary biology began this process and the Freudian psychology and behaviorism have helped it along. This is not the place to essay the story; but when the insight of Darwin had been fairly exploited in psychology and logic, it was seen that ideas arise out of lack and keep endeavor alive until the want can end in satisfaction. If the lack persists, the idea of what would satisfy becomes encrusted and acquires the dignity of an ideal. If the want grows chronic, the ideal gets hypostatized into glorious thinghood, and a realm of absolute values arises to arrogate to itself alone the virtue of reality.

The same psychological mechanism that objectifies ideas into objects satisfactory to thwarted desire can, and under sufficient provocation does, personify these ideals, since at bottom the whole human ideational process is social. Earlier men set a god as a personified guard for every value; but integrated social organization upon earth was reflected in heavenly efficiency, and one God eventually arose (personified out of the good) to guard and guarantee all the goods that men wanted but could not assuredly get. And so finally out of the persistence of human lacks, imagination rears from humble beginnings a city not made by hands, set eternally in the heavens, whose builder and maker is God. Ideas under humanly unfavorable conditions become ideals and ideals under still more generalized distress become spiritual institutions. Cults arise to keep desire alive through indefinitely prolonged absence of satisfaction.

The principle upon which the division of labor is consummated as regards the various disciplines is that of the degree of separation between desire and its satis-

faction. Psychology and logic deal with ideas, the imaginative counterparts of readily satisfiable desires; ethics has historically dealt with ideals, those imaginative artifacts whose availability as satisfactions was more remote and precarious. Christian theology has traditionally preoccupied itself with values so inaccessible as satisfactions that, despairing of any mundane success, men turned to faith in some cataclysmic process to bridge the otherwise impassable gulf between desire and fruition. Through various degrees of delayed satisfaction, then, it became the part of good men to keep holy the faith that good men would at last get the goods. There has historically been no faith harder to keep than this. There is human poignancy in the confession of the Hebrew psalmist that when he saw the prosperity of the wicked, his feet almost slipped.

The persistence of transcendental religion into a scientific, technological, and prosperous age has made the faith harder for modern men than for the psalmist. For devoted to an orthodox tradition that located elsewhere the prime source of blessings they have slowly opened their eyes to a plethora of economic goods made easily available to others—and if to others, why not to them?—by purely secular processes. To pray for blessings that come independently of prayer, thank God for higher wages empirically traceable to the labor union, these responses seem at best slightly inappropriate to the situation—even worse than inappropriate if while the pious pray horny-handed sinners make away with the goods. Capitalism presents Puritanism at last with the perturbing question: is it not after all only men who know not what to trust that trust they know not what? With this question fully understood by modern men, good tends every-

where to shed its capital letter, ideals become again ideas of delayed satisfaction and ideas become media through which satisfaction can take the place of delay.

The upshot of this greatly simplified metamorphosis is that the ideal ethics becomes an ethics without ideals. It is immediate satisfactions that men want, not ideals as vicarious counterparts of dissatisfaction. Let us be clear, however, that nothing invidious is meant in this comparison of the value disciplines. It was as natural and inevitable that theologies would arise when wants exceeded supplies on a large scale as that the balancing of supplies and wants would usher in the *Götterdämmerung*. It was as natural and inevitable and desirable that men should have lofty ideals when they could not have anything better as that ideals should be forgotten when goods grew plentiful. If prosperity causes men to forget the gods, as their prophets have always complained, it is hard on the gods, though not necessarily so on the men. It is to natural science, pure and applied, as the instrument through which the slack between needs and goods was taken up—in so far as this has happened for common men—that we owe the downfall of transcendental theology and categorical ethics. It is to the social sciences that we must look for the building out of what natural sciences and technology have given us of an assured life for humanity on earth. Contemporary philosophical ethics knows no goal but the commonsense one of a satisfying life for every man. And it has no instrument save intelligence as used in the various sciences.

III

That this wholesale surrender of ethics to positivism is bringing and will bring heartburnings to many is indisputable. The achievement has not been made with-

out many backward glances by ethicists themselves. Living idealists, like George P. Adams in his *Idealism and the Modern Age*, still argue that though values rise from the level of impulses and wants, yet they represent, as he puts it, certain significant and objective structures. Genesis may explain but it does not explain away, does not exhaust the wealth of values. In mood more bold Adams at times thinks of values as not merely floating free from their impulsive genesis but as having somehow floated down from some other realm to crown our affective strivings. This distinction between genesis and value represents in general the method used by critical idealists in their attempt to come to terms with the modern age.

But as realisms of various kinds and pragmatisms of thirteen varieties have arisen at the expense of idealism, the naturalistic account of both the genesis and the nature of values has won the day. With its victory, all general rules, all moral concepts, all categorical imperatives have had to content themselves, along with other less honorific concepts, with an instrumental value. They call attention to how somebody has looked at something sometime; and since nothing human is alien to us, they counsel us to take into our consideration as more or less relevant all the factors to which rules and principles point. But the more or less is our concern, ours the judgment and the responsibility. As Dewey conceives the matter, all this conceptual moral machinery is but a tool for analyzing our situations so that we may react to all factors. In his latest book, *The Public and its Problems*, he identifies the rise of the community and the function of the state with the prevision and control of remote and communal consequences. The genuine life of morality, speculative and

applied, looks thus not back to principles but forward to consequences. It is not by its roots but by its fruits that man identifies the tree of good and evil. To react to all the elements of a situation and to count into the situation what it will become for future action by virtue of the proposed reaction, this is to act intelligently; and to act intelligently is to act morally. To have the kind of habit-system that analyzes situations before action, sees all the elements involved, foresees the consequences that are most likely to follow various alternatives of action,—this is to be a moral character. Scientific insight into causal sequences so as to previse consequences and a sympathetic nature that sensitizes one to the wants of others as factors in the foreseen consequences,—these two virtues constitute the newer morality. The good life of popular parlance is, then, as Bertrand Russell describes it, a life "inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

But stands the individual strictly alone in this judging of the situation? Is there no insurance against the lure of the immediate and the lure of the selfish? Shall not the pure in heart still see God? In short, has modern ethics *no* objective standards to reduce the hazards of interest-judgments? And as a consequence are the humanistic disciplines reduced to the precarious, not to say capricious, level assigned them by Hobson in his *Fru Thought in the Social Sciences*?

IV

There remains indeed a certain moral objectivity, but its nature is easily misunderstood. All moral judgments are functions of interest; but interests, though variegated, are not perforce socially anarchic. Initiated by interests that are loosely classifiable in spite of individual

differences, moral judgments may eventuate as habits or even as customs that have much of the inflexibility craved by those who demand metaphysical objectivity. How objective habits are one can indeed see if he attempts to change folkways. Let one attack monogamy or business enterprise or patriotism. Let any reformer with high-powered hopes for moral betterment try to supplant one of these accepted values with his own home-brewed variety, and he will learn what it means to skid upon the habits of his contemporaries. No profounder statement for the moralist was ever made than Jefferson's observation that "all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed," unless perchance it be the similar statement from Mr. Justice Holmes that historical continuity with the past is not a virtue, but just a necessity. This is to say, that the change that happens to an impulse of one person when it gets established as a general habit and matures to be a custom is so great and so much in the direction of permanency that no other meaning than this is needed for the notion of objectivity except by the very tender-minded. Why should we import a transcendental species of objectivity when such a durable variety grows up indigenously from our own reeking soil? That this type of objectivity is very real can be seen not only by contrasting one's desires with the habits of others but even more intimately still by noting the dualism in one's own self. "Bad" habits are so objective as to frustrate one's own subjective, ideal values. The same objectivity is acquired by good habits, of course, were there any motivation for remarking the fact.

But habit does not—blessed be the thought!—constitute irrevocable objec-

tivity. Since it can grow from sheer subjectivity, there remains hope for change. The whole process may now be explicitly summarized and applied to the social sciences. We start life with the complex of inner urgencies called in the large, desire; in the small, wants. When satisfaction is at hand, there is no news—life moves easily forward upon the animal level. Ideas arise when satisfaction is not at hand, and become values, ideals, if satisfaction is long delayed. Here there is news, human news; and if the delay in satisfaction becomes chronic, there will be, as William James liked to exclaim, there will be news in heaven! Objectifying of the subjective is not a process, then, of metaphysical discovery of the pre-existing, but a process of psychological projection and of social persuasion.

The first level of value fixation is best represented, though not exhausted, by the economic. Economic goods are objective values wherever there is no slack between the sensory and the motor systems. All subsequent levels represent devices for re-instating the first level. The second level is represented by sociology and counts as values the social machinery envisaged as necessary for objectifying the values of the few so as to make them available for the many. The third level is represented by politics and counts as values the achieved or projected generalized organs of peace and order and security necessary for the production and distribution of economic goods. Theology may as a modest humanitarianism get dissipated into these foregoing levels emotionalized or it may remain a fourth level, a hypostatized realm in which, to use Shailer Mathews' phrase, "transcendentalized politics" operates through faith to make objective the first level of economic goods—to get through God the goods for the good. Aesthetics repre-

sents still another level on which we achieve objectification of values to satisfy autonomic or other vague yearning. Ethics, when it rises above the naïve level where commonsense connects it with sexual dissatisfaction, has no realm of its own; but commemorates (at its lowest) the realization of value on any of the levels or marks (at its highest) the integration of the various social sciences as means of realizing for all, here and now, the basic immediate goods.

Whatever the complicated process through which the idea of one or of a few grows by acceptance of many into a code which all must in action consider, it is the process whereby value becomes objective. There is, then, such a thing as the objectivity of value; but it belongs in the category of constructs humanly achieved rather than of metaphysical entities esoterically given. Values are then in fact at once too much and too little objective. As habits they are too much

objective, as hopes too little. This unstable relativity makes it hard on indolence; for one must be forever on the jump to keep objective the values that he approves and subjective the values he disapproves. The struggle of interests with all the paraphernalia of propaganda goes on as merrily in morality as anywhere else. And vested interests have the advantage here as everywhere. Kantian ethics and all ethics that emphasize the notions of Oughtness and Duty by mistaking past achievements for metaphysical irrevocables are socially conserving agencies that discourage progress. It is equally clear that Utilitarian ethics and all ethics that emphasize the notions of Goodness and Interest are destructive of the old in the interest of the new. The one ethics eventuates as a social philosophy glorifying order and security, the other as a social philosophy glorifying freedom and progress. The one prays for peace, the other glories in growth.

THE LOGICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

GLADYS MURPHY GRAHAM

THE social sciences at the present time seem definitely and seriously concentrating on the task of giving reality to their questionable designation as sciences. One hears it on all sides. Scientific method is the goal in the campaign and the watchword is objectivity. It was President Glenn Frank, of the University of Wisconsin, who pointed out the need of the country as "a League to enforce objectivity" among the social sciences, and the social sciences appear ready to join without reservations. Research committees have been appointed in practically all the varying fields; con-

ferences held. Serious attempt is being made to deal with materials dispassionately.

It seems, then, that the spirit is now willing, but it must be remembered that objectivity in research, while vitally prerequisite, is not the end and aim in the matter.¹ This is, of course, a well-known

¹ W. S. Carpenter, writing with special reference to political science, says, "The first step in political science must be to place it on a basis of fact; its theories must be grounded on objective evidence. But this is necessarily only the beginning in any science. The collection and arrangement of facts must lead to the formulation of principles, if politics

fact but one at times overlooked in the exuberance of a newly discovered objective attitude. The research man can become so interested in unemotionally observing and collecting facts and figures as to forget that indiscriminate accumulation has small value and that from facts valid inferences must be drawn.² Scientific spirit is unbiased objectivity, a fine and basic thing but not to be confused with method; scientific method is the concrete technique governing the selection, use, and interpretation of materials. The spirit is here in ideal at least; the task is to formulate—or discover and apply—precise and accurate methods. There must be law in the "League to enforce objectivity."

So much is evident. But to attempt to get below simple desire to actual technique in relation to complex, largely non-repeatable materials of a type which cannot be taken into the laboratory for investigation—this is no easy task. It has been variously approached, notably through the conference method brought to a serious and interesting concrete focus in the National Conference on the Science

is not to be a mere matter of accident or chance." ("Methods of Political Reasoning," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, p. 214.)

³ The deluge of questionnaires is a case in point. In many instances the whole matter is considered closed when the secured responses, regardless of number, distribution, etc., are tabulated—nothing more. Not without reason does one writer speak of the questionnaire as "a high-sounding travesty of scientific research."

From John Dewey comes the statement: "We forget that facts are only data; that is, are only fragmentary, incomplete means, and unless they are rounded out into complete ideas—a work which can only be done by hypotheses, by a free imagination of intellectual possibilities—they are as helpless as are all maimed things and as repellent as are needlessly thwarted ones." ("The Rôle of Philosophy in the History of Civilization," *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 1-9).

of Politics held at the University of Wisconsin during each September for the years 1923-1925 inclusive and reported each succeeding February in the *American Political Science Review*.

The purpose of the conferences as set down by Dr. A. B. Hall, father of the movement, was "to unite those interested in political research in a common attack on the problems of technique and method."³ "Obviously," he writes, "there can be no real science of politics until we have developed a fact-finding technique that will produce an adequate basis for sound generalization. This raises problems of method and technique, both in finding the facts and in drawing conclusions."⁴ The organization for the "common attack" involved the formation of eight roundtables, each one dealing with a specific subject in political science, e.g., Roundtable on Public Law, Round-table on International Organization, Roundtable on Political Parties, Round-table on Regional Planning, etc. Each member of the conference attended one roundtable, naturally the one on the subject which constituted his "field."

The reports make interesting reading but the further one goes in them the more clearly one sees a danger involved in the very type of approach. It is one which Professor Potter, leader of the Round-table on International Organization, formulates in his "General Review of Nature and Work of the Roundtable."⁵ Despite the theory of methodological aim there is an overshadowing likelihood of the submergence of the question of method in that of specific material. Several of

³ *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XX, No. 1, p. 124. Cf. also the *Journal of Social Forces*, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 373.

⁴ *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, p. 120.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. XX, No. 1, pp. 168-170.

the roundtables discussed the same political problem throughout the sessions of the conferences continuing it from year to year. In view of certain of the reports there would seem to be reason for Mr. Potter's calling attention to the fact that "the attainment of results in terms of answers to any of the substantive questions discussed in conference is a false goal, quite beside the point, and possibly inimical to the true purpose of the conference." Method is easy to lose in a known and intensely interesting subject matter.

Indeed, at its best, what is such a procedural technique of search for methods likely to yield? Objectively, what has it yielded in Mr. Potter's own roundtable where certainly, one may assume, the central problem was kept clearly to the fore? These two things were reported from the last of the three conferences: types of materials useful in the investigation of specific problems were listed, and suggestions of possible correlations *which should be investigated* were set down.⁶ Certainly these are of value but as far as precise method is concerned it is as if, in the natural sciences, it were prescribed for the bacteriologist "germs of various types may be examined and *it would be well to discover* if any of them cause infantile paralysis." Valuable suggestion of a problem on which to use method, but not method; definitely a pre-method stage. Following a formulation of problems to which methods should be applied, the question arises—what methods? How use materials to find and test correlations? And one is back at the starting point again.

⁶ Cf. reports on "Development of Nineteenth Century Commerce and Consular Service" and "Trading Consuls, Native Consuls, Career Consuls," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XX, No. 1, pp. 165-166.

There is no room for reasonable doubt that the National Conference on the Science of Politics has been of value. It pioneered in its field and it accomplished something, probably a considerable amount in relation to objective approach and the first requirement of which Dr. Hall spoke, "finding the facts;" little or nothing in regard to the important "method and technique . . . in drawing conclusions." One thing it has seemed clearly to demonstrate—that if its type of approach is the necessary one for securing a formulated method for the social sciences, then at best they are doomed to a long and groping forty years in the wilderness. Necessarily so, for it is admittedly the trial and error method; it is the approach of the pre-discovery of law period of any endeavor. Out of it one hopes there will somehow emerge formulated method which, in a later period with real possibilities of advance, may be applied. If it is true that there is no applicable technique already formulated, then the social sciences do stand at the beginning of that preliminary stage. It is possible, however, that there may be certain methods already set down and capable of translation and application. If this should be the case, the goal of method for the social sciences would not be reached—but the road to it would be materially shortened.⁷

⁷ In commenting on the previously noted organization of the conference on method—into roundtables according to political science subject matter—Dr. Hall notes that it was based on the realization that questions of method could be dealt with only in connection with some specific project of research (Cf. *Journal of Social Forces*, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 373). This is probably true; abstract method, alone, is not the thing needed in the social sciences, yet it is at the other extreme to go at the problem, en masse, through specific research projects, without any pre-realization of possibilities. If there could be a foreknowledge of potentially applicable methods to give direction to

The natural sciences have long had their scientific methods of procedure formally set down. Because by long acquaintance and use they have become a very normal, taken-for-granted, almost subconscious sort of thing, their repository, while they remain in abstract form, is not frequently considered. Even when thought of as a whole they are simply known as *scientific method*, rarely as, what they none-the-less very definitely are, a type or types of logic. This is perfectly well known—when it is recalled. A large part of the inductive portion of texts on logic is known as *scientific method*; the most familiar of all the laboratory methods of the physical sciences are "Mill's Canons" concerned with the causal search and they are a vital part of his *Logic*.

Thus, in logic, are methods which set down the procedural norm of the laboratory sciences. Because it has been so frequently said, it need hardly be repeated that these methods are largely inapplicable, in their present form at least,⁸ to the material with which the social sciences must deal. But here is the point: they are logic but by no means all of logic. It is for this reason we use the

conference work, if a certain amount of conference time could be spent in critical translation and application of abstract method—then, it would seem, the road to the goal would be materially shortened.

⁸ The relation of the laboratory or experimental method to certain problems of sociology is interestingly brought out in Hart's "Science and Sociology." (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 364-383) Instances are given of errors directly traceable to non-observation of the recognized canons of logic, the application of which is practically second nature to the natural scientist. With social phenomena, however, direct laboratory experiment must be replaced. The laws governing the causal search experimentally made still hold, but they require adaptation. The social scientist interested in such adaptation will find of great value the work of H. W. B. Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*.

plural of the term in the title. Mill's Canons along with orthodox deduction by no means exhaust the field. It would seem at least possible, then, that in some other part of it, perhaps in some of the "new logics" which have sprung up and developed in the same years that have seen the rapid growth of the social sciences, there may be other formulated methods which, could they be brought over, would be of tremendous value.

But, the question immediately arises, if this were the case, wouldn't the social scientist know about it, wouldn't he long since have made use of such material? Not necessarily. The fact that this line of approach has not been genuinely investigated, that it has, in general, been dismissed as unproductive without consideration, is due to two things: first, and basically, particularly in the case of the political scientist, a mistaken identification of a part with the whole in logic, a peculiar twist of reasoning which has closed the door upon knowledge of later developments; and, second, the particularization of philosophical terminology which has seemed to remove philosophy, and logic, tangled with metaphysics, along with it, very far from the social sciences. Since these are the barriers to consideration of what could at least conceivably be a storehouse of methods, it may be of value to consider them a moment.

Logic as such is far from general favor at the present time. Tracing this unpopularity back, one finds that it arose in a wave to counter and oppose the rigid intellectualism of the eighteenth century. It is well-known that political, legal, practically all types of thought, passed through a period of strict, mechanical application of generalizations which were simply excogitated theories uninfluenced by concrete facts. It was the period of

legal abstractions, of "the man *in vacuo*." The method of reasoning was basically and uncompromisingly deductive⁹ and the evils of rigid application of set and abstract rules were manifold. The trouble arose from the overuse of the syllogism in a logic of rigid demonstration working from unscientific premises. Against it there broke, and rightly, a storm of opposition.

It was vital that such an uncritical use of a single type of reasoning should be opposed. But the interesting thing that has happened is this: in concentrating on the part opposed in logic there has unconsciously come to be in many quarters a complete identification of it with logic. This has been aided by the fact that induction can easily lose its logic relation in the term scientific method and that, in accordance with orthodoxy, only induction and the traditional deduction are taught in any but advanced courses in philosophy departments. There has been slight attempt from the field of philosophy to counteract in the popular mind the tendency to identify a static part opposed with a constantly developing whole. Gradually the terms *syllogism* and *logic* have come to be used interchangeably by many in the social science field and justifiable opposition to overuse of a part has subtly come to involve a preconception of uselessness in relation to the whole.

Professor Dewey shows this interchangeable use of the terms in his work on "Logical Method and Law"¹⁰ and their identification as the basis of the strictures upon logic of Mr. Justice Holmes. The matter is brought to a

focus in the statement of Justice Holmes: "The actual life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the times, the prevalent moral and political theories . . . have had a great deal more to do than the *syllogism* in determining the rules by which men should be governed."¹¹ Professor Dewey adds, what must be obvious, "In other words, Justice Holmes is thinking of logic as equivalent with the *syllogism*."¹²

Many an illustration could be cited. To give but one, from the field of political science: in a recently published work one of the leaders in the field writes, "There is such a thing as being *too logical* in politics." He goes on to illustrate through the working of the mind of the reformer in regard to use of civil service in the choice of public officials. The thing objected to in the reformer is this: "So he argues that *all* appointive offices ought to be filled in this way. . . . It rarely if ever occurs to him that an insistence upon the choice of *all* administrative officials by formal, competitive tests ought to be modified by a sense of the practical . . . to press the point thus far [to apply to all] is to give a typical example of the reformer's *bondage to principle*." This as an illustration of being "too logical" in politics. Unquestionably the reformer under discussion is wrong but his error is in the unjustifiable over-use of the deductive method; he has insisted on a cover-all generalization and its mechanical application. The point established is not that "there is such a thing as being too logical in politics" but too syllogistic—which is a very different proposition.¹³

⁹ In relation to the law, Dean Roscoe Pound deals with the persistence of the deductive method. Cf. *The Spirit of the Common Law*, particularly pp. 155-156.

¹⁰ *Cornell Law Quarterly*, Vol. X, No. 1.

¹¹ Holmes, O. W., *The Common Law*, p. 1. Here and below italics are mine.

¹² For several weeks it was the writer's privilege to be a silent witness at daily and bi-daily conferences of a group of political scientists. It was in-

Professor Dewey adds to his statement that Justice Holmes "is thinking of logic as equivalent with the syllogism," "as he is quite entitled to do in accordance with the orthodox tradition." It is true that it is not unnatural that this identification should take place—but also true that its assumption is increasingly false. While a preconception of uselessness of all of a field because of proof of overuse of a part has set up an obscuring barrier, much has been going on behind the line of visibility.¹³ Many new logics have been

formulated until Professor Johnson could write in his recent work, even of the deductive field: "Having restricted my technical treatment of the syllogism to a single chapter [in his three volume work on logic] it will be easily inferred that I attach considerable importance to this form of inference, while at the same time I hold it to be only one among many other equally important forms of demonstrative deduction."¹⁴

So much for the first limiting cause of non-investigation of the possibilities of logic. As has been said, it is most notable and widespread in the political science field. Perhaps because of the infancy of sociology in the period of rigid deduction, one finds a little different situation there, a little less of preconceived hostility. At least, according to Professor House, there is not uniform opposition. He writes of the situation: "There appears to be considerable difference of opinion concerning the relation of what is ordinarily called 'logic' to sociology."¹⁵ Despite a following statement that "many sociologists do not appear to feel that there is any relation between the two subjects to which the sociologists need pay particular attention," from Mr. House's own conclusions and from those one finds on running through the items listed in his bibliography, as well as other sociological works, it seems evident that logic—at least something called by that name—is looked upon by many in the field without antagonism and by some as a thing of considerable value.¹⁶ Of par-

¹³ Johnson, E. W., *Logic*, Part II, p. 102.

¹⁴ House, Floyd N., *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, p. 272.

¹⁵ Cf. particularly Hart, H., *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 364-383, and Malgaud, W., "Le rôle de la logique dans la sociologie," *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie* (Solvay Bulletin) IV, 1, 183-204. Malgaud's discussion, dealing in part with Durkheim's theory of observation as all

teresting to note that again and again, in conference and in private conversation, the phrases flew: "too logical" or "where logic takes us"—and in every case the reference was in fact to too rigid deduction, to the use of the syllogism where another method of reasoning was needed. An amazing collection of specimens was amassed. It is a peculiar blind spot, and a most limiting one.

¹³ Noting only a few works of potential value: an outstanding contribution, already referred to, has been made by Professor Joseph in tempering the work of Mill to form an available guide in the non-experimental sciences. (Joseph, H. W. B., *An Introduction to Logic*) He has shown the unity of the well-known "methods" and stressed the all-important matter of scientifically determining the non-causal in a group of potentially determining factors—exactly the thing which Dr. Hall examples as the dominant need in political science as he states: "We do not know how to isolate the variable from the constant factors in a given situation." (*Journal of Social Forces*, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 374) As the formulation of a long wished-for method of reasoning through a complex situation to an implied future development, there is Bosanquet's "Logic of System." (Bosanquet, Bernard, *Implication and Linear Inference*; cf. also his *Logic*) The method is an alternate to the linear inference long opposed; it gives a scientific basis for the "developmental," the "historical" approach so frequently referred to in the literature of the social sciences. Attention is also called to Keynes' work on probability (Keynes, J. M., *A Treatise on Probability*) and to later brief discussions of the subject (e.g., Nisbet, R. H., *Mind*, Vol. XXXV, No. 137). It is no absolutistic logic that one finds there. See also Professor John Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic* for most valuable material.

ticular interest is the fact that "Logic of the Social Sciences" has since 1922 been a sub-heading in the classification of notes and abstracts of articles in the *American Journal of Sociology*.¹⁷ The term is not, then, in general disgrace in the profession.

But what of the "Logic of" as admitted to the field? Mr. House notes that four years after the category was inserted, "so far as is known to the writer no attempt to define or describe the field to be designated by this topic has been published in the English language."¹⁸ Mr. House refers to "logic as a special discipline," or "what is ordinarily called logic," i.e., the actual science, and holds that it would be possible to list most of the recent text books and treatises on logic as such in the bibliography covering "Logic of the Social Sciences." In fact, he lists but three such books and, in the last analysis, omission comes nearer the right of the matter than inclusion for the fact is there is as yet in a condition to be christened practically nothing which may be properly called "Logic of the Social Sciences." The designation is the substance of things hoped for; also, examination of materials listed will indicate, largely the evidence of things not seen.¹⁹ It is the statement of union

that is required or desired in scientific research, is well worth the attention of the social scientist.

¹⁷ This caption is first found in the "Tentative Scheme for the Classification of the Literature of Sociology and the Social Sciences" in the issue of September, 1922 (Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, p. 244) and has been included in it ever since.

¹⁸ House, *loc. cit.* p. 271.

¹⁹ The general character and the listings of divisions IX and X of the "Tentative Scheme" ("Methods of investigation" and "general sociology" and "Methodology of the social sciences"), particularly of X,2 ("Logic of the social sciences"), will bear careful and critical investigation. Between divisions IX and the second part of bifurcated general heading X there seems to be at times a confused haziness as to boundary lines; X,2 tends to become confusion

of two related fields not yet genuinely united.²⁰ For the title of this discussion the attempt was made to remain within the bounds of the actually existing. It is "logic as a special discipline" on the one side, with much to contribute—sociology on the other, not yet having adapted the logic to itself. The liaison word is only an *and*. Where works on logic should be listed is under some such caption as "Source Materials for Method in the Social Sciences."²¹ "Logic as a special

rather definitely confounded. Certainly there is very far from strictness of classification when articles on straight psychology—see the May, 1928, issue of the *Journal* for obvious examples—are listed under "Logic of the social sciences." It is impossible to go into detailed analysis here; it is suggested that such analysis is needed.

It is indicative that in a recent article (*Social Forces*, Vol. V, No. 3, pp. 413-422) where the *American Journal of Sociology* scheme of classification was said to be followed, division X was cut to "General sociology" without mention of methodology and 2 was then listed under it interchangeably as "Logic" and "Logic of the social sciences" without apparent realization of change of meaning or potential content. And yet—strict definition of terms, exact classification and definition of boundary lines are among the vital prerequisites of scientific development.

²⁰ W. M. Kozlowski's recent article on "The Logic of Sociology" (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 6, pp. 912-921) is of distinct interest and value. Its treatment, however, is of the place and aim of sociology rather than of its method, of logic as theory of knowledge.

²¹ One of the most promising projects of the Social Science Research Council is that for a *Journal of Social Science Abstracts*. Advisory committees "in the fields of cultural anthropology, economics, history, human geography, political science, sociology, and statistics" have been appointed with a part of their function "to draw up a scheme of classification adequate to the needs of the systematic grouping of materials from their respective fields of specialization within the social sciences. (*Social Forces*, Vol. VI, No. 4, pp. 589). It will be noted that neither philosophy in general nor logic are mentioned in the listing—it is John Dewey who predicts that "As long as we worship science and

discipline," the new with the old, is vital potential material for the sciences seeking method; a real "Logic of the Social Sciences" will be the result of its selective application.

But separating sociology from this goal is not only a vagueness of realization of the meaning of the terms but also the second of the two general reasons cited for non-consideration of the whole field of the newer logics. The general charge, rather frequently made by sociologists though by no means restricted to them, is that logic is too far removed by its terminology and its relation to one metaphysical theory or another to be available. These criticisms often take the place of the "Logic = Syllogism ∴ useless" attitude. Professor Carpenter, for example, does not discuss logic on the basis of criticism of a part; he does contend: ". . . the student of the social sciences has had to part company with the philosopher because of the propensity of the latter to indulge in a terminology which cannot be widely understood. The truths of the social sciences must be stated in language which the layman can understand. . . . Since the time of Immanuel Kant philosophy has been occupied with the elaboration of its own peculiar terminology. . . ."²² This is undeniably true of philosophy—but not peculiar to it. There has been a constant development of compartmentalism throughout the branches of knowledge;

barriers of particularization in terminology have been set up by practically all, by economics, certainly by psychology. Of these as well as general philosophy and logic it can be said that they "have not been ordered with a view to his [the social scientist's] needs" and yet, when it is seen that they have something to contribute, the great tendency of the present is to translate their material and use it. Dr. Hall urges breaking down departmental barriers; Professor Merriam suggests for political science that it "sit around the table with psychology and statistics and biology . . . etc."²³ while Professor Potter presents a method of attempting to level the barriers in his "Proposed Research Consultation Bureau."²⁴ Because logicians have not adapted their abstract materials to the work of the social scientist nor translated them into his vocabulary, it does not follow that those materials are out of his reach. Logic as such is necessarily ab-

²² Merriam, C. E., *New Aspects of Politics*, p. xiii.

²³ Potter, P. B., *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XX, No. 1, pp. 167-8. Mr. Potter interestingly includes logic in his group of subjects to be contacted. In this the writer would of course concur, though not in the proposed method of establishing the relationship between the two subjects—that of a research consultation bureau. When subject matter, as such, is to be brought over from one field of knowledge to another it may be satisfactory merely to have an expert in the second furnish information upon call, but method cannot be superimposed for a particular time and problem without a resultant laborious formalism. This is true of any rules until their use has become habitual. Method is not a thing to be simply intellectually realized, though such realization is necessarily the first step. It is a tool. What A. W. Small said concerning "the technique of historical research and exposition" holds for all social science technique, that it "like laboratory methods, may be described in words but. . . . can be acquired only by practice" (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIX, p. 83). For this reason it seems most doubtful if satisfactory results could be obtained with knowledge of method held by proxy.

are afraid of philosophy we shall have no great science"—but a possible place is left under the phrase ". . . such materials from. . . other related fields as are of interest to scholars in the fields first mentioned." (*The Social Science Research Council, Third Annual Report*, 1927, pp. 33). It is sincerely to be hoped that in the proposed classification a clearly defined place may be found for source materials for method.

²² Carpenter, W. S., *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, p. 225.

stracted method; it is left to each of the social sciences to take over, translate and adapt. It is as *applied* logic that each may state its particularly suited scientific method.

Of greater moment than the foreign vocabulary fear is the question of the necessary relationship of metaphysics and the newer logics. Only the traditional logics have been separated out, the others come tangled with one metaphysical doctrine or another. The social scientist has no interest in these and a fear that they would work against his newly-found objectivity. In fact logic, as the methods of valid reasoning, need not depend upon any philosophical system nor is any such necessary to it. It is true that different types of logic are elaborated, formulated, and stressed by men who wish to reason by means of them to a particular theory or system. It is probably true that Bosanquet emphasized a type of logic of relatedness and stressed implication and the coherence theory of proof because it fitted in with his philosophy, but he did not *create* the logical relationships involved, nor do they stand or fall with the superstructure he erected upon them. Professor Dewey has also stressed implication and a coherence theory and philosophically he has reached utterly different conclusions. Logic can be and is coming to be a science in and of

itself. A hundred years ago psychology was regarded as entirely inseparable from philosophy; now the two are as independent as philosophy and physics. To use logic for purposes of method the social scientist need pay no heed to the philosophical theories held to be implied. Einstein's work is said to lead to and form the basis for Carr's Theory of Monads and Alexander's Space-Time, yet the physicist and the astronomer use Einstein without the least thought of these or knowledge of their existence.

One philosopher has put it that it is a matter of "professional accident" that logicians have also been philosophers. It is an accident which has created difficulties for the social scientist—but not of the type which cannot be overcome. One is reminded of the incident with which Professor Cobb closes a certain article. The position of the social scientist seeking method is likened to that of the small boy industriously digging for a possum. When asked if he thought he was going to get him, he replied, "Going to get him? Got to get him. Parson coming to dinner and no meat in the house." There are difficulties but an urgent need must stand the strain. The main aim of this discussion has been to attempt to clear away the brush obscuring the hole and to suggest that there is something down there worth the digging.



PP
a 1
act
th
the
ter
ph
T
ent
ter
qua
me
B
in t
incl
rura
inte
men
dem
ing
coöp
servi
coun
beca
char
agric
inclu
lent,
engag
person
with
respo

O
volum
600
12
raph
1 E
Ithac
one a

FARMER LEADERS IN THE UNITED STATES

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN AND CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN WITH I. O. ADAMS, O. W. BEHRENS, O. D. DUNCAN, DAN DVORACEK, FRED C. FREY, AND ELMO H. LOTT

THE purposes of this study are twofold: first, to find the concrete characteristics of the men who play a leading or important part in the life and activities of American farmers; and second, through an investigation of the traits of the farmer-leaders, to grasp some characteristics of the group of leaders and the phenomenon of leadership generally.

The Materials of the Study are taken entirely from *Rus* for 1925.¹ The character of *Rus* is shown by the following quotation from the introductory statement.

Rus is intended to be a register of rural leadership, in the persons of living men and women. It aims to include those persons who are prominently engaged in rural work, and in whom the public has reason to be interested, as farmers, teachers, investigators, business men, lecturers, ministers, farm, county, and home demonstration agents, authors, editors, and the leading personalities in the administrative, commercial, co-operative, organizational, political and public-service fields as they directly influence agriculture and country life. It is not intended to include persons because they are good farmers but only as they are charged with public interest. Staffs of colleges of agriculture and of experiment stations have been included above the rank of instructor or its equivalent, in case the title indicates that the person is engaged in the agricultural side of the work. 14,887 persons were solicited directly and others indirectly, with a second solicitation to those who did not respond.

Of the 6005 biographies given in this volume, we have taken all on the first 600 pages to which are devoted at least 12 lines. There are 735 pages of biographies in the book. However, the 2171

secured by this method, are at least representative of all the persons using 12 lines or more. As a matter of fact there was a great similarity between the results of each 100 pages, so that the addition of 135 other pages would only add quantity and not change the conclusions. Not all the biographies gave full data on every item. For that reason the number studied varies sometimes for different items. Again, at times it was not considered essential to tabulate data on all 2171, so conclusions are based on a representative sample of 100 pages. The reader may judge for himself as to whether these data apply to the agricultural leadership of the country. The authors are of the opinion that they apply to agricultural leadership as far as such a list can include leadership. *Rus* probably represents agriculture as capably as *Who's Who* represents the general and especially the urban leadership of the nation. Any major statistical conclusions based on these data are valid for agricultural leadership and for leadership in general to the extent that such leadership is more prevalent in *Rus* than in the general population.

Occupational and Social Status of the Leaders Studied. The occupational and social status of the leaders is given by Table I. Half of the leaders are represented by the classes J and K. This is probably due to the fact that academicians answered the questionnaire more often than the others but it is also due to the organization of rural leadership about the agricultural colleges. In order to grasp the differential characteristics of leaders generally and especially those between

¹ Edited by L. H. Bailey and Ethel Zoe Bailey, Ithaca, New York, 1925. This is the third volume, one appearing every 5 years.

leaders of small and larger caliber, we made special comparisons of the combined classes A, B and C, or small leaders, with

TABLE I
OCCUPATIONAL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE LEADERS

SOCIO-OCCUPATIONAL CLASSES	NUMBER OF LEADERS IN EACH CLASS	PER CENT
A. Prominent farmers and managers of farms.....	165	7.6
B. Ministers and teachers in secondary schools.....	145	6.7
C. County and home demonstration agents.....	131	6.0
D. District leaders of extension and directors of sub-experiment stations.....	190	8.8
E. Managers of cooperatives and of other farmers organizations.....	89	4.1
F. Journalists and writers (in farm and agricultural publications).....	35	1.6
G. Editors (of farm and agricultural publications).....	57	2.6
H. Bankers and commercial people.....	82	3.8
I. Senators, congressmen, United States administrative officers, politicians, and state administrative officers of full divisions.....		
J. Teachers in colleges, research workers in colleges, and writers of a research nature.....		
K. Deans, presidents, directors of main experiment stations and extension forces, and administrative heads of the United States subdivisions and state subdivisions which deal with agriculture especially in its scientific phases.....		
L. Men of especial eminence or genius.....	211	9.7
M. All unaccountables.....	4	0.2
Total.....	16	0.7
	2,171	100.0

those in J, K, and L or the greater leaders. Such a division into small and greater leaders is far from being perfect; yet, as an approximate basis for an evaluation of the

caliber of the leaders, it will serve. From the standpoint of economic remuneration, social prestige, social requirements, and position on the social and administrative ladder, the classes J, K, and L occupy a higher social place and are far more rigorously selected than the classes A, B, and C. In addition to this basis of division into small and great leaders, at times we have used education. Those with less than a bachelor's degree from college were called small leaders while those with the degrees of Master of Science and Doctor of Philosophy, or their scientific equivalents, were called greater leaders. This is also questionable. Yet, to some extent a positive correlation exists be-

TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION OF AGRICULTURAL LEADERS BY SEX

		WHOLE GROUP		CLASSES A, B, C		CLASSES J, K, L	
		Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Males.....	2,101	96.8	81	96.4	153	97.4	
Females.....	70	3.2	3	3.6	4	2.6	
Total.....	2,171	100.0	84	100.0	157	100.0	

tween leadership and education as well as position on the social scale.

Sex of the Leaders. This is given in Table II. It may be seen that 3.2 per cent of the leaders are females. The smaller leaders have 3.6 per cent of females compared with 2.6 per cent among the greater leaders. Among the 1030 most prominent British men of genius during the period from the fourth to the nineteenth century, Havelock. Ellis found 55 or 5.3 per cent were women.² Among one thousand prominent American Scientists, J. McKeen Cattell, found 18

² Ellis, Havelock, *A Study of British Genius*, pp. 1-10, London, 1904.

women or 1.8 per cent.³ Our data occupy an intermediary position between these figures. These and many similar studies indicate a relatively low proportion of females among leaders in various activities of different countries and times.⁴ While we did not classify all of our small and greater leaders as to sex, yet we find that the proportion of females tends to decrease in passing from the group of smaller to the group of higher caliber leaders. This is in harmony with Cattel's

there is only one leader below the age of 25 years among the 2171. This means that the chances of becoming a leader below that age are practically nil. Second, the chances of becoming a leader of this type below thirty years of age are also insignificant (2 per cent). Third, the bulk of the leaders are between the ages of 35 and 49 years (56.6 per cent). Fourth, the modal age is from 35 to 40 years. Fifth, there is no appreciable difference in age distribution between the leaders of the smaller and of the greater caliber. The age groups up to 30 years are represented more among the smaller caliber leaders (12.7 and 10.8 per cent). This is to be expected in view of the greater requirements for the positions of the larger caliber leaders. Obtaining such positions is more difficult below 30 years of age. On the other hand, the age groups above 55 years are also represented more among the smaller leaders (25.8 per cent compared with 19.1 per cent among the bigger leaders). This may be a matter of mere chance but it may also mean that if a leader of smaller caliber has not advanced by the time he reaches 55 years, his chances for future advancement are small. The majority of such leaders seem to reach their limit and do not advance with an increase of age. This inference is, however, a hypothesis which must be tested by further studies before any definite conclusions are reached. Later we shall return to this problem from another angle.

Marital Conditions of the Leaders. Of the whole group, 1971 or 90.8 per cent, were married and 200 or 9.2 per cent were unmarried. This gives a marriageability very near to that for the corresponding age group of the general population of the United States. Also, it is almost identical with that for American men of science,

TABLE III

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE LEADERS

AGE GROUP	ALL LEADERS		CLASSES A, B, C		CLASSES J, K, L	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
<i>years</i>						
Under 25	1	2.0	0	0.0	1	1.9
From 25 to 29	43	10.3	7	3.3	10	8.9
From 30 to 34	223	22.2	20	9.4	52	22.1
From 35 to 39	482	19.7	43	20.2	129	20.5
From 40 to 44	429	19.7	32	15.0	120	20.5
From 45 to 49	320	14.7	32	15.0	94	16.1
From 50 to 54	256	11.8	23	10.8	64	10.9
From 55 to 59	177	8.2	22	10.3	50	8.6
From 60 to 64	106	4.9	14	6.6	28	4.8
From 65 to 69	65	3.0	12	5.6	21	3.6
70 and over	53	2.4	7	3.3	12	2.1
No data	16	0.8	1	0.5	3	0.5
Total.....	2,171	100.0	123	100.0	584	100.0

data concerning the sex of scientists of smaller and larger caliber.⁵

Age of the Leaders. The age distribution for the whole group and for the classes A, B, and C, and J, K, and L are given in Table III. The average age of all 2171 leaders was 45.25 years. The table suggests the following conclusions. First,

³ Cattel, J. McKeen, *American Men of Science*, pp. 583 ff. 1910.

⁴ See for instance Clarke, E. L. *American Men of Letters*, pp. 48, ff. N. Y., 1916.

⁵ Cattel, *Ibid.*, pp. 583 ff.

but below that for American millionaires.⁶ If, however, we take the female group of leaders, the picture changes strikingly. Only 13 or 18.6 per cent of all 70 female leaders were married while 57 or 81.4 per cent were unmarried. Considering the facts that all the female leaders are above 25 years of age; and that the majority are above 39 years at which age the chances for marriage decline rapidly, we see that female leaders appear to "buy" their leadership at the cost of marriage, and that the rôle of leader means sterility for them. Thus leadership by women contributes a full share to the extinction of that which seems to be a valuable stock and to the so-called impoverishment of the best hereditary fund of the race. This is true in so far as leadership is correlated with exceptional native ability. This conclusion is in harmony with those which may be drawn from other studies of the marriageability of educated and prominent women in the United States and some other western countries.⁷ Furthermore, the percentage of unmarried among this group of females is exceptionally high. It excels by several times that for the unmarried females among the common population, and is even higher than the total percentage of unmarried among the college and educated women in the United States.⁸ We re-

⁶ See Abstract of *Fourteenth Census of the United States*, 1920, p. 222; Cattell, *op. cit.* p. 790; Sorokin, P. American Millionaires, *Journal of Social Forces*, Vol. III, 1925, p. 629.

⁷ See Dublin, L. J. Higher Education of Women and Race Betterment, in *Eugenics in Race and State*, Vol. II, Baltimore, 1923, pp. 377-385; Holmes, S. J. *The Trend of the Race*, Ch. VI, N. Y. 1921; other references and data are given in Sorokin, P. *Social Mobility*, Ch. XV, N. Y. 1927.

⁸ According to the census of 1920 the percentage of the unmarried females in the United States is 11.4 for the ages from 35 to 44; 9.6 for the ages 45 to 54; 8.4, for the ages 55 to 64; and 7.1, for the ages 65 years and over. *Abstract of the Fourteenth Census*, 1920, pp. 222-223.

peat, that if leadership and exceptional native ability are correlated positively, the nation pays an expensive price for female leadership.

Age at Marriage. Table IV summarizes the ages at marriage. The modal age is from 25 to 29 years. More than 90 per cent of the leaders marry between the ages from 20 to 34. These data do not differ substantially from similar data concerning the common population of the United States.

Fecundity of the Leaders. This group does not represent an exception to the

TABLE IV

AGES AT WHICH THE LEADERS MARRIED

AGE GROUPS	NUMBER	PER CENT
<i>years</i>		
Up to 20	7	0.3
20 to 24	369	19.1
25 to 29	1,020	52.9
30 to 34	397	20.6
35 to 39	101	5.3
40 to 44	25	1.3
45 to 49	4	0.2
50 and above	5	0.3
Unknown	43	
Total	1,971	100.0

The unknown are excluded in the column of the percentages.

general rule of low fecundity and high sterility for the educated classes and prominent individuals of contemporary western society. This may be seen from the following data: the total number of the living children for the 1971 married leaders is 3961 or about 2 per family. Compare this with the average number of living children for native born white American families which is 2.8 children, and for foreign-born parents (immigrants) which is 3.4.⁹ Both native white and

⁹ *Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality Statistics*, pp. 171, ff., Table 10, Washington, 1925. See other data in Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, Ch. XV.

immigrant families have considerably larger families than the group studied. This conclusion remains valid even if we take the "exhausted-fecundity" of the leaders. There were 610 married leaders at the age of 50 years and above and their total number of children was 1519. This is about 2.5 children per family. Even the leaders of exhausted fecundity have families smaller than those of the native born white Americans, not to mention the foreign born population. Childless marriages among the leaders are also considerably more prevalent than among the common population of the United States or of Europe where the percentage of childless marriages fluctuates from 8 to 12. Among the 610 married leaders 50 years of age and above, 125 have no children. Thus 20.5 per cent of the marriages among this group are childless. The proportion of childless marriages within the group is near to the proportion of such marriages among the royal families of Europe, among English men of genius, among Swedish nobility, and among other groups of the intelligentsia in contemporary western society.¹⁰

Sex of the Children. Of the total 3961 children, 1884, or 47.6 per cent are females, and 2077, or 52.4 per cent are males. This gives a rate of 110.1 males per 100 females among the children. In the white population of the United States there were 103.2 males per 100 females in 1920, 104.6 in 1910, and 105.3 in 1860. This shows that the per cent of the males among the children of the leaders is somewhat higher than among the total white population of the country. It is lower than the percentage of males among the children of deceased American millionaires (124.3 males per 100 females).

¹⁰ See the data and references in Holmes, S. J. *op. cit.*, Ch. VI; Sorokin, P. *op. cit.*, Ch. XV, and pp. 373-377.

higher than among the children of living American millionaires (103.4 males per 100 females), and very near to the proportion of males among the children of American men of science (107.2 males per 100 females). Considering the fact that the proportion of males among the children of the white population of America fluctuates considerably from state to state, the sex distribution among the children of the leaders is not abnormal. At any rate it does not show a superabundance of female children, which has existed at times among the later generations of the aristocratic, and intellectual groups in various countries.

Geographical Distribution. Table V summarizes the geographical distribution of the leaders according to place of birth and present location. The third column shows the number of people classed as rural by the census of 1880 for each leader born in that state or geographic division. (All unincorporated population units of 4000 or more were classed as urban in the census of 1880.) The census of 1880 was used because the average age of the leaders was 45 years. The last column shows the number of farm population per leader residing in the states or geographic divisions according to the "farm" population census of 1920. (We must caution the reader very carefully that comparisons of these last two columns with each other is not valid. The figures are only valid for comparison with others in the same column.)

This table enables us to draw the following conclusions. First, the New England, Middle Atlantic, East North-central, West North-central and East South-central divisions have produced leaders in a greater number than they have furnished "use" for them while the South Atlantic, West South-central, Mountain and Pacific divisions furnish "use" for

TABLE V
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION AND RELATIVE FRE-
QUENCY OF THE LEADERS ACCORDING TO PLACE
OF BIRTH AND PRESENT LOCATION

GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION	NUMBER BORN	NUMBER NOW LOCATED	ONE BORN FOR EACH ^a		ONE NOW LOCATED FOR EACH ^b
			NUMBER BORN	NUMBER NOW LOCATED	
<i>New England</i>	244	165	6,893	1,793	
Maine.....	21	14	23,920	14,114	
New Hampshire.....	25	14	8,479	5,430	
Vermont.....	32	21	9,461	5,964	
Massachusetts.....	125	71	2,158	1,669	
Rhode Island.....	12	11	1,500	1,376	
Connecticut.....	29	34	13,005	2,744	
<i>Middle Atlantic</i>	319	281	16,471	6,735	
New York.....	198	186	11,266	4,305	
New Jersey.....	19	25	27,575	5,748	
Pennsylvania.....	102	70	24,505	13,547	
<i>East North Central</i>	563	343	14,439	14,323	
Ohio.....	131	81	16,453	14,065	
Indiana.....	87	45	18,299	20,162	
Illinois.....	146	104	14,639	10,560	
Michigan.....	100	60	12,315	14,145	
Wisconsin.....	99	53	10,113	17,359	
<i>West North Central</i>	427	308	11,804	16,790	
Minnesota.....	63	77	10,045	11,651	
Iowa.....	134	52	10,277	18,938	
Missouri.....	78	52	20,799	23,295	
North Dakota.....	10	21	3,421	18,785	
South Dakota.....	13	30	7,004	12,074	
Nebraska.....	42	28	9,326	20,863	
Kansas.....	87	48	10,242	15,362	
<i>South Atlantic</i>	183	444	35,251	14,452	
Delaware.....	5	6	19,523	8,535	
Maryland.....	12	35	46,591	7,977	
D. C.	9	226			
Virginia.....	43	33	30,804	32,255	
W. Virginia.....	29	31	19,462	35,416	
N. Carolina.....	37	36	36,341	41,700	
S. Carolina.....	26	20	35,424	53,734	
Georgia.....	19	29	73,531	58,110	
Florida.....	3	20	80,848	10,067	
<i>East South Central</i>	109	87	46,922	59,573	
Kentucky.....	31	24	45,121	54,369	
Tennessee.....	33	25	43,173	50,868	

TABLE V—Continued

GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION	NUMBER BORN	NUMBER NOW LOCATED	ONE BORN FOR EACH ^a	ONE NOW LOCATED FOR EACH ^b
<i>East South Central—Cont.</i>				
Alabama.....	24	21	49,749	63,613
Mississippi.....	21	17	52,238	74,734
<i>West South Central</i>	53	117	55,819	44,685
Arkansas.....	11	21	70,045	34,621
Louisiana.....	6	19	116,759	41,371
Oklahoma.....	1	26		39,127
Texas.....	35	51	41,284	44,662
<i>Mountain</i>	52	138	9,589	8,466
Montana.....	3	18	10,724	12,537
Idaho.....	4	18	8,152	11,161
Wyoming.....	4	13	3,659	5,177
Colorado.....	13	31	9,205	8,583
New Mexico.....	0	12		13,453
Arizona.....	1	18	33,433	5,031
Utah.....	24	21	4,595	6,678
Nevada.....	3	7	14,304	2,309
<i>Pacific</i>	35	175	20,314	5,795
Washington.....	6	27	11,332	10,495
Oregon.....	7	26	21,273	8,231
California.....	22	122	22,458	4,235
<i>Foreign Countries</i>	171	100		
Unknown.....	10	13		
Total.....	2,171	2,171		

* This column is based on rural population in 1880. Consequently it is not comparable with the second column based on farm population 1920. The figures are only comparable with others in the column.

† Based on farm population 1920.

leaders far beyond the number born within these areas. The first group of regions "loan" the leaders to the second group. Second, the states which produced an especially great number of leaders are: New York, Illinois, Iowa, Ohio, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin; and the states

and areas in which an especially great number of the leaders are located are: the District of Columbia, New York, California, Illinois, Minnesota and Ohio. New York, Illinois, and Ohio produced a large number and have retained a large number. Third, the divisions which produced agricultural leaders most frequently, when differences in numbers of rural population in 1880 are eliminated, are New England, Mountain, West North-central, East North-central and the Middle Atlantic; and the divisions which produced least are the West South-central, East South-central, South Atlantic and Pacific. Fourth, the New England, Pacific, and Middle Atlantic divisions have the most leaders relative to the size of the farm population in 1920, the East North-central, West North-central and South Atlantic divisions have the middle proportion of leaders, whereas the other divisions have least of all. This, of course, signifies, if these data are representative that the districts most backward in agricultural leadership at the present time, on the whole, are the East and West South-central division states. Fifth, the number of leaders born in foreign countries and now in the United States is greater than the number born in the United States and now abroad. The "import" of leaders into America is greater than their "export" from America. Sixth, it appears that certain divisions in the East were producers of leaders whereas others in the South and West were consumers. The westward and southward migration of agricultural leaders is greater than the proportionate migration of the general population. As such it represents a social selection of a talented class in favor of the West and South. If we take the West South-central division we find it has 54.7 per cent more leaders than were born in these states. On the other

hand only 21.7 per cent of the entire native population of that area were born in other divisions. In a similar manner the Mountain division had 62.3 per cent more leaders than were born there compared with 47 per cent of its native population born in other divisions. Similar figures for the Pacific division are 80.0 and 51.8 and for the South Atlantic division are 58.8 and 6.9.¹¹ We may add as a corollary to our first conclusion that this migration of leadership appears to have been a social selection in favor of the West and South.

In a similar manner we must consider the migration of agricultural leaders to the United States from abroad. In 1920, 8.5 per cent of our gainfully employed farm population, 10 years of age or over were foreign born.¹² Is the migration of leadership more or less than the migration of the general population? Cattell's study found that scientists came from abroad about the same as the general population (12.7 per cent of all scientists studied) except that certain countries predominated to the exclusion of others, whereas, Sorokin's data showed American Millionaires to be more of an American product¹³ (13.3 per cent in the deceased generation and 8.3 per cent in the living generation of American millionaires). The data on agricultural leadership shows that 8.2 per cent of those residing in the United States were born abroad. This shows that foreign countries supply farmer-leaders in the same proportion as they supply the gainfully employed persons in agriculture. There is no evidence in these figures that migration to this country has been malselective.

¹¹ See Volume III, Fourteenth Census of the United States, p. 614, Washington, D. C.

¹² See Immigrants and Their Children, Census Monograph No. 7, 1927, page 273, Washington, D. C.

¹³ Cattell, *op. cit.*, pp. 804-05; Sorokin, *op. cit.* p. 633.

Place of Birth and Rearing of the Leaders. The comparative rôle of farms, villages and towns, and of cities in production and rearing of the rural leaders is given in Table VI. The table shows that an overwhelming majority of the leaders was born and reared in the country. Only 15.3 per cent of them were born and only 9.5 per cent were reared in the city. This shows that rural origin and rearing are conducive to the choice of an occupation

city. If we take the Census of 1880, we find that the population of places less than 4000 was 71.4 per cent of the total: it is reasonable to conclude that the total population of the places below 2,500, and the total farm population were less yet. If we compare the 84.7 per cent born on farms or in towns and villages, with the 7.14 per cent of the population classed as rural in 1880, we find the difference is about 20 times the standard error of the 84.7 per cent.

In 1880 the population on farm composed about 40 per cent of the total population of the United States.¹⁴ Forty per cent of the population which were on

TABLE VI
PLACE OF BIRTH AND REARING OF THE LEADERS

TYPE OF PLACE	NUMBER BORN	PER CENT	NUMBER REARED	PER CENT	PER CENT OF THE URBAN AND
					RURAL UNITED STATES POPU-
					LATION (IN 1880)†
Farm.....	1,348	64.5	1,424	67.0	71.4†
Village or town.....	422	20.2	257	12.1	
City.....	319	15.3	202	9.5	28.6†
Combined (rural and urban).....			242	11.4	
Unknown.....	82*		46		
Total.....	2,171	100.0	2,171	100.0	100.0

* Excluded in computation of the percentages.

† Places with population above 4000 are called urban in the census of 1880.

dealing directly or indirectly with the farm population and to leadership in rural problems.

The table is interesting in another respect. Numerous writers have attempted to show, and it is generally accepted that, in the production of the prominent men and leaders, the share of the city is considerably higher than the share of the country. In the case of the farmer-leaders this general rule (if it is really valid) does not hold: absolutely and relatively, for the group studied, the share of the country is higher than that of the

TABLE VII
EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF THE LEADERS

EDUCATIONAL CLASSES	NUMBER OF ALL LEADERS	PER CENT
No college.....	89	4.1
Some college.....	153	7.1
Four year degree.....	805	37.1
Masters.....	671	30.9
Ph.D. or equivalent.....	451	20.8
Unknown.....	2	
Total.....	2,171	100.0

farms produced 64.5 per cent of the farmer-leaders of 1925; the 31 per cent in villages and towns produced 20 per cent; and the 29 per cent in cities produced 15 per cent. Such a computation gives an increasing differential in favor of rural birth for farm leadership. These data suggest that the usual computations of the share of prominent men produced by the cities and rural districts are somewhat onesided because they are based principally on the data of "Who's Who" and similar editions whose "urban" character is rather evident.

Educational Status of the Leaders. Table

¹⁴ See Farm Population of the United States 1920, Census Monograph No. VI, Washington, D. C., for the basic data for these computations.

VII shows that the educational status of the leaders is very high: 88.8 per cent of them have at least a four year college or university degree, and 51.7 per cent hold higher degrees. Thus the group is more qualified by education than American leaders in other fields. Nearing found only 77.4 per cent of his leaders were holders of degrees, and Sorokin, found that only 80.4 per cent of American millionaires had graduated from college.¹⁵

Degrees and Age of Their Obtaining. Table VIII gives the average ages at which these leaders obtained college degrees and makes some interesting comparisons.

who obtained a Ph.D. or higher degree it was 27.2 years. This is a difference of two years. The Ph.D. degree shows the same. The farmer-leader group obtained it at the age of 35.0 years, while the college professors obtained it at the age of 28.4 years, and leading American scientists at the age of 30.2 years. This regularity is shown further by some other detailed data which were obtained in this study. However, for the sake of the economy of space, they are not given here. Thus it seems probable, that environmental conditions being similar, the individuals of greater intellectual capacity climb the

TABLE VIII
AVERAGE AGE OF OBTAINING DEGREE

CLASSES OF DEGREES	FOR THOSE WHO HAVE ONE COLLEGE DEGREE AND NO MORE		FOR THOSE WHO HAVE MASTER'S DEGREE AND NO MORE		FOR THOSE WHO HAVE PH.D.'S		FOR 920 COLLEGE PROFESSORS ¹⁶		FOR 758 LEADING AMERICAN SCIENTISTS ¹⁷	
	Number	Age	Number	Age	Number	Age	Number	Age	Number	Age
A.B. or its equivalent	766	26.2	1,057	23.8*			920	22.9	758	22.2
Master's or its equivalent.....			646	29.2	306	27.2				
Ph.D. or its equivalent					437	35.0	920	30.2	758	28.4

* For all who took graduate work, Master's and Ph.D.'s were not divided.

The table shows that the average age of obtaining the A.B. degree or its equivalent for those who did not secure a higher degree was 26.2 years; while for those who did graduate work it was 23.8 years; and it is still lower for the group of college professors and for the leading American men of science. The same regularity appears in regard to the master's degree. The average age of securing it for those who did not get a higher degree was 29.2 years,¹⁸ while for those leaders

ladder of scientific degrees earlier, more rapidly, and, in the long run, go higher. The same conclusion probably applies to the other "degrees" of life.¹⁷ This correlation appears in spite of considerable differences of environmental conditions surrounding the farmer-leaders as well as members of the groups studied by Cattell and Holzinger.

Types of Colleges. Table IX gives the types of colleges at which the leaders took their undergraduate work. State universities occupy the first place; the next two places belong to state and to private colleges. Teachers' colleges and

¹⁵ See Nearing, Scott, *The Younger Generation of American Genius*, *The Scientific Monthly*, January, 1916; Sorokin, P. *American Millionaires*, *Journal of Social Forces*, Vol. III, p. 637.

¹⁶ See Holzinger, K. J. *Higher Degrees of College Professors*, *Journal of American Statistical Association*, Vol. XVIII, p. 879; Cattell, *op. cit.*, pp. 582-583.

¹⁷ Compare Sorokin, P. *Social Mobility*, Chaps. XVII, XVIII, XIX.

normal schools played an insignificant part.

Some Specific Universities and Colleges in which the leaders did all or a part of their

TABLE IX
TYPE OF COLLEGES WHERE THE LEADERS TOOK UNDER-
GRADUATE WORK

TYPE OF COLLEGE	NUMBER OF LEADERS
Private College.....	633
Teachers' College or Normal School.....	33
State College*.....	686
State University.....	715
No College.....	89
Unknown.....	25
Total.....	2,171

* This means colleges of agriculture and applied science, where they are separate from state universities.

TABLE X
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTIVITY OF FARMER-LEADERS BY
SIXTEEN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES	NUMBER OF THE LEADERS
1. Cornell University.....	150
2. Ames College (Iowa State).....	92
3. Kansas State College.....	85
4. Michigan State College.....	82
5. University of Wisconsin.....	80
6. Massachusetts State College.....	69
7. University of Illinois.....	67
8. University of Missouri.....	60
9. University of Minnesota.....	58
10. University of California.....	29
11. Harvard University.....	26
12. University of Michigan.....	20
13. Yale.....	15
14. University of Chicago.....	8
15. Columbia.....	5
16. Princeton.....	5
Total.....	851

undergraduate work are given in Table X. The table shows that Cornell occupies first position. The next eight places are occupied by seven Middle-Western institutions and Massachusetts State Col-

lege. It is curious to note that some of the best American Universities (Nos. 10 to 16) which educate many of the leaders in other fields of activity, take quite an insignificant part in the education of the farmer-leaders. Nine state colleges and universities, seven of them in the Middle West, dominate the field of productivity of agricultural leadership of these types.

Type of Undergraduate Speciality of the Leaders. Table XI summarizes these. The development of social sciences with research under the Purnell Act, may enable them to make a more prominent contribution in the future.

TABLE XI
UNDERGRADUATE SPECIALTY OF THE LEADERS

TYPE OF UNDERGRADUATE SPECIALTY	NUMBER OF THE LEADERS
1. Agronomy.....	348
2. Entomology, Plant Pathology, Botany.....	272
3. Animal Husbandry.....	212
4. Horticulture and Landscape Gardening.....	187
5. Agricultural Economics, Farm Management, Rural Sociology.....	179
6. Chemistry.....	120
7. All others.....	622
Total.....	1,940

Leadership and Writing. Talking and writing play a considerable part within present society. It is one of the signs and one of the agencies of leadership. In order to find out the per cent of the leaders who are writers of books and the kind of books they wrote, we enumerated these data when they were reported. The information is probably not complete and somewhat incidental; therefore, it must be considered only an approximation. Of all the leaders studied only 341 or about 16 per cent reported the writing of books. The total number of books were 911, or an average 2.7 books per leader.

Of these, 205 belong to social science, 179 to general science, 496 to technical agriculture, 7 to fiction, and 24 to popular science. More than 50 per cent deal with problems of technical agriculture.

Occupational Shifting of the Leaders and Average Age at which They Obtained Their Present Positions. In a mobile society the social position of an individual is only partly the result of social inheritance.

TABLE XII
INTENSITY OF SHIFTING FROM POSITION TO POSITION

NUMBER OF DIFFERENT POSITIONS HELD	NUMBER OF LEADERS IN EACH SPECIFIED CLASS	PER CENT
Up to 2	219	10.3
From 3 to 5	1,252	58.7
From 6 to 10	628	29.4
11 and more	35	1.6
Total.....	2,134	100.0

TABLE XIII
NUMBER OF YEARS BETWEEN SECURING THE FIRST AND
THE LAST POSITION

NUMBER OF YEARS	LEADERS IN EACH CLASS	
	Number	Per cent
<i>years</i>		
Up to 5	498	24.8
From 5 to 10	597	29.7
From 11 to 15	400	19.9
From 16 to 20	235	11.7
21 and more	278	13.9
Total.....	2,008	100.0

The position of a considerable portion of the individuals is determined mainly by other factors such as their inherited and acquired traits. Under such circumstances, the rapidity with which individuals change their positions or move one position to another, and the ages at which they climb to a given occupational, economic or social status, becomes interesting and important. We have tried

to study the occupational and social shifting of this group. The essential results are as follows.

The 1933 leaders for whom data are given, reached their present position at the average age of 36.7 years. This age is near that at which hired men and farm tenants in America become farm-owners (36 years); it is a little higher than the average age of obtaining Doctorates by the Ph.D.'s. of this group and it is considerably higher than the average age at which 920 college professors or 758 leading American scientists obtained their Ph.D. degrees. It is close to the average age at which the leading American scientists obtained their recognition (from 30 to 44 years). It is much lower than the average age of becoming a president of the United States or of France (55 and 59.5 years respectively); or of becoming a Roman Catholic Pope (61.3 years); or a non-hereditary monarch (48.5 years); or an American millionaire (75 per cent of the poor men who reach wealth do so at an age of more than 40 years);¹⁸ or a member of the Russian Academy of Science (48.5 years).¹⁸

Table XII gives the intensity with which the leaders shift from position to position. About 90 per cent of the leaders have changed their position more than twice; the majority have changed from three to five times; about 30 per cent have changed more than five times. Relatively this is a high coefficient of shifting. The number of the shifting is dependent to some extent, on the length of time during which the individual has been engaged in an occupational pursuit. Table XIII distributes the leaders according to the time which has passed between securing their first and last position.

¹⁸ These data taken from Sorokin, *Social Mobility* p. 454

Leadership and Mobility. There exists a considerable amount of factual material which seems to suggest a correlation between leadership, or prominence, or intelligence, and the mobility of individuals, or their shifting from place to place, or from one occupational or economic position to another. Other conditions being equal, the group of more prominent or more intelligent individuals seem to be more mobile than the group of less prominent or less intelligent. This does not mean that every more mobile individual is more prominent or intelligent

biographies do not give, of course, how many miles they have travelled during their life time or the number of different places in which they have stayed. But they do give the number now located within the state of their birth (22.9 per cent) and in other states or foreign countries (77.1 per cent). These data are somewhat comparable with the corresponding data given in the United States Census (already quoted) which shows that in 1920, 67.2 per cent of the total population were residing in the state of their birth, whereas, 32.8 per cent were in other

TABLE XIV
MOBILITY OF SMALLER AND GREATER LEADERS ACCORDING TO THE TIME THEY HAVE BEEN
IN THE OCCUPATION*

TIME FROM FIRST TO LAST OCCU- PATION	LEADERS WITH LESS THAN 4 YEARS COLLEGE EDUCA- TION		LEADERS WITH GRADUATE DEGREES		CLASSES: A, B, C		CLASSES: J, K, L	
	Number	Average posi- tions	Number	Average posi- tions	Number	Average posi- tions	Number	Average posi- tions
<i>1907</i>								
Less than 5	16	3.25	101	3.16	47	4.13	134	3.27
From 6 to 10	15	4.93	171	4.49	81	4.51	241	4.65
From 11 to 15	25	5.11	136	4.94	58	5.81	179	4.80
From 16 to 20	15	4.67	82	5.43	30	5.39	99	5.60
21 and over	27	5.74	107	6.37	28	6.14	108	6.70
Total.....	98	4.90	597	4.85	244	5.04	761	4.86

* Based on tabulations from 400 pages.

than a less mobile one. The statement is made from comparisons of homogeneous groups but not individuals, and the correlation, if it really exists, only pretends to be a relationship between statistical averages. Besides, the correlation disappears beyond a certain limit of mobility.¹⁹

Part of our data seems to uphold the hypothesis. In the first place there is the territorial mobility of the leaders. The

states or abroad. Thus the territorial mobility of the leaders compared with that of the common population supports the theory of a positive relation between prominence and mobility.

We wished to test the correlation by comparing the occupational shifting of the leaders with that of the common population. Unfortunately, this could not be done, partly on account of the lack of data concerning the intensity of occupational shifting by the common population, and partly on account of the incompleteness of the data concerning the leaders themselves. All we could do was to compare

¹⁹ See the details of the hypothesis and some data and references in Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, Ch. XXI; *Leadership and Geographic Mobility*, *Sociology*, and *Soc. Research*, Vol. XII, No. 2.

one group of the leaders with the others. The data are incomplete and the division of the leaders into smaller and greater caliber is very tentative, consequently the results are to be taken as inconclusive. With this reservation and warning they may be given.

Table XIV is an analysis of the mobility of the smaller and the greater leaders according to the number of years between their first and last occupation. By this method of cross tabulation we are enabled to eliminate differences due to time. From this table we may state the following conclusions. First, there appears to be no great difference between the total mobility of the small and the larger leaders. The small differences are in favor of the smaller leaders but these might have arisen through sampling. This conclusion is somewhat inimical to the theory of a positive correlation between prominence and mobility. Second, small leaders are most mobile the first fifteen

years of their occupational life whereas greater leaders are most mobile in the later periods of life. This means that exceptional men continue to advance after the average or less great men have reached their highest levels. This statement confirms the theory of a positive correlation between prominence and mobility. The more prominent leader moves at a slower rate at first but in the long run he advances farthest and in the total course of a lifetime he shifts as much as the leader of lesser caliber.

The reader must be careful to note that this is a comparison of leaders with leaders. These conclusions are very tentative in themselves and are probably not valid for a comparison of leaders with common people. There are some reasons to believe that great leaders did not report their changes of position as thoroughly as did the smaller leaders. Furthermore they often hold several jobs at the same time.

NEIGHBORHOOD PLAY CENTERS OF AMSTERDAM

THIRTY years ago a movement in Amsterdam was started to direct playgrounds in the neighborhoods of the workers. The movement has prospered and has been maintained under the direction of the working people ever since. There are now 24 playgrounds in different parts of the city, each equipped for the play of children and supervised by a man hired by the municipality. On any one playground the traveller is apt to find a large club house in which are carried on many kinds of activities. No less than 24 clubs directed by volunteers in the neighborhood were found in one such house. There were athletic groups, music, classes of various kinds, social activities, civic groups, etc. Each attendant is asked to pay a small fee. The clubs organized in these neighborhood play centers often use the school buildings in the evening, paying a nominal rental. When a society is formed, clubs are often the first activities carried on, running a playground themselves for four or five years when they induce the city to pay the rent and supply them with a playleader, as well as subventions of money. The organization of the club and the local societies are very democratically run. Mr. J. C. Diemel, Director of the society

covering the whole city, which in reality is a federation of the various neighborhood societies, maintains that the spirit of neighborliness can be found in each of the local groups. He says that they bring together political enemies who work in harmony and that persons of all faiths find common interest in the dramatics, the civics, the athletics and play in their neighborhood houses and grounds. One feature to be noticed by Americans is the cooperation of neighborhood private and of city public organization. While the membership in the neighborhood groups takes in most of the residents, especially the workingmen, the proposal to subsidize these centers in the municipality is usually made by the socialists. Another feature is the cooperative nature of the organizations. The director of a group of boys and girls, eight to ten years of age studying singing, for example, will be some neighborhood person of musical ability, seldom an expert selected by a musical society. The play of the children is spontaneous and while the director of the playground watches and keeps order, the children have been organizing much of their own play activity.—*Le Roy E. Bowman*.

TEACHING AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

"THE PROBLEMS OF AN EMPIRICAL SOCIOLOGY"

WILSON D. WALLIS

AN ARTICLE on "The Problems of an Empirical Sociology" which Dr. Thurnwald, editor of the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, has recently contributed to that journal¹ deserves the attention of his colleagues on this side of the water. Previously, he says, sociology was considered a deductive science. In many countries there has been an attempt to make sociology an inductive science; but in Germany this movement has had little success. The tendency in recent German sociology has been to rely on biological analogy, or to resort to psychology, rather than to make sociology an independent science based on social phenomena. But neither psychology nor biology, however suggestive they may be, can suffice for sociology. Sociology must be built on social phenomena and it must be inductive.

John Stuart Mill dealt with this problem in his *logic*. He pointed out that whereas some sciences proceed deductively, as notably mathematics and those dependent upon it, in particular, physics and chemistry, the social sciences, or moral sciences, as he calls them, must proceed inductively. There are no axioms from which can be deduced the sciences of

sociology, history, or politics. Spinoza, indeed, is the classic example of the attempt, and the failure, to apply successfully the deductive method of mathematics to problems of conduct.

A more voluminous example of this procedure, and one which has wrought more havoc in social science—for philosophers have not greatly influenced the trend of social thought—is Herbert Spencer. In form inductive, his work is really deductive, the finding of examples to illustrate principles which he considers basic in the history of social development. But no amount of illustrations will convert deductive procedure into induction. Spencer did not investigate; he sought to prove; he was an advocate rather than an inquirer.

Today the inductive method is generally accepted, or at least professed. Probably no sociologist would admit that he is not empirical and inductive—though none are. Induction is, of course, a prime requisite in science; and everybody who wishes to be in good standing is anxious to be scientific, for science has won the respect of the world. From induction, it is a safe surmise, there will never be a turning back to deduction as the method of constructing a sociology. Let us, then, accept the principle and proceed on the assumption that induction is the only

¹ III, 56-273, September, 1927.

sound method in sociology. Acceptance of this principle is, however, not the end, but rather the beginning of trouble. There is, first, the problem of selecting the data on which induction is to be built. Can the selection of the data be regarded as an inductive procedure? Certainly not by any usual interpretation of *inductive*. Whatever knowledge of facts it may presuppose or realize, selection is essentially a matter of judgment and discrimination, perhaps one of evaluation also. The investigator may remain silent regarding the mysterious manner in which he is enabled to make the selection, but it is a safe surmise that if he attempts to show that the selection is itself an inductive procedure he has let himself in for a hard job. There is also the question of the relevance of the data. No amount of empirical procedure will determine this matter, for data do not of themselves answer the question of their relevance. As a matter of fact, the inductive method seems especially applicable only to social phenomena regarded as static. If two phenomena, A and B, are correlated it is assumed that a certain constancy existed; for if A changed while B was being observed, and B changed while A was being observed, then A is not A and B is not B, but A is something in process of change, and likewise B. Moreover, if there is no constancy, then the investigation has only historical value, and even this would appear to be of no very high order. The knowledge that social life is dynamic must, of course, be based on observation, but it is difficult to understand how one can proceed empirically except by hope, faith, and a proper admixture of charity. If, moreover, there are no new categories for the new phenomena, then likely enough their real significance for sociology will be lost.

Empiricism involves analysis, a break-

ing up of social phenomena into units which can be observed and compared. But analysis implies a synthetic compound, and so these very units imply something more comprehensive than their several selves.

But synthetic unities are not matters solely of empirical observation. They are essentially matters of intellectual comprehension; though this does not imply that they lack reality. Empirical procedure deals of necessity with parts; but the parts presuppose the whole; and the attitude toward the whole is not empirical, but is presupposed in empiricism. There are moreover, what may be called planes of empirical procedure. Those, for example, who study social phenomena as essentially psychic manifestations proceed on one plane, while those who regard them as essentially culture manifestations proceed on another plane, and those who regard them as but the resultants of historical processes proceed on yet another plane. Each method may have its peculiar merits, and each may yield truth and insight, but certainly no one of them is justified by previous empiricism; for the task is new, otherwise it is superfluous. Success on any plane of procedure involves critical insight, otherwise it turns out to be devoid of meaning.

In other words, mere observation is useless, for one must know not merely what but also how to observe. As a sheer matter of fact, no observation is mere observation. It implies a social philosophy, although not necessarily the formulation of one. Those who use it may not be disposed to confess it.

If there is no appreciation of the significance of the observed facts there is no profit in the procedure. To one who knows nothing of the significance of social phenomena, sand yields as much

social relevance as sin, and hanging a dog as much as hanging a man. Before one can be empirical with any profit one must achieve some appreciation of the nature of the social world, even though one wishes to discover empirically its real nature; and new insight changes the meaning of the data.

A flash of insight gave Darwin the suggestion of his theory of evolution, and the point of view of evolution changed the meaning of a million data. It was so with the theory of relativity, which has made the world a bit different, and keeps us guessing whether we are going around the sun or the sun is going around us, and whether we or the savage are the more deserving of pity.

It was so with the concept of culture which affected not merely procedure but the perception and understanding of social phenomena. It was so with diffusion—witness the new world of social phenomena which unrolls before the eyes of Elliot Smith and Perry, Kroeber and Wissler. A concept has given entirely new color to many phenomena. If, then, it is not merely a desideratum, but actually a necessity to be empirical, how shall one achieve this? Only, so it appears, through a proper social philosophy, which, of course, must be based on facts, but which, in utilizing them, must somehow pass beyond them. Is it justifiable to say that only a sound social philosophy can be the test of the soundness of the empirical method, and that only a sound social philosophy can yield a sound empirical method? As mere facts, more facts are merely more facts and mere empiricism yields merely facts.

As an example of some of the implications of the empirical method consider the problem of an inductive study of crime. First, the question, What is crime? must be answered. To say that, "for the purposes of this investigation it

will be interpreted as meaning so-and-so," does not really solve the problem but merely postpones it. For the question, Did the investigation study crime? will always be pertinent.

One must, as a matter of fact, proceed on some basis, using a social, an ethical, a legal, or some other test of crime. Granted that a test of crime has been adopted, what are the relevant phenomena? Unless one has some idea of them in advance one is not likely to discover them empirically; and the importance attributed to what may be called related phenomena is largely a matter of judgment, and must be so. How, for example, shall one rate for purposes of the investigation, poverty, industrialism, readjustments, religion, ethics, family life, rapid changes in the culture, individualism, the disintegration of community morals, or the deterioration of community morale? Everything may be relevant—in the long run it undoubtedly is, though the long run is very exhausting—but the investigator can not include everything. To do so would merely leave him where he was before he began.

There must be selection of data, and a method of dealing with the chosen data. It is precisely this selection of data and the method of dealing with them which reflects the social philosophy. Therein lies concealed the cloven hoof of something which is not inductive, and which has determined the character of the induction. The observation may necessitate a revision of the philosophy, but certainly the philosophy guides the observation, and even determines whether observation shall be made, and to what purpose. Dr. Thurnwald calls attention to the fact that empirical sociology is not merely a procedure but a problem as well—and indeed a very subtle one which touches practice wherever it touches theory.

Statistics? To be sure. The more the

better; and preferably the better. Statistics, however, are no more free of philosophy than are other uses of symbols, or other formalistic procedures.

Statistics will discover truth with about the rapidity that the Aristotelian categories will discover it—those which were worked so hard in medieval times. If Bertrand Russell is correct in defining mathematics as "that science in which no one knows what it is about or whether any thing it says is true," then, insofar as a procedure is mathematical it has no relevance to the facts. It is relevant only insofar as others accept the rules of the game and follow suit. Even then they may not know when to trump in. Moreover, as Dr. Thurnwald points out, statistics can never obviate the shortcomings of observation, but can only record them and treat them as though they were correct. For no statistical procedure is without subjective tinge and meaning. This does not imply that it must be abandoned—unless every procedure is to be abandoned—but it means that it is about as profitable as the manipulator's point of view, his insight, and his intelligence.

Induction passes over into deduction, and deduction into induction. Each, in fact, presupposes the other; they are part one of another, and only in rationalization can they be divorced.

Herein the study of social phenomena is nowise different from the interpretation of natural phenomena. In any science the so-called laws and facts are, of necessity, largely postulates, or the result of postulates or hypotheses. As an authority in the field of physics has recently said:

It is a truism that no science can advance far without the aid of a metaphysical element. This bald statement may cause horror to many experi-

mentalists, but by it I am merely emphasizing that the successful development of any science is absolutely dependent on the manufacture of hypotheses and that the state of progress to which the particular science has attained is due largely to the character of the postulates on which it has been built. Nowhere has this been more conspicuously evident than in the rise of atomic theory in the physical sciences. It was the bold guesses of Prout and Dalton which gave so much stimulus to the advancement of chemical knowledge that they practically founded modern chemistry; while the revolutionary assumptions of Planck, Rutherford and Bohr are directly at the basis of the enormous mass of investigation into the constitution of matter which we have witnessed during the past two decades. It is true that physics, like all science, rests on experimentally determined facts, but it stagnates without the spur of hypothesis, of a theory to guide the seeking out of the facts and to accomplish the correlation of the new with the old. In its choice of what I choose to call a metaphysics (in the sense of something beyond the observed facts of physics) it finds its success or failure.

And, again:

In modern physics the strongly contrasted philosophical doctrines of realism and idealism merge into a common pragmatism. We build a hypothesis which seems best to satisfy our longings for logical completeness and then we act toward our hypothesis as if it were reality, because it works. This is a very sensible attitude, yet we must never forget that this reality is of necessity a transient one. New facts render old hypotheses untenable—the old reality yields to new reality and so science progresses. More and more it becomes clear that the true reality is but the ideal with which we have become so familiar as to believe in it and have faith in it.³

Meanwhile, 'all around us are problems of social life awaiting solution. An understanding of them can come only through an empirical sociology which bases its inductions upon a comprehensive understanding of the relevant factual material.'

³ R. B. Lindsay, "Some Philosophical Aspects of Recent Atomic Theory," *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 26, pp. 299-300, 305.

PRESENT TENDENCIES IN RURAL SOCIOLOGY

W. C. WATERMAN

THE problem of the present status of rural sociology presents several aspects which are worthy of study, and among which can be enumerated: the nature of courses in rural sociology at present being offered in American schools and colleges; the type of textbook in use; the topics covered in monograph studies, and finally the attention paid to the subject at meetings of sociologists.

In a study by Professor C. R. Hoffer of Michigan State College, appearing in the *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1926, the statistics of institutions offering courses in rural sociology were tabulated as follows:¹

State Universities and Colleges.....	34
State Agricultural Colleges (not located at State Universities).....	19
Private Universities and Colleges.....	201
State Normal Schools and Industrial Institutions.....	134
Theological Seminaries.....	39
 Total.....	 427

In the survey of the curricula of 110 colleges for the current year, 1927-1928, it was discovered that 35 were offering courses in rural sociology. However, the bulletin descriptions of the topics included under the general subject of rural sociology were definitely lacking in uniformity, indicating that among the teachers of the subject there is as yet no common agreement as to its proper content. The aim evidently is to furnish trained leadership for rural life.

Central College, Fayette, Missouri, describes its course as one having "The practical aim of preparing the student for

effective social leadership. Special emphasis will be given to rural economics, and the rural home, school and church. The community approach will be made to this study." As an indication of emphasis, it should be noted that this college offers additional courses in "Rural Church Method," and "Church and Rural Welfare."

Cedar Crest College at Allentown, Pennsylvania, describes rural sociology as "A Study of development of agriculture in the United States; the historical background of modern problems of society in rural districts and an approach to a constructive policy in rural development."

It can be said for the most part the bulletin descriptions indicate that rural sociology is a course of study in which there is more or less superficial description of problems assumed to be distinctly rural. Rural sociology at Bethany College, Bethany, West Virginia, is a study of the "Social, economic, religious and educational conditions in rural communities. Intensive study of rural school and church. Constructive and remedial forces. Plans of coöperative organization. Developing community leadership." Bethel College at Newton, Kansas, attempts in its course of a semester, to conduct a "Survey of the country and village communities in the United States, and a study of rural problems, such as economics, housing, health, sanity, morality, church, schools, and recreation." In Boston University the course has a definitely reform purpose. Here in a semester the student is introduced to "The social condition, resources, and welfare programs of the American village and rural community, with emphasis on the psychic element of the rural

¹ "The Development of Rural Sociology." *Am., Jour. of Soc.*, Vol. 23, p. 96-97.

problem." At Carnegie Institute, rural sociology is an introductory course pointing directly to professional rural social work.

While there is danger of being misled by a bulletin description of a college course, yet, if the descriptions given in a little less than 10 per cent of all the courses of rural sociology at present offered, are anywhere nearly accurate and typical of the entire group of 427, rural sociology as it is taught might perhaps better be described as rural social economy. Certainly the emphasis is very definitely on social reform, and rural welfare. This, of course, raises the question of the limits of the subject matter which may properly be included under the general head of sociology. On this question there is a very great divergence of opinion, as is clearly shown by even the most casual examination of textbooks on general sociology, or by a comparative study of curricula.

In the textbook approach to rural sociology, there are at least two methods of treatment possible, as Professor Taylor has most admirably pointed out.² The study may make a general social analysis and use the facts of rural life for purpose of illustration and example. This method rests upon the assumption that generalizations relating to social origins, social evolution, social control, social change, etc. are universally valid, and are as essentially true in rural as in urban social life. Rural sociology then becomes the application of these generalizations to the group living under an environment peculiar to the open country.

A second method is to emphasize the specific social problems occurring in the rural community. It is this second method which is the one most generally followed, and the textbook becomes a

descriptive account of problems. Thus in Taylor's work, probably the best of the rural sociologies, eleven of the twenty-two chapters are definitely given over to the discussion of problems of rural isolation, tenancy and ownership, rural family, the rural church, rural schools, rural health, rural art, etc. In all instances the approach to the problem is that of the social worker and reformer interested in palliative treatment.

Concerning the status of rural sociology, Professor John M. Gillette has the following to say:³

If by sociology is always meant a rigidly scientific attempt to account for group phenomena, and if, further, the attempt must be dissociated from utilitarian motive, then the title 'rural sociology' is incompetent to express the scientific import of sociological studies of rural communities. . . . The great business of rural sociology is, and perhaps ever will be, the attainment of a sympathetic understanding of the life of farming communities and the application to them of rational principles of social endeavor. . . . Its first imperative is to understand rural communities in terms of their conditions. Its next imperative is to formulate right ways of action. We may think of rural sociology as that branch of sociology which systematically studies rural communities, to discover their conditions and tendencies, and to formulate principles of progress.

Holding this view of the nature of rural sociology, Professor Gillette conceives that it has a three-fold task to perform:⁴

1. Like other sciences, rural sociology must find or ascertain the essential facts which lie within its domain. In order to garner these facts, it will be necessary to conduct investigations into the conditions obtaining in non-urban communities. . . .

2. With the essential facts in hand, rural sociology will proceed to organize the data into a body of knowledge, accurately representative of rural society and its conditions. . . . The facts will be related to each other and assembled into groups according to their significance. Thus related they may represent rural conditions relative to crop production, health, education, the home and other subjects. . . .

² Taylor, C. C., *Rural Sociology*, pp. 4, 5.

³ *Rural Sociology*, p. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 10.

3. Quite naturally and logically the mind passes from assessing values to asking what shall or should be done. . . . This is the final step for any applied science; consequently, it is an ultimate step for rural sociology.

From such a statement of the task of rural sociology, it is to be expected that Gillette's text would be given over largely, as is the case of Taylor's work, to a discussion of economic and social problems from the point of view of the reformer.

From the standpoint of social problems, the textbook writers apparently have assumed that rural sociology deals with a very different set of problems than that of general sociology and more particularly of urban sociology. As a matter of fact there are few if any social problems or situations arising in rural community life which do not have their companion problems in urban living. The problem of the rural church may be cited as an illustration. In both the rural community and in the city, the organized church is reputed to have lost its position of social dominance. The writers interested in investigating the rural church appear to believe by totally ignoring the experiences in urban communities, that in the two situations there are no common elements worth considering.

In the religious field, perhaps the very best study which has been made is that by Luther Fry, under the title, "*Diagnosing the Rural Church*." This is a careful statistical study of the rural churches in thirty-two counties, typical of the various rural areas in the United States. As the result of a process of careful analysis, Fry reaches certain conclusions as to causal environmental factors operating to create problems confronting rural religious leaders today. These factors are: 1. Economic status of the community, affecting both the financial and all other phases of church life dependent upon the local

support of its members; 2. Density of population, with the church functioning with increasing efficiency with an increase in population up to a point of optimum density beyond which a decline seems to set in. 3. The racial make up of the population. 4. The trend of population, with the church growing or declining as population increases or decreases. 5. Regional location, again closely connected with population trend. 6. The occupation of members.⁵

The close resemblance, of this enumeration of factors of basic importance to the rural church, to the factors which would appear in a similar enumeration for city churches is obvious. In other words, the considerations determining the place of the church in rural community life are not essentially different from those in an urban society.

It should be borne in mind that one of the purposes of Fry's study was the very practical one of reforming church administrative practices. In his own words this purpose is stated as follows:⁶

This study then is but one of a series of investigations that are necessary if we are to arrive at an adequate, scientific understanding of how the rural church operates. "But," some one may argue, "why go on? What's the use of studies of this kind? Of course, they may be valuable from the standpoint of sociology, but what's their practical value? How can investigations of this sort help the Church to function better?"

In answer to these questions Fry proceeds to make constructive suggestions, still without any reference to the experiences of city churches, where these same problems under a different guise, it is true, but still basically the same, have been faced for period of years. It is the opinion of the writer that this practical study would have been greatly strength-

⁵ *Diagnosing the Rural Church*, pp. 227-229.

⁶ Op. cit., p. 232.

ened if this aspect of the general problem of organized religion had been tied up with the major problem instead of leaving the reader with the impression that no such connection exists, that the rural church and its problem represents a peculiarly distinct and separate situation.

The question of the rural church has been dealt with in this detail as representing a tendency in rural sociology, to separate its problems in watertight compartments without what would seem to be a proper consideration for the essential unity of all the problems of social interaction.⁷

A comparison of problems and conditions recognized as distinctly rural over, say, a twelve or fifteen year period, is interesting as showing very marked developments in rural living which have occurred in that length of time. Some of these developments the earlier writers seem not to have clearly sensed. In this respect a comparison of the rural sociology of C. C. Taylor and that of Paul L. Vogt, which appeared in 1917, is interesting. The earlier work, for example, stresses the fact of isolation and repeats with approval that one of the results of such isolation is an unduly high rate of insanity, among rural dwellers. Professor Taylor ten years later gives scant credence to this problem for the very good reason that the earlier view was not supported by any body of scientific data.

This reference to rural insanity is mentioned simply as indicating a rather pessimistic bias which seems to have colored the writings of rural sociologists a decade or more ago and which is conspicuously absent from Taylor's work.

Rural isolation is a condition which was emphasized early, and which is in a way the crux of the whole rural problem.

What has happened and is happening to rural isolation is illustrated by the recent history of a township in central New York, which is typically rural. The township is located from six to eight miles from the nearest railroad and contains no villages. Twenty-five years ago it was a truly isolated community. Its only daily contact with the outside world was a stage coach which left the township center early in the morning and returned at from 7:30 to 10 o'clock at night, depending upon roads and weather. The nearest city was about 17 miles distant from the township center, and because of bad roads, was visited only infrequently by members of this community. The result was a self-centered community, with a definite community spirit and loyalties, but with a relatively narrow intellectual and cultural horizon. Here the two-fold effect of group isolation was clearly apparent: a rather intense intra-group activity, finding expression in the thronging of the center four corners general store on Saturday nights. Frequent "bees," parties, and other social events, were coupled with a dearth of outside interests. There were not more than a half dozen subscribers to daily papers and the only source of news for most of the population was the weekly and semi-weekly papers, published at the county seat 17 miles distant.

During twenty-five years, however, this picture of rural isolation has been completely changed. All told, there are in round numbers 300 families in the township. Of these 300 families, approximately 150 have telephone service; 100 own radios; 200 own automobiles; more than 200 of them are subscribers to daily newspapers, while the semi-weekly has discontinued publication.⁸ Fifteen miles

⁷ Cf. Ellwood C. A., *The Social Problem*.

⁸ The reason for its discontinuance is that the rural edition of the daily paper is furnishing all the local

of concrete highways within the township and linked with the highway system outside have made the city the logical play and shopping center of the community. This change has produced certain results which the textbook writers seem to have been slow in appreciating as having already arrived. Isolation has been broken down, and the intellectual and social horizon has been to that extent broadened. With this increase of interest, the older community life has been adversely affected. Practically all the early group activities have been abandoned and instead of the isolation of the community, has come a comparative diffusion of the social activities of the individuals, with the result that while the contacts for the individual have been increased, community solidarity has progressively diminished, so that close social cooperation is now no longer common. It is this process, which Galpin refers to as "rurbanization" and which is taking place at a rather high degree of rapidity in the East, that is extremely important and yet has received scant attention from rural sociologists, the reason being, perhaps, that the general textbooks in rural sociology have been written mainly by men from the grain belt in the Mississippi valley, where this process is not yet so evident, and where rural life has tended to dominate the city point of view, rather than the reverse as in the East.

news, and is in every way supplying the same service as the older semi-weekly. In this fact is the probable explanation of the decadence of the rural press, as noted by Willey in his study of the country newspaper. The country weekly has largely outlived its usefulness and has been supplanted by the rural edition of the daily paper. The great increase in the circulation of daily newspapers is the result of the introduction of rural free delivery which has made it possible for the farmer to receive the daily paper within a few hours after publication.

In a leading article in the May, 1927, number of the *American Journal of Sociology*, Professor Clark Wissler stresses the importance of the idea from the standpoint of the anthropologist "That there are regional differences in material, and also in social behavior, and that social evolution is itself regional."⁹ Carrying this idea over into the field of rural sociology, it raises the question of the desirability of a new approach—that of studying rural social life as it has been influenced and determined by distinct environmental conditions peculiar to certain well defined areas within the United States and determining in part at least the population makeup, the form of agriculture and the social institutions of these areas. The result which might reasonably be expected would be a series of rural, regional sociologies, which however restricted the scope of their field might be, would at least have the merit of grouping facts that are really comparable, instead of the rather unscientific procedure of grouping facts, simply because they are rural and which close scrutiny would show are highly incomparable.

It is the tendency to generalize on the basis of conditions characteristic in a restricted area which is responsible for some of the glaring contradictions among writers in this field. As an illustration of such contradiction is cited the opinions concerning rural degeneracy from two recent textbooks writers in the field of rural welfare.

Professor Macy Campbell, Head of the Department of Rural Education, Iowa State Teachers College, portrays the following picture of rural decadence.¹⁰

⁹ "The Culture Area Concept in Social Anthropology," *Am. Jour. of Soc.*, May, 1927, p. 881.

¹⁰ *Rural Life at the Crossroads*, pp. 39, 40. Cf. Review of this book by Carle C. Zimmerman, *Am. Jour. of Soc.*, May, 1927, pp. 994-997.

The influences that tend to drain the most competent young people out of the rural regions are free to operate more rapidly and to produce their dread results more quickly in America than in any other nation of the World's history. Here we have no caste or class system to bar the way of ambitious and capable young people who desire to get away from the land as was the case of the nations of the Old World. . . . The very things we prize most in our national life are, under present conditions, rushing the most competent young people off the land and carrying us on toward the destruction of rural life.

Already we have sufficient proof that the average intelligence of farm people of America, which was formerly very high, is now declining. If this tendency is not checked, America's most important natural resource will soon be in the hands of her least competent people, who, as Calvin Coolidge said, "will carry down with them the general social and economic level."

We may regret that America's brightest and best young people are continuing to leave the farm in ever increasing numbers, that this flight of the best to the cities must leave the poorest on the land; that these inferior people tend to reproduce inferior individuals like themselves and will eventually people our farms with an inferior stock; that this must ultimately debase our agriculture and in turn jeopardize the life of the whole nation; we may regret and deplore these conditions, but we can never hope to change them until we succeed in restoring the buying power of the farm.

A directly opposite position is taken by Professor Taylor whose optimism, perhaps, is somewhat exaggerated.¹¹

Furthermore, during the World War, we developed altogether too universal an appreciation of the capability and capacity of the farming class to tolerate any longer the assumption that our rural communities are decadent, and our rural population in need of uplift. The drift to the city has been real enough and still continues. It does not, however, in any of its immediate aspects present a serious rural problem. American farms are producing more in annual products than at any previous time. American farmers are producing more per man than any farm population of the earth. . . . Production per acre has increased one-half per cent per year in the United States for the last twenty-five years. . . . It is production per man and not per acre by which we measure

the adequacy of rural life. Apparently the drift to the city has not thwarted progress and efficiency in farming to any great degree, nor has the rural population absolutely decreased in any decade in our national life. We have today one and one-half millions more people living in rural districts than we had a decade ago. And six millions more than we had 20 years ago. With a greater population, with a greater gross production, a greater per capita and a greater per acre production, it is little short of sophistry to assert that the urbanization of American society has left us a degenerate rural population, at least so far as numbers and productive capacity are concerned.

It is obvious that the opinions of Campbell and Taylor on the effect of the urban trend of population are sharply opposed. An explanation of this may be that Professor Campbell wrote from an Iowa setting, and that at the time of writing his book Iowa was in the midst of a well-nigh unparalleled agricultural depression, with its consequent social manifestations of fear and anxiety. His foreboding of the future of rural life under the present system of distribution of farm products apparently expresses the state of mind approaching an anxiety neurosis. On the other hand, with a broad background of research in rural surveys, Professor Taylor reaches a much more hopeful conclusion. The point to the references quoted is that generalization in the field of rural sociology, based on the experiences in a restricted area is exceedingly unsafe, when applied to the nation as a whole. This, in turn, comes back to the possibility that the hint in Wissler's article on the culture area concept, which has its place in the study of any primitive group, may be of some value in the study of problems of rural life today.

While the writer is inclined to believe that the sectional differences are so great in the United States as to seriously affect the discussion of any given rural problem, yet there are certain general tendencies that seem, in the by and large, to be

¹¹ *Rural Sociology*, pp. 12, 13.

common to all rural communities. These tendencies are tied up with the improvement of means of communication, and means of production.¹² Perhaps the most important of all of these tendencies is that of rural education. That rural education still presents a serious problem is evident to even the most casual investigator, but that the answer to this problem has as yet been discovered is open to serious question.

In a rather careful survey of the New York State rural schools in 1922, an attempt was made to apply certain objective tests of school efficiency, centering about the supply of trained teachers and the adequacy of curriculum and equipment.

The efficiency of a teaching staff can be measured in part by the educational preparation of a teacher, her age and experience. Measured by these standards the rural school teachers in New York State are woefully inadequate.

The minimum of such (professional) training for elementary school teaching is generally recognized to be two years of work beyond high school graduation. The country child in New York State, who attends a one teacher school has one chance in twenty of coming under the instruction of a teacher who has met this minimum standard; the child living in a village has more than one chance in four of having such a teacher, while the child living in a typical city of the third class, has less than one chance in five of not having such a teacher.¹³

Lack of fitness on the part of the rural teacher is expressed likewise in the following table showing her immaturity:¹⁴

¹² To the improvement in farm machinery can be traced the enormous increase in man production on American farms. A corresponding improvement in household appliances has greatly increased the leisure time of farm women.

¹³ *Rural School Survey in New York State, 1922*, p. 38.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

	MEDIAN AGE	YOUNGEST RANGE OF FIRST FOURTH	17 RANGE OF FOURTH (OLDEST) FOURTH
Teacher in 1 teacher school...	23.7	18-21	30 and older
Teacher in 2 teacher schools...	27.6	18-23	33 and older
Teacher in elementary schools...	28.5	19-24	37 and older
293 teachers in village high schools.....	26		
Elementary teachers in 50 New York cities of the third class...	19		
Elementary teachers in 7 New York cities of the second class.....	34		

From the above table it is evident that the rural teacher is much more immature than her sister teaching in the city schools. The survey also divulged the fact that the rural teacher had less than half the number of years experience of the teachers in village and city schools. From these comparisons it is evident that the rural child is at a serious disadvantage with the city child, at least as far as formal training is concerned. In achievement, as would be expected, in schools with immature, inexperienced, poorly trained teachers, the rural pupil rates somewhat below those from the larger school.¹⁵ The experience in Connecticut confirms the conclusion obtained in the New York survey.¹⁶

The solution of the problem, which is now almost universally advocated, is that of consolidation, so that a school plant with an equipment similar to that of an urban school can be maintained and the atmosphere of a city school where "chil-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-176.

¹⁶ Larson, E. L., *One Room and Consolidated School in Connecticut*.

dren work together, play together, and learn together" can be developed. In other words, the plea is to extend the plan of mass education to the country, and this just at a time when at least a few educators are beginning to question the desirability of mass education in city schools and to hope for a greater individualization of the educative process.

Assuming that the urbanization of the rural school is the best method of reforming the glaring defects that recent surveys have uncovered, there are certain physical difficulties tied up with population distribution and means of communication that propagandists have, with almost common agreement, attempted to explain away. A relatively large school population must be insured to make the system work, otherwise the expense becomes an intolerable load to the tax-payer, and there are not enough children to "work together, play together and learn together," to furnish the amount of inter-stimulation sought by the educator. In the city this can all be secured in an area of a few city blocks. In the country a district of several square miles must be created, and even then the question of financial support is a difficult one, with a school tax rate in some rural districts approaching one per cent per year on the assessed valuation.¹⁷ Moreover, the question of transportation is one which the city school administration does not face, and for which the plans proposed, or in operation in the rural centralized district are all open to serious criticism and objection.

The fact is that the wide distribution of rural population is a condition which in itself makes the rural community non-comparable with the city as far as the administration of an educational system

is concerned. This does not, of course, mean that the experience of the city should not be of value even as the experience of an urban church ought to be of value to the rural churchman. In both cases, however, the factors of population distribution and difficulties of transportation must not be ignored. These factors are much more important in the school problem than in that of the church. In the one case, there is the matter of daily transportation of mixed groups of small children without parental supervision, while in the other, even assuming regular attendance at all church services, there is only the relatively minor inconvenience of occasional journeys of the household as a unit.

The original location of both churches and schools was an adaptation to the usual means of communication of an earlier day. That of the church was within easy driving distance with a horse drawn wagon from the most remote community dweller. The boundaries of the school district were determined by the walking ability of the child. From a physical standpoint, the church may now easily be centralized, for the automobile has supplanted the horse. In the case of the school, however, the child still walks, or where the school has been centralized, rides in a school bus with attendant physical and social dangers, which ought not to be minimized. The chief obstacle in the way of a centralized church is that of the emotional and traditional values, associated with the older organization in the minds, not only of its members but of the community as a whole. To a somewhat lesser degree, this same factor plays its part in the opposition to the abandonment of the one-room school, as any one familiar with the glorification of the "little red school house" will recognize. It is this matter of attitudes and emotions

¹⁷ Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 300 ff.

of interest to the social psychologist that the rural reformer has been all too accustomed to ignore or to dismiss as an evidence of stubbornness.

The psychological approach to rural sociology has recently been made by Professor Galpin, and more particularly Professors Groves and Williams.¹⁸ Professor Galpin's contribution has been mainly that of raising questions without attempting, in the light of present knowledge, to answer them. Professor Williams, on the other hand, has attempted a psychological interpretation of rural institutions on the basis of direct environmental influence. While there is a certain cock-sureness and finality in the assertions of Professor Williams, which is reminiscent of the Freudian psychiatrist, rather than that of the psychologist, some of his conclusions are interesting and acceptable at least as reasonable hy-

potheses. The chief contribution, however, of all three writers is to point the need of further study in a field which gives promise of interesting results.

Finally, it is the writer's belief that rural sociology is a branch of applied sociology, the teaching of which has been given pretty largely over to the statement of opinions rather than of verifiable scientific generalizations. Many of the reform programs advocated in the name of rural sociology have not taken into proper account sociological and psychological factors admittedly valid with urban populations, but somehow believed to be non-operative in rural communities. The careful reader of the texts in rural sociology will moreover be impressed with the evidence of an emotional bias on the part of many of the writers, and an absence of agreement among them as to facts of a verifiable nature. All of this can be explained on the basis that the study is still in a formative stage and in need of much fact collecting, which regional studies may in part supply.

¹⁸ Galpin, Charles J., *Rural Social Problems*.
Groves, Ernest R., *Rural Mind and Social Welfare*.
Williams, James M., *Our Rural Heritage*.

THE CONTENT OF RADIO PROGRAMS

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG¹

THE content of newspapers has, during the last two decades, been the subject of a number of studies.² The reason for this type of research has been the recognition of the fact that before the mechanism of public opinion and other public reactions can be understood, a knowledge of the nature of the material upon which these reactions are founded is essential.³ Recently, another

means of communication has developed, namely, the radio, which has become almost as general in its appeal and contacts as the newspaper. What is the nature of the material of which it is the carrier?

"There are at present approximately 5,000,000 radio receiving sets in the United States, which means that there are probably 20,000,000 potential 'listeners-in' each night."⁴ Much has been said about the probable social effect

¹ The statistics of this study were compiled by my students in a course on *Public Opinion* at Wells College in 1927.

² Willey, M. M., *The Country Newspaper*, pp. 24-32.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁴ Benick, M. D., "The Limited Social Effect of Radio Broadcasting." *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1927, p. 616.

of this sudden development of a new means of communication and socialization. "These programs have stimulated the conclusions that we shall have a greater religious consciousness, that we shall take a greater interest in politics than we are wont to, that we shall find less apathy for education, and that we shall wake up one bright morning with an international consciousness, the result of worldwide broadcast programs, and the dawn of mutual understanding and world peace will have come."⁵ Whether any or all of these optimistic expectations are justified or not, depends to a great degree on the nature of the material being broadcast through this new device. As in the case of the newspapers, therefore, the quantitative analysis of radio programs is the first step in an estimate of their social influence.

The same difficulties of classification which have been a principal obstacle to the analysis of newspaper content, confronts one to some degree in analyzing the subject matter of radio programs. But due to the far more limited variety of the latter up to the present time, this difficulty is correspondingly less serious. Several difficulties which do not obtain in analyses of newspaper contents, however, occur in connection with quantitative analyses of radio programs. Instead of measuring the space devoted to each type of subject matter as in the case of newspaper studies, it is necessary in the case of radio programs to measure the amount of time devoted to each class of material. In a few cases, the exact length of time occupied by an item on the program is not stated, it being necessary to estimate the duration of such items. This occurs infrequently, however, and usually the nature of the item and its position on the program makes possible a fairly accurate

estimate of the time occupied. A more serious difficulty is encountered in such items as "To be announced," "Impromptu," "Variety program," etc., as well as in the cases where it is not possible to determine the content of an item from the title appearing in the program. Fortunately these items again represent a negligible proportion of the whole program, and may therefore be classified as "miscellaneous," as has been done in the present study.

DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL BROADCASTING TIME FROM ALL THE STATIONS OF NEW YORK CITY,
FEBRUARY, 1927

TYPE OF SUBJECT MATTER	TOTAL NUMBER OF HOURS	PER CENT OF TOTAL
Educational.....	263.66	9.3
Religious.....	150.40	5.3
Dance Music.....	743.66	26.2
Other Music.....	1,362.33	48.0
Children's Programs.....	32.83	1.1
Drama and Readings.....	74.50	2.6
Information.....	81.25	2.8
Sports.....	49.50	1.8
Miscellaneous.....	76.45	2.6
Total.....	2,834.58	99.7

As a preliminary attempt to get some light on the subject of the nature and probable influence of radio programs, an analysis of all the radio programs broadcast from the nineteen stations of New York City during the month of February 1927 was undertaken. The categories employed are admittedly general, but are regarded as sufficiently definite for the present purpose. While the proportion of time devoted to each type of subject-matter varies considerably with different stations, the comparison of stations is not here exhibited, the purpose being merely to determine the general character of "what's in the air" for radio fans. The results are found in the accompanying table.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 617.

The table shows that for the month of February 1927 programs aggregating 2,834.58 hours were broadcast from the stations of New York City. Three-fourths of this time was devoted to music, about one-fourth of the total time being devoted to dance music and about one-half of the total time to other music. Approximately five per cent of the total time is devoted to the broadcasting of religious services, Bible stories, and lectures on religious subjects. About nine per cent of the time is devoted to subject-matter of a generally educational nature, chiefly lectures, travelogues, and talks. About three per cent of the total time is devoted to information—news, market and weather reports, police alarms, etc. About two and a half per cent of the time is devoted to drama (plays and readings), one per cent to children's programs, about two per cent to sports, and the remainder to miscellaneous unclassified material, including a small amount of material of a political nature (about 0.2 per cent of the total broadcasting time).

The general conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the radio is at present used almost entirely as an entertainment device for the advertising of the radio itself, and of the businesses which provide the programs. This advertising consists of the broadcasting of the name of a business as well as the short advertising talks which intersperse the items on the regular program. It is recognized, of course, that the time distribution for the month of February is not strictly representative of all months of the year. A similar analysis during a political campaign or during the football season would undoubtedly reveal a larger percentage of the time devoted to politics and sports respectively. As a sample of the time distribution during the greater part of the year, however, it is believed that the analysis for February is perhaps representative. The present direct influence of the radio as an organ of public opinion, therefore, would appear to be very limited.

BRANCH LIBRARIES IN SCHOOL BUILDINGS

THREE is a drive in progress to put branch, sometimes called "community," libraries in public schools. In various cities the arrangement has worked successfully for years and the proposal is not therefore altogether new nor doctrinaire.

Apparently there are many economies of administration that are effected by using the schools as houses for neighborhood library branches. In addition there seems to be in St. Louis, where the libraries in schools were visited by officers of the National Community Center Association, very real advantages in the juxtaposition of school and library. Classes used the branch for "browsing" purposes that had all the earmarks of good intellectual stimulation without urging or driving. The fact that the finest selection of books was provided according to teachers' and librarians' judgment does not detract from the advantages of volitional selection as the students hap-

peneed to see the books they thought they wanted. Coordination between school and library went much further, in furnishing readings, paralleling class work, and in other ways.

The figures seem to show that circulation is greater when there are many accessible branch libraries. The difficulty of school branches, as might be surmised, lies in the administrative connection between two different municipal systems. It is not to be disposed of with a gesture, but will need to be worked out over many years of experimenting in cooperation between library trustees and educational authorities.

It is not altogether hypothetical to suppose that sooner or later a system will evolve for many cities of (1) a large central library, (2) a few branch library buildings in different sections, and (3) several neighborhood libraries in school buildings.

PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

THE INTELLIGENCE OF CHILDREN IN DEPENDENT FAMILIES

R. CLYDE WHITE

IT IS quite generally believed that the intelligence levels of people who become dependent are prevailingly lower than those of the average population of the country. There are those who believe that in a quasi-democracy, such as the United States, an occupational division of the population on the basis of intelligence would lead to the establishment of a society somewhat resembling Plato's ideal republic. Many studies of the I.Q.'s of special groups have been made in the last half dozen years, but the writer knows of only one which dealt specifically and exclusively with children in families who were under the care of a social agency. This was made by Phyllis Blanchard and Richard H. Paynter and was concerned with 80 children from 23 families under the care of the Philadelphia Family Welfare Society.¹ Obviously, the number of children used here is too small to warrant generalization, but it may be more significant, if future studies corroborate or supplement the conclusions drawn. All the families considered by Blanchard and Paynter are from the lower economic strata of society. They were


not able to make satisfactory adaptation to the social environment and have sought the aid of a social agency. The writers are cautious in their conclusions. They point out that "intelligence" is only one factor in social adequacy and that in discussing the eugenic value of social work, intelligence levels constitute one criterion only, while emotional adjustment and behavior patterns are of equal importance if not more significant. However, they remark, "It must be admitted that the darkest spot in the picture we have presented is the numerical preponderance of intellectually inferior children."² They find the median I.Q. of the 80 children to be 89.0, which is 11 points below the median of Terman's "unselected children." In so far as these children are representative of the children in families under care of the Philadelphia Family Welfare Society, it would appear that the Society is dealing with people of relatively inferior intelligence in a majority of cases. Should we expect to find similar conditions in social agencies of other cities?

When the writer was recently connected with the New York Charity Organization Society, he made a further study of intel-

¹ Reference is made here and in other parts of this paper to "Socio-Psychological Status of Children from Marginal Families" by Blanchard and Paynter in *The Family*, Vol. 8, No. 1, P. 3ff.

² Op. cit., p. 9.

ligence levels bearing on the problems during the last half dozen years. Two studied by Blanchard and Paynter.⁸ The districts of the C. O. S. on the Middle West



New York Society has been using the intelligence test to an increasing extent

⁸ While the data were gathered by the Charity Organization Society, the conclusions herein expressed are exclusively my own, and for them the Society is in no way responsible.

Side have joined in sending children to a psychological clinic in which several hundred were tested in 1926 and 1927. The data used in this paper were obtained from these two districts and a third district on the Lower West Side. They include

the I.Q.'s of 451 children from 204 families together with information concerning relief, number of children per family, the chief problem presented to the social agency and the nationality of the child. Substantially all of the I.Q.'s known in the three districts up to August, 1927, were secured. The case workers in each district stated that with a few exceptions children were not taken to the psychologist, because mental defect or mental superiority was suspected. A brief inspection of the table and curve given below will show that this absence of special selection seems to be indicated

TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE FOR 451 C. O. S.
CHILDREN, 80 F. W. S. CHILDREN, 821 RILEY
HOSPITAL CHILDREN AND 905 UNSELECTED CHILDREN

I. Q. RANGE	451	80	821	905
	CHILDREN	CHILDREN	CHILDREN	CHILDREN
	per cent	per cent	per cent	per cent
Below 66	8.6	10.0	13.3	0.33
66-75	12.6	6.3	12.8	2.3
76-85	27.6	25.0	19.1	8.6
86-95	23.4	27.5	23.1	20.1
96-105	18.4	18.7	18.3	33.9
106-115	6.4	10.0	8.7	23.1
116-125	2.8	2.5	3.4	9.0
126-145	0.7	0	1.3	2.85

statistically. The aim was to have all the children of school age tested as rapidly as the psychologist at the clinic mentioned, or some other clinic, could take them. They were not picked for early examination, except in isolated cases, because the family presented a certain problem. Hence, while the data do not represent strictly a random sample, they approximate that. There might be slight variations in other C. O. S. districts, but it is believed that the statistical analysis which follows represents with reasonable fairness the facts concerning children under C. O. S. care.

In addition to the data from the New York C. O. S. the writer has included the percentage distribution of I.Q.'s for 821 children tested by Dr. Herman H. Young of Indiana University for the James Whitcomb Riley Memorial Hospital at Indianapolis. This hospital takes no pay patients and no one above 16 years of age. Dr. Young is the Director of the Psychological Clinic of the hospital, and from October 5, 1925, to October 1, 1927, he tested 821 out of the 1,007 admitted to the hospital during that time. The Riley Hospital receives patients from every county in Indiana; the county judge ascertains the economic status of the family and certifies that the family cannot pay for treatment. The dependency in these cases consists of dependency for free medical treatment and, consequently, differs somewhat from the dependency represented by the C. O. S. families. However, a large proportion of the C. O. S. children received free medical treatment also, and many of their families received no cash relief.

Table I gives the percentage distribution of I.Q.'s for Terman's "unselected children," Blanchard and Paynter's Philadelphia children, the C. O. S. children and the Riley Hospital children. Presenting these percentages graphically, Diagram I shows the comparative distribution of the same children.⁴

This diagram makes it possible to generalize about the intellectual status of children who come under the care of a social agency whose services are free to clients. It is clear that we are dealing with a section of the population which is well below the average in intellectual capacity. The three curves for children

⁴ The data furnished the writer by the Riley Hospital have not yet been published but will be used in a more general study which Dr. Young has under way.

under the care of social agencies are skewed far to the left of that for unselected children. Furthermore, the three curves are remarkably alike, which is another way of saying that children who come under the care of free care agencies are similar in intelligence levels. The fact that such large numbers of children are used for the C. O. S. and the Riley Hospital gives scientific verification to the general opinion that the majority of people who become temporarily or permanently dependent for one kind of service or another are below the level in intellectual capacity. To be more specific, 48.8 per cent of the C. O. S. children and 45.2 per cent of the Riley Hospital children have I.Q.'s of 85 or less, whereas of the unselected children only 11.23 per cent fall into this class. That is, nearly 50 per cent of these special groups of children are dull normal, borderline or definitely deficient. At the upper end of the scale we find that only 28.3 per cent of the C. O. S. children and 31.7 per cent of the Riley Hospital children would probably benefit appreciably from school above the 8th grade, whereas 68.85 per cent of the unselected group could take with profit more than a common school education. The median I.Q. of the C. O. S. children is 86.68, of the F. W. S. children 89.0 and of the Riley children 86.63. The medians of the C. O. S. children and the Riley children are so nearly identical that it stretches one's credulity not to feel that there was suspicious collusion among statisticians. As a matter of fact, the writer had already written this paper, before he heard of the Riley tests, and, upon showing it to Dr. Young, he offered to calculate the median for his tests for comparison, because he believed it would be quite similar to that of the C. O. S. children, but neither he nor the writer expected it to come out so nearly the same. This similarity of

intelligence levels among children in widely separated parts of the country suggests that one is warranted in making a generalization to the effect that the median I.Q. of children under the care of social agencies is likely to be around 87.

These are some of the general implications of the curves for I.Q.'s of children under the care of social agencies, but there are some special implications which should be indicated. The latter are of particular importance to social agencies which treat dependency by the case work method.

While the median is between I.Q. 85 and I.Q. 90 in each case, there are a considerable number of children whose I.Q.'s fall at the lower end or at the upper end of the curves. Case work aims to individualize the person, and the I.Q. very definitely enables the case worker to individualize the child in so far as intelligence is concerned. The mass of children with approximately average intelligence require individual study and treatment, but those who vary widely from the average need more attention of this sort, simply because they are variants, because the social order is adapted to people of average intelligence rather than to people of exceptional intelligence—either low or high. A few examples will make this clear. Among the C. O. S. children the I.Q.'s range from 29 to 132. The child with I.Q. 29 is now in an institution for the feeble-minded, where he will probably remain for the rest of his life, but the child with I.Q. 132 has just earned a scholarship in the high school for exceptionally good work and should be encouraged to finish high school, and some way should be found for her to go through college or to take professional training. To secure the environment suited to these two children and enable them to stay in it is the task of the case

worker. There may be children in the same family who require such diverse treatment as sending one to an institution for the feeble-minded and urging another to finish high school. In ten of the families included in this study, where two or more children were tested, the difference between the lowest and highest I.Q.'s was 30 or more. In one of these families the lowest I.Q. was 64 and the highest 106; in another the lowest was 52 and the highest 99. For each of these families the institution for feeble-minded and the high school are possible resources for treatment. Out of the 204 families from which the children of the C. O. S. were selected 43 had one or more children with I.Q.'s of 70 or less. Approximately half of the children under care of the C. O. S. and the Riley Hospital, if forced to stay in the ordinary school on account of the compulsory school law until they are 15 or 16 years of age, will have been held back two or three times and in many cases will have suffered the emotional disturbance incident to thwarting of the ego, which, it is well known, often results in delinquency. The large number of children in this class points to the need of greater adjustments in the public school system to accommodate children of less than average intelligence but above the grade of imbecile. From a knowledge of the distribution of I.Q.'s among children of dependent families case work should benefit largely, and in turn the community will have to organize its resources more adequately so that the case worker can make the adjustments necessary for children of varying levels of intelligence in their clientele.

Rarely does a family come to the attention of a social agency, because somebody suspected mental deficiency or mental superiority. Some type of distress, like dispossession, illness, or misbehavior,

puts the social agency in touch with the family, and then the I.Q.'s of different members of the family may be found and help to determine the treatment. But do we find high I.Q.'s in connection with certain kinds of social problem and low I.Q.'s with other types of problems? If we know the I.Q.'s of small children, would we be able in any degree to predict the kind of social difficulties into which they may later fall? If we know the prevailing nationality in a community, can we predict with some degree of probability the median I.Q.? Perhaps we cannot do much prediction, but the writer has analyzed the data at hand with respect to some of the problems presented, and

TABLE II
MEDIAN I.Q.'S IN RELIEF AND NON-RELIEF
FAMILIES AND IN FAMILIES WITH
INSUFFICIENT INCOME

GROUP	NUMBER OF CHILDREN	MEDIAN I.Q.
Relief Families.....	294	86.11
Non-Relief Families.....	151	87.25
Insufficient Income Families.....	93	85.11
Families with 7 or more children.....	104	82.86

the results are given below. The median for the 451 children is 86.68, which is more than 13 below the median for the 905 unselected children.

First, we shall consider certain groupings based upon obvious financial difficulties. Two of these groups are designated as children from relief families and non-relief families. A third one is based upon "insufficient income" which has been indicated by the case worker as the chief problem presented by the family. The phrase, "insufficient income," has a somewhat technical usage. It implies that the wage earners of the family do not earn enough to support the family according to the C. O. S. standard

budget because of irregular work, limited capacity to work, or too large a family. Relief may or may not be given. The group of children drawn from families into which seven or more children have been born is really a special aspect of the "insufficient income" group, but it is important enough to indicate separately. The medians for relief and non-relief families are almost the same, and that for families of insufficient income is so little lower than these two as to be negligibly different. Considered on the basis of relief there is somewhat of a surprise here, because it is quite generally suspected that families whose incomes have to be supplemented with cash from an agency are relatively lower in intelligence than those who come to the agency with some other predominant problem. This turns out to be only slightly true. It seems that either relief or non-relief families constitute a fairly even distribution with respect to I.Q.'s. But the large families tend to have substantially lower I.Q.'s. There are 49 families with seven or more children, and all except seven families are receiving relief or are designated as having insufficient income. The median number of children in all relief families is 5.5, and it is the same for non-relief families. The median number of children in these 49 families is 8.5, or three more than that of either relief or non-relief families. Do people with low I.Q.'s tend to have large families? It is generally suspected that they do, because they do not calculate the responsibilities of a large number of children. Our figures tend to support this opinion. Only 14 of these families have had a child tested whose I.Q. was 100 or more, whereas 17 have had children tested who had I.Q.'s of 70 or less. This tendency to large families cannot be accounted for on the basis of nationality; for of the 17 Italian families

in this group 5 have children with I.Q.'s of 100 or more, which is about their proportion on the basis of probability. If this particular group of Italians had exceptionally low I.Q.'s, some of the condition could be explained by linguistic difficulties in taking the tests, but as a matter of fact it will be seen below that the median I.Q. in large families is almost identical with the median for Italian children, and the Italians constitute only about one-third of the 49 families and have their proportion of normal or superior children. In order to test out the question raised here further, it was decided to calculate the coefficient of correlation existing between number of children born into a family and the average I.Q. Eighty-eight families from which half of the children had been tested were selected. In the case of very large families, if at least three of the children had been tested, the family was included. The mean I.Q. in each family was taken, and the number of children born into the family was used. With these two sets of facts a correlation table was made. The coefficient of correlation was found to be -0.242 ± 0.081 . It is not high, but it is negative which indicates that there is some tendency for children in large families to have low I.Q.'s. This raises the eugenic problem and the suggestion of birth control. It indicates that the present generation of C. O. S. parents with low I.Q.'s is likely to have a large number of children with low I.Q.'s, in so far as the I.Q. measures a hereditary trait, who will in turn have large families with low I.Q.'s. Obviously the small number of families from which this tentative inference is made does not warrant a positive generalization, but a question is raised somewhat more definitely than it has been before.

Three other problems in relation to

I.Q.'s are given in the table below. Table III is concerned with problems more or less unrelated to income. Only in the case of alcoholism is the median lower than the median for the 451 children, and it is only slightly less. Where illness or domestic infelicity is the chief problem, the I.Q. is likely to be slightly above the general median. Two children whose I.Q.'s are 132 each, the highest of the 451, are from a family in which the father has cerebro-spinal syphilis; they

TABLE III
MEDIAN I.Q.'S OF CHILDREN IN FAMILIES WHERE
ALCOHOLISM, ILLNESS OR DOMESTIC INFELICITY
IS THE CHIEF PROBLEM

GROUP	NUMBER OF CHILDREN	MEDIAN I.Q.
Alcoholism.....	62	86.36
Illness.....	119	89.08
Domestic infelicity.....	76	90.28

TABLE IV
MEDIAN I.Q.'S OF CHILDREN FROM AMERICAN,
ITALIAN, IRISH AND MIXED FAMILIES

GROUP	NUMBER OF CHILDREN	MEDIAN I.Q.
American.....	132	89.28
Italian.....	92	82.38
Irish.....	55	93.77
Mixed Nationality.....	62	92.14

come under the illness classification. Half a dozen of the other high ones are in the illness group, and in two other instances the problem specifically is syphilis. In any family which offers alcoholism, illness or domestic infelicity as the central problem for the C. O. S. there is more than an even chance that the children have at least median intelligence.

On the basis of nationality some interesting results appeared. The only nationality groups sufficiently represented to justify calculating a median were American, Italian, Irish and mixed. The

figures here presented have no bearing whatever on the question of race inferiority or superiority; they simply show the comparative intelligence levels of these races, or rather nationalities, which happen to come under the care of social agencies. Table IV gives the median I.Q.'s. The Italian group is lowest, but some allowance should be made for linguistic hindrances—perhaps 5 points or more. That the American should be lower than the Irish is rather surprising. The phrase, "mixed nationality," requires some definition. It refers to children whose parents have different national origins, one or the other of whom was born in the old country. An "American" child is one, both of whose parents were born in America and are of the same nationalistic ancestry. An "Italian" or an "Irish" child is one who was born in the old country or both of whose parents were born in the old country. On the basis of nationality the Irish families seem to offer the most promise, where intensive case work is done.

CONCLUSIONS

The degree to which social work is eugenic or dysgenic is not indicated by these studies, because to demonstrate this it would be necessary to show that the I.Q.'s are with rare exceptions inherited biologically, which geneticists are not prepared to admit without qualification at present, even when the low I.Q.'s due to accident or illness are eliminated, and to prove that social work contributes to the relative increase of inferior persons in the population, concerning which adequate research has not been done.⁵ So

⁵ For recent opinion among geneticists regarding inheritance of intelligence, see "The Biology of Superiority," Raymond Pearl, in *The American Mercury*, November, 1927, and "Evolution and Genetics," Thomas Hunt Morgan, p. 206ff.

far as the individual is concerned, however, this is not so important. Regardless of whether the I.Q. is determined in the germplasm or not, it is a fact that the I.Q. of an individual changes little in his life time. There are exceptions, where the individual recovers from illness or is "re-conditioned," but these are relatively not numerous. When it comes to reproducing his kind, the cause of the individual's low I.Q. becomes highly important; if it is an inherited deficiency, then reproduction is dysgenic, and any social worker who encouraged reproduction under the circumstances would be functioning dysgenically. But social workers are increasingly concerned with this problem and may be expected to apply their case work technique to it.

In view of the above limitations, our conclusions are chiefly statistical and are summarized as follows: (1) Social workers are dealing with children, a majority of whom are well below average capac-

ity; (2) the fact that a family gets cash relief signifies nothing as to probable intelligence levels in so far as C. O. S. families are concerned, except that, like the majority of children in C. O. S. families, the I.Q.'s are likely to be lower than those of the average population; (3) there is some tendency for low I.Q.'s to go with large families; (4) where illness or domestic infelicity is the chief problem, chances are more than even that a child has intellectual capacity equal or better than the C. O. S. median; (5) Italians tend to be low, partly on account of language difficulties, though Dr. Young thinks they are lower than certain other nationalities anyway; (6) American children tend to be lower than children of Irish or mixed parentage; (7) the intelligence test helps to individualize the child; (8) the distribution of I.Q.'s among children from dependent families indicates the need for more adequate social resources in the community.

THE PAUPER IDIOT IN KENTUCKY

ARTHUR H. ESTABROOK

KENTUCKY has subsidized its feeble-minded poor with direct grants from its state treasury for over a hundred years. In 1793, the Kentucky legislature passed an act providing that any person of unsound mind with an insufficient estate to support him might be granted, through the courts, what is virtually a pension out of the public funds. The records now available show that \$8640.47 was paid by the state in the year 1829 to its feeble-minded poor. The number aided that year is not indicated but as the grant then was less than fifty dollars a year, it probably

represents about three hundred individuals. The story of the administration of this law, its sudden abolition and then almost immediate re-enactment is unique in social history.

The courts were empowered by the first pauper idiot law and its subsequent amendments to adjudge a person of unsound mind and without sufficient support a pauper idiot after the presentation of evidence and verdict by a jury. At first no definite allowance was mentioned in the law. Later, the grant was set at fifty dollars a year and about the year 1870, it was placed at seventy-five dollars per

annum and remained at that figure for over fifty years and until the law was repealed in 1918. As the state increased in population, the number of pauper idiots paid a yearly grant increased until in 1910, one person in every one thousand and thirty of the population of the whole state was on the payroll of the state treasury as a pauper idiot at the rate of seventy-five dollars a year. In that year, the state paid \$161,643.86 to its indigent feeble-minded; this amount being 3.7 per cent of the total operating expenses of the state that year.

As early as 1881, when the year's grant to four hundred feeble-minded poor was only \$19,657, the State Auditor wrote in his annual report,

I am fully satisfied that this charity is greatly abused. . . . A large portion of these beneficiaries are mere children, less than ten years old. Inquests have been presented placing mere infants in arms a charge upon the Treasury, as idiots—one of only seven months, a number of twelve, fifteen and eighteen months of age. . . . I have invariably refused to pay these . . . on the broad ground that no jury could be competent to determine whether an infant of so tender an age was an idiot or not; and that it could not have been the purpose of the Legislature, in enacting such a law, to provide that a mother should be paid seventy-five dollars per annum for furnishing nature's nutriment to her babe.

This in 1881!

He goes on to say,

I am creditably informed that in some counties people go about hunting up children who do not manifest the ordinary degree of sprightliness, take them before the county court, obtain a verdict of idiocy with the understanding that the person be appointed the committee.

He then suggests that there be a more rigid investigation before the inquests.

The high peak in payments by the state to its pauper idiots was reached in 1917,—\$167,236, to approximately twenty-three hundred pauper idiots. The following year, 1918, the Legislature passed an act

providing that until January 1, 1921, every pauper imbecile should be committed to the institution for the feeble-minded and that no such person should be placed on the pauper idiot list unless the superintendent of the institution shall first notify the judge that no room exists. After January 1, 1921, every pauper imbecile shall be committed to the institution, according to the act. This act further provided that no pension should be granted for a period beyond the first of January, 1921, upon any inquest held after the passage of the act. The previous law had provided that inquests must be held every five years and a grant held until the end of that period. Hence the granting of the pauper idiot pension came to a close. The total amount paid for pensions then slowly decreased following 1918 until the year 1925 when only \$2.16 was paid.

The Commissioner of Charities, in 1921, carried on an investigation of conditions among the pauper idiots in several counties, visiting the homes of the idiots and talking with the committees. It might be explained that the committee is the person to whom the money is paid directly from the state treasury, usually a merchant either in the county seat or in the neighborhood of the idiot's home. These committees had never been required to make an accounting of these funds although the circuit court had the power to order such return. It was apparent that many abuses of these grants were taking place. The pauper idiot sometimes was the lever wherewith to secure public funds and the whole family of the idiot became the beneficiaries of the food and clothing. The family of many of these idiots were moronic and they never knew how much was due them from the merchant; hence many misunderstandings took place. In a very few cases the committees were actually dishonest in the

matter of the pauper idiot funds. On the other hand, many of the committees, especially the country merchants, were very kindhearted and permitted the idiot's family to overdraw the account to the merchant's loss. The pauper idiot pension had thus become a form of outdoor relief granted from the state instead of the county, the usual source of such relief in Kentucky.

The Legislature in 1924, however, re-enacted the pauper idiot pension law,—the only difference being that in the new act the county paid one half the pension, the state the other, the amount per year remaining the same, seventy-five dollars. The law provided that the individual be brought before the court, "tried" by a jury and if adjudged to be an idiot or a lunatic and a pauper, the action of the court shall be certified to the fiscal court of the county and also to the State Auditor who shall issue his warrant on the treasury. It was evidently the intent of the legislature to endeavor to keep down the number of grants by having the local authorities pay one half of the amount.

In the first year following the passage of the new act providing for county participation in the idiot grant, seven hundred and eight individuals in eighty-seven counties had been tried before a jury and adjudged pauper idiots and placed on the pension rôle. In these later "trials" one or two physicians made affidavit or gave direct testimony concerning the mental status of the person. A parent or neighbor usually testified as to the person's lack of estate or sufficient support. The law in 1926 cost the counties \$26,277, and the state an equal amount, or a total of \$52,554. In 1927, nine hundred and fifty pauper idiots in ninety-nine different counties were on the county and state list at a total cost of \$70,218.

This is the situation only three years

after the passage of the new act providing for county and state participation in the pauper idiot grants, each on an equal basis.

From 1840 until recent years, the State Auditor has published each year in his Biennial Report the names of the pauper idiots receiving the state grant. A study of the names shows some interesting facts. Fourteen pauper idiots in Clay county in the mountain section of the state received pensions in the year 1850. The population of the county then was 5421. There were twenty-seven in the list in 1880. The number had increased to thirty-nine by 1910, (population 1910, 17,789), or one in every four hundred fifty-six of the county population was receiving pauper idiot aid.

In this same county, the records show one man received a pension in 1850—his name was still on the list in 1900. Three thousand, two hundred and fifty dollars had been paid by the state to his committee. Another in this same county first appears in 1860; his last appearance was in 1900. Here two thousand, seven hundred and fifty dollars had been paid for the care of one person. Several are found listed in 1890 and still being paid in 1927, having received aid continuously except for the short period about 1924 when it ceased. One woman received aid for about twenty years, then was dropped from the rolls for twenty years and in 1927 appears again.

Twenty-nine pauper idiots in Clay county received state grants totalling \$2,175 in 1921. Twenty of these were males, nine were females. This is an incidence of pauper idiocy of one to five hundred eighty of the general population of the county. In 1926, eight of these pauper idiots were given relief under the provisions of the act of 1924 at a cost to the county of \$300 and the same amount to the state. Two of these eight also received

other help from the county as outdoor poor relief,—one of \$245.90 to be "kept" and the other of \$10. Thus one pauper received \$320.90 from the public funds in one year. In this same year, 1926, one other individual was adjudged a pauper idiot and granted the usual amount, making nine who received the grant during that year.

A study of the status of the pauper idiots on the list of Clay county in 1921 was made in the year 1927. Twenty-two of these were still living in the county and nine of these received pauper idiot relief in 1927. Three were dead, three in other counties of the state, only one being in the State Feeble-Minded Institute, and one was unknown. One of the former pauper idiots, not now receiving help, but still in the county, was reported physically and mentally capable of self-support and it was the opinion of the community that he should be made to work. Another was married, with a family, and traveled about the county as a tinker and made a very fair living. This man was not then considered feeble-minded. The other ten were in their respective homes and apparently getting along perfectly well without the pension. In several of these cases the former committee had lost track of the ward. The committee of one woman stated that he still had some money belonging to the ward and would send it to her if the investigator would locate her,—this eight years after he had received the pension check from the state!

Fourteen pauper idiots received the pension in 1927. Nine of these had been on the 1921 list. One who had not received a pension for fifteen years was placed on the list that year. Four new individuals were adjudged pauper idiots in 1927. The cost to Clay county for the pauper idiots in 1927 was \$525; there was an equal cost to the state.

The same story can be duplicated in other counties. Leslie county, also in the mountain section, has had approximately ten pauper idiots on the records every year since the formation of the county in 1879. In 1927, nine received grants under the joint county-state payment plan. One of these had been on the list for thirty-five years. Her brother, with whom she has lived for many years, has been a farmer of average success, was later county jailer for a term and more recently has run a general store in the county seat. Another idiot has received relief for twenty-seven years. The incidence of pauper idiocy in Leslie county is as one to eleven hundred of the population.

The number of pauper idiots in Owsley county, also a rural mountain county, increased from three in the year 1850 to thirteen in 1910. It then decreased to eight in 1921. This county gave ordinary poor relief to five of these pauper idiots at the rate of \$25 per year during 1922 at the time when the state grant had ceased. In that same year the county also gave \$25 poor relief to each of three other individuals who later were adjudged pauper idiots when the 1924 act went into effect. Eight idiots were given the pension in 1926. One of these eight also received \$37.50 extra that year from the county on account of blindness. Six were recipients of the pension in 1927 and one of these in turn received extra poor relief because of blindness.

The city of Louisville with a population of 235,000 and a well organized public and private charities program, had a few less than two hundred pauper idiot pensioners in 1920. This represents a ratio of one pauper idiot to every one thousand one hundred and seventy-five of the population of the city. Sixty-four individuals in Louisville were granted the idiot pension

SOCIAL FORCES

in the year 1926 under the provisions of the 1924 law and seventy in the year 1927. The largest city in the state with a highly developed economic and social organization is thus taking advantage of the pauper idiot grant as well as the rural and more backward sections of the state.

The State Institution for Feeble-Minded at Frankfort, Kentucky, had four hundred fifty-eight inmates the last day of June, 1927. Their care for that year had cost the state \$100,695, or \$225 each. These four hundred odd feeble-minded are being

pensioners. It will soon be paying \$150,000. This money is given directly to the committee of the idiot and there is no subsequent supervision in any way by the state or county as to its use.

There are no provisions in the 1924 law which indicate any desire or formulate any plans to better the condition of the feeble-minded subsidized by this act. The same amount of money—this money—could be spent constructively. The present institution for the feeble-minded could be enlarged not only in inmate capacity

TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER OF PAUPER IDIOTS IN KENTUCKY, THE AMOUNT OF RELIEF PAID BY THE STATE, TOTAL STATE EXPENDITURES AND STATE POPULATION AT VARIOUS PERIODS

YEAR	NUMBER OF PAUPER IDIOTS	COST TO STATE	TOTAL STATE EXPENDITURES	STATE POPULATION
1829		\$8,640.47		687,917
1830		10,049.72		
1840	392 (year 1844)	17,358.41		779,818
1850	478 (year 1851)	18,738.55		982,405
1860	453 (year 1861)	22,255.49		1,155,684
1870	403	19,063.89		1,321,011
1880	895	68,941.59		1,648,690
1890	1,270 (year 1892)	99,327.95		1,858,635
1900	2,040	138,937.46	\$2,824,225	2,147,174
1910	2,233	161,643.86	4,304,309	2,289,905
1917	2,300 (est.)	167,236.41	9,675,957	
1920	1,788	132,081.00	12,948,630	2,416,630
1922	1,486 (est.)	111,545.51	18,619,405	
1923	850 (est.)	64,028.77	18,022,954	
1924	52 (est.)	3,861.95	23,619,296	
1925		2.16	42,123,109	
1926	708	26,277.48	40,853,930	
1927	950	35,109.65	38,487,589	2,536,000 (est.)

cared for in a very satisfactory manner and will not reproduce their kind.

Nine hundred other feeble-minded—all indigent—judicially declared pauper idiots—exist in the state. Past experience shows that within the next five years there will be at least twenty-five hundred names on this list of pauper idiots. These will be found scattered over the whole state, in the cities and in the rural districts.

The state is now paying out over \$70,000 each year directly to these feeble-minded

but greater facilities for the care and training could be provided. Farm colonies can be built for those who need continual oversight but who can work well under supervision. A parole system can be inaugurated. Competent and continuous supervision can be given to those feeble-minded who finish their instruction at the institution and can be placed out in the community, and there are many such feeble-minded who can live almost normal lives under those conditions.

SOME NEGLECTED ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF POVERTY

MERTON K. CAMERON

THREE is no problem confronting the modern world of greater importance than that of poverty. It is no new phenomenon. Nor, have students of social conditions ever been remiss in their recognition of its significance and in painstaking study of the factors involved. Certain aspects of its nature, causes and function, however, seem to be accorded inadequate emphasis in recent discussions. The proper social attitude toward poverty, to say nothing of remedial policy, would seem to justify a well-balanced presentation of all phases of the problem.

The word poverty is commonly used so indefinitely that any analysis of it necessarily compels a preliminary statement of what is meant thereby. It would seem that it is nothing more nor less than a comparative social condition depending upon relative control over economic goods, the standard of comparison being a social group possessing a maximum of such control, called the rich or wealthy. All who are not so distinguished constitute the poor and to their social condition the noun poverty may be applied. This class, however, comprises a hierarchy of subclasses each possessing a lesser degree of control over the wealth of its age than the one immediately preceding. Both of the primary as well as the various subgroups comprehended in the poor are characterized, also, by distinctive social attitudes and a close similarity to the corporation in that they are continuous associations of men whose personnel is continually changing through members of the lower groups being elevated into the higher and vice versa.

If this analysis of the nature of poverty

is correct, we must logically conclude that its complete eradication is impossible outside of communism. The most that can be anticipated in this direction is to elevate in whole or in part the marginal class alone or contemporaneously with the preceding ones. Nor, may any improvement in the material condition of the poor resulting from a policy of this kind be expected to eliminate dissatisfaction with the distribution of wealth since inequality, the basic cause of discontent, will still remain. In fact, the more hopeful spirit inspired in them by such changes combined with the absence of a marginal class as poverty-stricken as that previously existing to serve as a standard of invidious comparison, may even augment their discontent.

Assuming, then, that poverty is a comparative social condition which can never be eradicated short of communism, what are its causes? An adequate answer, of course, requires an explanation, first, of the hierarchy of classes and, secondly of the absolute amount of wealth controlled by each. Existing discussions of the causes of poverty are so numerous and penetrating that it would be useless, even though space permitted, to enter into a comprehensive analysis of the subject. Most students, however, seem to place inadequate emphasis on the following aspects of the problem.

The fundamental causes of this hierarchy of classes are certain psychological and physical characteristics inherent to varying degrees in men themselves. These qualities, the product of both birth and environment, contribute each its bit to the creation of variations in the amount of wealth enjoyed by them and thereby

to the emergence of social classes comprising those possessing control over economic goods to the same degree.

First among these qualities is mental ability. Those enjoying a superior working equipment in this respect are able to acquire a greater portion of the wealth of their age than their less favorably endowed neighbors. This is because intellectual preeminence enables its owner to call to his assistance such productive agencies as experience, organization and capital, facilitates more efficient use of the other factors influencing wealth control and what is even more important enables him to foresee and grasp opportunities for this arising from the economic maladjustments peculiar to a dynamic society or from the relative incompetence of his business associates.

Of almost equal significance in creating disparities in the control of wealth are divergencies in physical ability among men. The physically strong are more efficient productive agents than those less gifted in this respect. They can work harder and longer without stopping to recuperate, while the longer life peculiar to those so endowed affords an added opportunity for accumulation. Nor is it necessary for them to dissipate such a large proportion of their earnings to maintain their working efficiency. At the same time, preeminent physical ability reacts favorably on the other factors effecting wealth control. The strong possess superior mental endurance and alertness which, in turn, facilitate its positive causative faculty in this respect. And, a similar effect is apparent in the case of the other factors controlling wealth accumulation analyzed in the following paragraphs.

Wealth control, also, depends upon the activity motivating effectiveness of man's instincts. These so function partly by

causing variations in thriftiness from man to man. For example, he who possesses a superior development of his acquisitive instinct will also tend to be surpassingly thrifty, accumulating thereby in due time a greater control over economic goods than his less favorably endowed neighbor. On the other hand, a super-development of the instincts of display and sympathy is destructive of thrift and its accompanying wealth control possibilities; for they encourage its dissipation both by spending and giving. Instincts also determine wealth control through their effect on the relative productiveness of men. Thus, the more pugnacious are inclined to work harder and hence be more productive than their fellows creating thereby a larger fund of goods upon which thrift may function. Similarly, the instinct of display often stimulates productive effort that its possessor may parade the accumulated results thereof before his associates.

Finally, differences in wealth control are due to a considerable extent, it would seem, to variations in the emotional tendencies which men display as they come and go from day to day. Emotions so operate through the fact that they, too, influence to no small degree economic productiveness. He who possesses a marked tendency toward emotion is apt to be less productive of economic goods than his less excitable neighbor. This is because much of the energy that would otherwise be devoted to this end tends to be sapped by the great variety and volume of his emotions; while, even that remaining is apt to be unwisely directed. This, of course, would not be true when the assumed emotion results in an overt act of a productive nature. Still, even under such an assumption, any increased productivity arising therefrom is probably largely offset by inefficient direction during the productive process so stimulated,

and subnormal productivity during the recuperative period immediately following. At the same time, the emotional usually find it difficult to adjust themselves to the economic organization designed by society for the satisfaction of its wants, a consideration naturally reflected in the continuity of their opportunity for the expenditure of productive effort. Emotions, also, effect unequal distribution of wealth through shaping the thrift capacity of various men in differing degrees. Those endowed with a supercapacity for such agitation are inclined to dissipate even hard-earned savings during an emotional spree. On the other hand, they may be equally penurious providing that the stimuli playing upon them happen to tip the balance in that direction. In our individual specialized-exchange society, particularly, the highly emotional are deprived of a very prolific source of accumulation by their inefficiency in bargaining. This is because the bickering involved in this process compels a cool and calculating brain encased in a sphinx-like physiognomy, neither of which by hypothesis characterizes such people.

Differences in brain, brawn, instincts and emotions, then, are important basic causes of variations in wealth control among men and hence of the various classes in the hierarchy of the poor as previously described. Of course, no one person is endowed with all of these characteristics to a maximum degree. Rather, it is the complex resulting from their union that fixes one's exact position in the hierarchy. It is often argued seriously in popular parlance and implied to say the least by those more analytically minded that inequality in wealth is primarily due to such incidents external to the individual as the trust movement, wars, methods, of railroad financing, etc. The truth would seem to be that they are simply tools or devices

used to effect the distribution of wealth and income in proportion to these ultimate capacities of men mentioned above. Were they non-existent, others equally repugnant would be invented.

If the above analysis of the causes of variations in wealth control is correct, then, we must logically conclude that an equalization of the environmental conditions that play upon individuals even if it were possible would never effect economic equality. For, in such an event, variations in men's mental and physical ability, instincts and emotions originating in birth-right would still remain to thwart the attainment of such an equilibrium. The most that ever can be accomplished by manipulating environment is to adjust wealth control more nearly to men's native endowment in these respects.

Finally, it is largely inadequate consideration of these human causative elements in the distribution of wealth that both accounts for and explains the failure of many alleged remedies for poverty. Any successful scheme of relief must rest squarely upon a realization of their preponderant importance. Perpetuation of undue emphasis on environment not only thwarts any possible relief but is, also, socially dangerous; for it tends to cause those afflicted with poverty to shift the responsibility for their condition and to become hopeless if not fatalistic, both of which operate to make of them poor workers and enemies of the existing economic and political order.

The absolute amount of wealth controlled by the rich and its posterior classes comprising the poor depends, of course, on the productiveness of the group of which they are the component elements. This, however, in the last analysis rests on the relation existing between its working natural resources and working labor power.

By working natural resources is meant

such diversity of natural resources as is available for exploitation. Unavailable resources have no effect on social productivity except in so far as they influence the rapidity of the exploitation of those already available. Thus, the existence of unlimited quantities of shale petroleum has no effect upon the production of petroleum except in so far as it thwarts its conservation. Furthermore, even the productive potentialities of available resources can never be attained without an adequate diversification thereof. This factor becomes increasingly significant as non-human agencies assume greater and greater importance in the productive process. In spite of this, however, there is still evident a tendency to unduly emphasize amount at the expense of diversification as a determinant of social opulence.

By working labor power, on the other hand, we mean the sum total of the energy possessed by an economic group capable of being devoted to turning its endowment of working natural resources into wealth. This, in turn, comprises the sum of the energy of its available laborers plus any additional amount contributed by such agencies as capital, organization, and experience which raise to a higher degree man's equipment in this respect and make available for his use such energy as is buried in nature about him.

Both the number of available laborers possessed by an economic group and its endowment of energy whether derived from the human organism itself or agencies extraneous thereto depend fundamentally upon the working mental and physical ability of its members plus the working effectiveness of their instincts and emotions as existent in the past as well as in the present. For, capital, organization, and experience are durable and both the evil and the good of parents are visited upon their children even into the third and fourth

generation. This being so, the economic accomplishment of a group at any particular point of time is not necessarily indicative of its economic strength because this depends upon its existing fund of the aforementioned physical and psychological qualities which is the sole source of the solution of its immediate economic problems. Actual accomplishment, on the other hand, is shaped by these characteristics as possessed by past generations as well as by the one of the time in question. It is this fact that often explains the rapid decadence of societies immediately after the age of their greatest power.

Though the productive energy of an economic group depends basically upon its store of mental and physical ability, instincts and emotions, it does not follow that a high general level of these will result in a maximum amount thereof; for this depends upon their dispersion as well as their general level, the former being especially significant in both new and highly dynamic societies where a sprinkling at least of men exceptionally well endowed in these respects is necessary to solve the highly complex problems peculiar to such groups. Herein, lies the danger of the modern tendency to connect national prosperity both in theory and practice with a high level of intelligence even though it be arrived at through the sacrifice of the gifted few. The members of an economic group at any particular point of time, however, should not be disheartened because its stars do not appear to measure up to those of the past. The fact of the matter is that the circumstances of a dynamic society seldom demand a succession of geniuses possessing exactly the same qualities; for the differing problems of each generation compels dissimilar types of ability. Hence, such a comparison is impossible and fruitless as indicative of either progress or decay.

In every economic group, there is a definite equilibrium between its working natural resources, working labor power and the component elements thereof which results in maximum social opulence. Thus, the productivity and hence wealth control of frontier communities is small compared with the wealth creating potentialities of their natural resources. This is because they are always deficient in the various elements comprising labor power. And, what is equally important, the efficiency of their existing supply is usually curtailed either because their equipment of capital, organization and experience either individually or in toto is inadequate to enable existing laborers to work with maximum efficiency or because the laborers themselves are too few to utilize the capacity the actual store of those components of labor power possessed by them. As these maladjustments in the relative relationship of natural resources, labor power and the constituents thereof are overcome, the productivity of the members of such communities both severally and as a whole increases and continues to do so until a certain equilibrium is attained. This point of equilibrium, however, is not necessarily the same for any two economic groups: nor for the same one at different times because natural resources vary in both nature and amount with place and time.

The application of additional laborers or an improvement in the efficiency of the existing ones beyond this point of equilibrium while continuing to increase for a time the sum total of the wealth of the group and even that of its individual members when increased efficiency alone is the source of the added labor power, will eventually result in either case in a decrease of its absolute productiveness. For, as either or both of these sources of energy are increased, supplementary sources remaining constant by hypothesis both in

number, kind and efficiency, a time will arrive when the added laborers or those saved as a result of their increased efficiency will be unable to contribute anything to the productivity and hence to the wealth of the group because of inability to secure the necessary supplementary sources of energy. This will be the more pronounced the further the group is from the primitive stage and therefore dependent upon capital, organization and experience for wealth creation. Contemporaneously, those actually possessing such agencies of production will become increasingly inefficient as they are rendered obsolete by the necessity of working resources more and more difficult of exploitation.

On the other hand, a similar result will ensue when the supplementary sources of energy are expanded beyond the point of maximum wealth creation. Under such conditions, much of the energy of the existing laborers will of necessity be expended in the creation and maintenance of such sources of energy many of which by hypothesis must remain idle all or much of the time, themselves constituting thereby no addition to the social wealth, adding nothing to it through the utilization of their energy and at the same time, rendering the group's necessary equipment in this respect inadequately manned, thereby diminishing its productivity to the extent that this occurs. In this case, the absolute productiveness of the group is immediately curtailed. Nor would the net result be essentially dissimilar were both laborers and supplementary sources of energy to be increased beyond the point necessary for maximum production. If the above analysis is correct, then social policy aiming to influence social opulence must be elaborated with reference to the effect of the relative relations of the various productive factors as well as that of their absolute amount thereon.

The changes in the productiveness of an

economic group as it passes from minimum through maximum to diminishing returns is, of course, reflected through the influence of those factors previously mentioned as determining wealth distribution in the opulence of the individual members of the group and through them in the status of the rich as well as that of the number and opulence of the classes comprising the poor.

In an economic group characterized by limited productivity, the spread between the rich and the conspicuously poor will tend to be exceedingly narrow and, correspondingly, the number of intervening classes will tend to be reduced to a minimum. For example, at the bottom of the scale, there will be a marginal class at the subsistence level and from this a limited number of classes will extend upward until the standard class, the rich, is reached. As the group approaches maximum productiveness, the degree of opulence corresponding thereto will tend to be indicated by a gradual widening of the spread between the rich and marginal class of the poor, the intervening space being plugged by additional classes. This increased spread will be due to a gradual upward swing of the amount of wealth controlled by the rich, the margin continuing to remain at the subsistence level. Contemporaneously, the major part of the population of the group will tend to gravitate toward the classes near the middle of the hierarchy, those at both ends of the scale becoming smaller and smaller with the tendency increasingly marked as these limits are reached. At the same time, the spread between the classes toward the top will tend to widen as it is approached. Thus, the margin does not rise as is sometimes implied but the marginal class tends to become of relatively decreasing importance.

After diminishing returns set in, the space between the rich and the margin

begins to shrink accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the number of the intervening classes. This occurs through a gradual downward swing of all the classes constituting the hierarchy the margin gradually absorbing one after the other those immediately antecedent to it, the rapidity of the movement tending to increase as the bottom of the scale is approached. The net result of this evolution will be to root an ever increasing proportion of the total population of the group in the marginal class and those immediately preceding it accompanied by a gradual widening of the space intervening between the successive classes as the top of the hierarchy is approached. It is this movement that is sometimes spoken of as "the destruction of the middle classes."

The primary cause of this shifting of the components of the social hierarchy would seem to be the increasing importance of mental ability as a determinant of wealth control. As an economic group passes from the primitive squalor accompanying inadequately developed resources through maximum prosperity and diminishing returns, an ever increasing premium is placed on capital, organization, and experience which supplement the energy of the human organism in the productive process and which depend more and more on mental ability for both their conception and utilization as their number and complexity increase. At the same time, as the social organism waxes more intricate thereby, it determines more and more the effectiveness of the other factors influencing wealth distribution. Finally, the more numerous and complex economic maladjustments peculiar to involved social structures compel a higher degree of intelligence for their discovery and successful employment as wealth accumulating agencies. However, once hit upon, their

very number and complexity, by rendering their control difficult, endow them with a peculiar effectiveness for purposes of wealth control. This being so, the basic solution for the problem of economic inequality in the later life of an economic group would seem to be the removal of any conditions conducive to mental degeneration and the elevation of the general level of its intelligence without sacrificing, as has been pointed out, the intellectually precocious.

The phrase, "Exploitation by the rich," is sometimes used to explain the so-called "poverty-stricken condition of the masses." Just what is meant by these phases is somewhat difficult to ascertain. Presumably, by the "rich" reference is made to the possessors of capital. This, however, raises the question of how much capital an individual or class must possess before he assumes this rôle. The tendency seems to be to understand thereby the rich as defined above or at least the upper classes in the economic scale. This position is taken, too, in face of the fact that the small capitalistic employer is proverbially exacting, heartless and penurious and the small corporate stockholder is the most vehement in demanding dividends and the most virulently vituperative when they are denied him. Nor is it logically conceivable that all capitalists whether large or small should be so disposed. The motives of human action are too numerous for the mere possession of capital to make men social ogres. This being so, the problem of exploitation if it exists is an individual rather than a class problem calling for individual rather than group antagonism and remedial action. Furthermore, this theory fails to explain why the "rich" in functioning are selective permitting thereby some who have no capital to enjoy a large quantity of economic goods and others only suffi-

cient for subsistence. Finally, assuming that such exploitation exists, it does not necessarily follow that it is socially dangerous. There are, as we shall point out, many manifest advantages arising from the existence of a poverty-stricken class.

The use of the terms "poor" and "poverty" and the mechanism by which the exploitation is effected are, also, not very clear-cut in the minds of those holding this theory. Whether the entire body of the poor as defined above or solely the marginal class or this class plus an indefinite number of those antecedent thereto is referred to cannot be accurately determined. It is generally assumed that the exploitation occurs through public guarantee of private property and contract which makes possible private control of capital and denial of its use to those having none or very little except in return for all or at least a very considerable proportion of their product above subsistence. If this is so, then there should be no poverty in early societies where this lever exists to only a minimum degree if at all. The fallacy of this conclusion, of course, is patent even to the casual student of social history.

Conceding, however, satisfactory answers to all of the above observations and assuming the term "rich" to apply to all large possessors of capital and "poor" to an indefinite number of classes at the bottom of the social hierarchy and the mechanism of exploitation to be private property and contract, this theory is invalid because the poor produce nothing to be filched from them. The entire product usually attributed to their labor is not produced by them but by the capital, experience, and organization with which they work and which is furnished them through the generosity of the superior classes in the social hierarchy. Hence, it is they who are the exploiters, the

capitalists being the victims of their fell designs. If this is so, the only justification of their conduct is the very questionable one that every man possesses the inalienable right to live and that this end justifies any means.

The proof of this thesis may be presented best, perhaps, by tracing the probable evolution of society in the light of conceded historical facts and economic principles. So long as the number of our earliest ancestors remained sparse relative to the natural resources of their tropical home, they were probably able to secure with their hands wealth sufficient to satisfy their primary wants with a minimum expenditure of mental, physical and emotional energy. As population increased, however, diminishing returns undoubtedly compelled them to dig ever deeper for roots and go farther up in the trees and away in the distance for fruit and nuts. Under such conditions, those on the margin mentally, physically, and emotionally unable to maintain the pace must have died, and insufficient nourishment and physical exhaustion shortened the lives of those classes antecedent thereto in direct ratio to their distance from it. Urged on by its imminence if not by actual suffering, we have every right to assume that those classes in which the average of the above characteristics was such as to enable them to do so proceeded to improve their natural equipment for maintaining life, such improvements falling into the categories of capital, experience, and organization. And, it is equally probable that both their conception and evolution involved laborious endeavor, severe mental anguish, and even physical danger.

At any rate, the net result of the presence of these new contrivances was a reduction in the expenditure of energy necessary for survival. Their use was, no doubt, confined at first to their discoverers.

But, as soon as their efficiency was demonstrated, they were unquestionably seized upon and utilized by the less gifted each to the extent that his intellectual and physical endowment permitted. Though the efficiency of their use naturally decreased as the bottom of the scale was approached, still, even the marginal class was probably able at first to relieve the burden of living considerably thereby.

With the passage of time, however, more and more numerous and intricate devices had to be conceived and constructed by the superior classes to ward off the dire fate of a population expanding in the face of the law of diminishing returns. Sooner or later, these inevitably became too complex for the marginal class not only to manufacture but even to operate efficiently. Confronted by inadequate sustenance, it was now compelled to enter into a bargain with its superiors both to furnish it with the necessary devices and to direct each member in their use in return for a share of the product the only quid pro quo available. In this bargain the value determining elements were no doubt such that it was compelled to pay the entire combined product derived from their use over and above what could have been produced with contrivances created and directed by its members minus that part of the remainder necessary to guarantee them a minimum subsistence at least.

This bargain was consummated by the superior classes mainly because of shortsightedness for the simple reason that, had they stopped to think, they would have realized that equal gains involving no greater expenditure of energy on their part could have been secured from still more improved devices conceived, created, and directed by themselves. As a matter of fact, not only did they not do this but a large part of the gains so secured was no doubt used to increase the number of those

already existing that all the members of the marginal class might enjoy thereby a longer space of life than their "I.Q." warranted. This being so, such returns both then and now partake somewhat of the nature of a reward received by the superior classes in society for holding out a helping hand to their less gifted fellow men.

The net result of the development outlined above was that a considerable part of the essential wants of the marginal class was now due to these improvements supplementing the natural endowment of its members for production. Had they been deprived of them, death ere long would have been their lot. As time has passed, an ever larger share of the necessary wants of the lower classes in the social hierarchy may be attributed in this way to the brains, brawn, instincts, and emotional control of those more gifted in these respects until today probably the entire livelihood of an indefinite number of the classes immediately above the margin as well as varying proportions of that of a number of those even further up in the social scale is derived from this source. Thus, even when these classes are allowed to live, to say nothing of being permitted to receive more of the social product than their subsistence, they are exploiting the upper classes in the social hierarchy who, through their contribution of experience, capital, and organization bring the wealth devoted to this purpose into existence.

While there is no exploitation in modern society in the sense discussed above, still, there is operative a continuous transfer of economic goods from man to man that from casual observations would seem to partake of the nature of exploitation. Everywhere in our social structure, men possessing a relatively higher average of brains, brawn, instincts, and emotional control are preying upon those with a

lower average. The possibility of this arises from the fact that under existing social conditions men may secure through inheritance, lucky economic maladjustments, etc., control over a supply of economic goods by no means commensurate with their working endowment of such qualities. This being so, a shifting of economic goods occurs tending to equalize their gifts in these respects and their control over economic goods. This type of exploitation, however, in its essence is socially beneficial since it operates to place wealth in the hands of those who can use it most efficiently.

Now, it may well be asked, if poverty has always been with us and seems likely to continue as long as man's mental, physical and psychological structure remains unchanged, does it perform any useful social function or is its presence to be universally deplored? The answer to this question cannot but be in the affirmative. For, many of its effects are unquestionably wholesome.

In the first place, poverty stimulates the more gifted to greater endeavor. Such men beholding the unsavory condition of the poor are incited to harder work and more careful preparation for the tasks of life that they may avoid thereby a similar fate. It operates, also, as a goal to those who have an aversion for work or who fail to adequately comprehend its necessity because of the intricacy of the social organism which tends to hide the close relation between reward and effort. This being so, as diminishing returns become more and more pronounced and the necessity for more constant and laborious endeavor becomes increasingly evident, the corresponding conspicuousness of poverty tends to stimulate men that they may meet successfully the new environmental conditions. Nor, is this stimulus limited to those engaged in any one occupation. Rather, it

permeates all whether they minister to the spiritual, esthetic, or physical man.

Poverty, too, spurs on those endowed with thriftiness to attain their maximum saving potentialities. This being so, a large part of the capital amassed by society owes its existence to the instinct of fear engendered by poverty, and, in this store even the most lowly share, so far as their capacities permit, not only through the legal possession themselves of more goods than otherwise would have been the case but also through the possibility of enjoying both physically and intellectually the greater quantity accruing to others thereby. For, legal possession is not necessarily the measure of the enjoyment of wealth as many critics of the existing social order apparently assume.

In stimulating capital accumulation, also, it is the very repelling force of conspicuous poverty that is most effective. Still, so harmonious is the scheme of things that this very class which encourages the collection of capital tends to restrain its concentration in the hand of single individuals. This arises from the fact that hostility of the rich is inspired in the poor in inverse ratio to the size of each man's fortune. In the same way, the rich tend to use their power to bridle the license of the lower classes and limit the extent of their exploitation. For, the more successful the parasitic classes the less their hostility and the greater the opportunity of the rich to secure the entire fruit of their efforts. The more nearly these contending forces attain a stable equilibrium the more stable will be the state.

A high degree of division of labor entails many occupations very unattractive either because of the laboriousness of the work connected with them or because of unsavory environmental conditions. Consequently, pressure of some kind is neces-

sary to force men to enter them. Poverty provides the required pressure. So justly, indeed, does it function that the unintelligent fitted by nature for no other occupations and those whose mortal existence is conditioned by this division of labor tend to be the ones who are selected for them. This may be economic slavery, but it is a slavery mellowed by justice.

Successful organization of labor necessitates that some command and others obey or what is probably more common today that the same man both give and receive obedience. In the case of those who possess a highly developed reasoning capacity, the consequences of disobedience conjured up by its functioning is usually quite sufficient to effect the desired result.

In other cases, however, the limited development of this faculty or a perverted development of one or more of the instincts which tends to smother it, render imperative a more tangible and compelling obedience commanding agency. This is furnished by poverty, the order of its procedure being disobedience, discharge, destitution, submission, and success.


Of no less social importance is the influence exerted by poverty in arousing the critical and inquiring spirit among men. The value of this is recognized and lauded by all. Still, it will remain submerged forever unless aroused to action by contrasts, the more marked the more effective their functioning in this respect. Of all the contrasts in the social world, that of poverty has been the most prolific in stimulating and fostering this laudable spirit. And indeed, once engendered, it has not confined itself to any one field but has spread over the whole realm of knowledge until there is no phase of human progress that cannot be said to be indebted for its being more or less intimately to conspicuous poverty.

Poverty, too, is a matchless builder of character. It is the struggle to rise against disheartening odds that tends to produce such estimable human qualities as determination, persistency, temperance, sanity of sympathy and breadth of moral vision all of which must be in the hearts of both the leaders and led of a highly complex society confronted by fast retreating resources if it survive.

It cannot be denied, of course, that poverty tends to drive men into vice and its attendant evils. It should be born in mind, however, that in such cases, the fundamental cause is the instability of the moral foundation upon which character is constructed. Poverty is only a contributory cause whose function in this respect can be performed equally well by extreme weather. In fact, by showing up such weaknesses, it really functions for the benefit rather than the detriment of society. For, its possessors are excluded thereby from holding positions which would afford them the potential power of doing even greater harm. Nor, should we fail to give due weight in this connection to the fact that poverty deters from vice many men with potentialities for evil by limiting the idle time at their disposal. It is quite probable that a more equal distribution of wealth secured by some artificial means would actually increase rather than decrease the volume of vice.

Finally, poverty would seem to increase the sum-total of human happiness. This arises from the very nature and origin of happiness, which is an attitude of mind consequent upon a feeling of joy, an emotional state arising primarily from a temporary satiation of the intellect or the capacity of man to acquire, organize and interpret knowledge. Hence, happiness is a by-product of intellect. This being so, the ultimate capacity of men to be happy will vary directly with their ultimate intellectual capacities. This latter, however, tends to decrease as we descend the social scale until the marginal class possesses intellectual capacity with its by-product of creating happiness to only a minimum degree. Consequently, when wealth is absorbed by the upper classes, it is being placed in the hands of those who possess a maximum capacity for enjoying it and so of being happy. So smoothly does this work out that intellect a cause of poverty, also prevents those possessing it from experiencing unhappiness. Furthermore, joy and happiness not only arise from the possession of wealth but also from accomplishment. This being so, the world's stock of happiness is increased the more men of capacity are born in poverty and are compelled thereby to fight their way up. For the harder the fight and the greater the distance the more the joy and happiness from accomplishment.





THE COMMUNITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD

This department is conducted by THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY CENTER ASSOCIATION, and is edited by LeRoy E. Bowman, 403 Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York City.

COMMUNITY CENTERS OF ADULT EDUCATION IN ENGLAND

BASIL A. YEAXLEE

THE problem of civic regeneration is always twofold. We must have better cities for people to live in, and better people to live in our cities. But without wasting time on futile discussions as to which comes first we may well differ in the relative emphasis we lay upon the two.

For us in England the situation has been a great deal clarified since General Booth wrote *In Darkest England and the Way Out*, and Canon Barnett founded Toynbee Hall. Much that had then to be initiated and carried through by voluntary effort has now become the duty of the state or the local government authorities. Education, housing, employment, pensions, and other public services are established as the business of the community. On the other hand the development of trade unions and the coöperative movement has brought about a great improvement in the material conditions of wage earners. The purely philanthropic activities of social workers are not needed in these days as they were a quarter of a century ago. Moreover, those for whom such efforts were made have become more independent: they do not want things done for them. They wish to be in a position to do things for themselves.

This obviously means that if the mass

of the population are to bear their full share of responsibility for government, national and local, to take their proper part in the organization of industry, to prove a constructive force in politics, and to create for themselves a satisfactory social life and environment, they must have adequate opportunity for the enrichment and discipline both of their individual personalities and of their corporate consciousness. The urgent question is how the present generation is to make, in the best sense, a happier and nobler business of living.

Dr. Ernest Barker concluded his inaugural lecture as Professor of Political Science in the University of Cambridge with a strong plea for the study of education. He said:

The theory of education is essentially a part of political theory. It is not so much a part of psychology . . . it is rather a matter of social theory—of grasping and comprehending the purposes, the character and the needs of Society and the State, and of discovering the methods by which the young can be best trained to achieve these purposes, to maintain and even improve that character, and to satisfy those needs.

What Professor Barker thus sets forth from a theoretical point of view is becoming generally recognized as the true line of practical advance towards the achieve-

ment of a better order of society in all respects. The adult education movement in England is developing rapidly because the twin forces of supply and demand are working vigorously together for its progress. It is an inseparable part of the considered policy adopted by organized labor and by the strongest of the working-class organizations. Curiously enough, though University Extension began just over half a century ago as an attempt to provide for the cultural hunger of the working classes, but for reasons became predominantly a middle-class movement, adult education has lagged considerably among that part of the population during the present generation. A renewal of appetite is becoming manifest again now, however. Two other constituencies are likely to prove increasingly important in stimulation demand; the various political parties are encouraging educational effort among their adherents, and on the other hand the Churches are slowly awakening to the necessity that religion must continue to lose ground unless every man is capable to some degree of giving reasons for the faith that is in him. There are also bodies of people nationally organized for special purposes, such as support of the League of Nations principle or advocacy of Copartnership in Industry, which necessarily stimulate their members to more or less systematic study and discussion, as also to more purposeful reading. One of the most notable tendencies in the life of the country at the present time is the increase of desire for high quality in such recreative pursuits as music and (among groups of the Community Players type, at any rate) drama. Perhaps the most significant feature of adult education in England just now is its many-sidedness. Never have we had a great number of men and women devoting themselves to serious study for courses lasting for periods which range from three months to three years,

while the number prepared to give up a whole year to a residential course in one of the people's colleges or at a university is growing. Yet at the same time the educative value of informal activities like hobbies, handicrafts, guided foreign travel, and so forth, is receiving recognition. One of the first questions to which we have to address ourselves with far greater energy than heretofore, however, is how to evoke and organize demand among the great multitude of the people.

No less encouraging is the growing readiness, amounting in some cases to almost enthusiasm, among sources of supply to put facilities for adult education at the disposal of all who wish for them. Following the example of Oxford in setting up Joint-Committees for Tutorial classes as they had previously followed that of Cambridge with regard to University Extension, the Universities and University Colleges are one by one setting up, as special Government subsidies have enabled Oxford and Cambridge to do, Extra-mural Boards with functions which include the two well-established types of work and contemplate experiments in many new directions. Local Education Authorities are giving more and more assistance to voluntary organizations, and the more enterprising of them are also making direct provision for the needs of adults in certain instances with striking success. The Board of Education itself is now definitely committed to the furtherance of adult education as part of its acknowledged responsibilities, and seeks to fulfill its task by means of financial aid and by the valuable work of its Inspectors, as well as through its representative Advisory Committee on Adult Education.

EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL SETTLEMENTS

The aim of Educational Settlements is to concentrate these forces in each community where they are established. A

common meeting place for diverse groups means more than increased amenities for each. It renders possible the formation of a student body which not only plays its part in the democratic government of the Settlement but also develops a corporate life which, as the ancient universities have shown, is a vital part of true education. The leadership of an experienced Warden, giving his whole time to the multifaceted task of teaching, organizing, and acting as friend and advisor to all who come to the Settlement, is an important factor in the success of this work. Obviously also this grouping of student-groups at a common center renders it easier to establish and maintain fruitful relationships with the Local Education Authority and the appropriate University, just as, on the other hand, it facilitates experiments in drama, foreign travel, and other less conventional forms of adult education.

Though Educational Settlements have developed on lines of their own, and have a federating association distinct from that of the Residential and Social Settlements, there is entire sympathy between the two bodies. Neither would claim that it possesses the full solution of the social problem. Nor would either maintain that programmes and policies effective forty years ago are adequate to the situation today. Equally, of course, the most progressive types of work now in vogue will almost certainly grow into, or be displaced by, others evolved by the next generation to meet its own needs. Yet in so far as the original venture went to the roots of both the realities and the possibilities of human life we shall always be able to say of it that "The more it changes the more it remains the same." Each real variety of social effort has something distinctive to contribute to the social good, and its particular contribution will continue to be

necessary even though it may take such forms that the continuity is not obvious. There is no reason to suppose that Social Settlements will all turn into Educational Settlements, or that the work they are doing could be accomplished by Educational Settlements. It is clear that the most vigorous of the older type are attaching increasing importance to the directly educational part of their activities. It would also seem that practically no new Settlements are being started on the old philanthropic lines, and that with certain exceptions the existing Social Settlements are finding it increasingly difficult to secure residents, whereas young people leaving the Universities are showing genuine eagerness to take some part in the development of adult education.

Generalizations regarding the trend in Social Settlement work, however, are even more hazardous than those about tendencies in the Educational Settlements. For various reasons the educational group (including five residential colleges for adult students) is more compact, and more inclined to beat out a common policy (while encouraging all fruitful differences of method and setting much store by perpetual experiment) than the social. The point of importance is that neither can get very far without discovering its need of co-operation with the other. But this does not invalidate the conviction that social progress cannot be achieved in the community or the nation, as they exist in these days, unless all efforts to foster it have a strong educational element. On our side of the Atlantic we are beginning to realize the value of Dr. John Dewey's philosophy of education, as he unfolds it, for example, in *Democracy and Education*. But an organization which does no more than merely arrange lectures and classes, excellent and useful as these may be, has not begun upon the real business of fitting

men and women to understand and make full use of themselves and their environment.

Mrs. Dorothy Canfield Fisher is wise in her insistence, at the end of her most stimulating book "Why Stop Learning?" that detailed comparison between Great Britain and the United States with respect to adult educational methods and achievements is

misleading. This holds true of social service generally, and perhaps in particular of settlement work. But though circumstances differ so greatly the ultimate reasons for social and educational work on a community basis do not, nor can the end in view be different, whether the scene be American or German, British or Chinese.

THE SLUM: A PROJECT FOR STUDY

NELS ANDERSON

THE word "slum" has come into disrepute. Having come into vogue with the wave of humanitarianism that swept the country in the eighties and nineties, suddenly, with the decline of slumming as a philanthropic pastime, the word became taboo, but the slum remains. In relative terms the slum differs from city to city as in any city it differs from time to time. In the organization and life of any city it is a changing and migrating fact. Yet it always remains the habitat of the socially and economically impotent folks; a retreat for the poverty-ridden and a last resort for the maladjusted. Every city has its worst area; its unkempt houses along the tracks, its shanties on the river bottom, its row of houseboats, or, if it is a metropolitan city, its East Side, its West Side or some other area of mediocrity. It is not poverty alone that marks the slum, nor is it the antiquated building. It is in addition an area of social disorganization, low morale and high transiency.

The transiency of the slum is one with the transiency of the city. The city is the creature of movement and feeds upon it. People are constantly being sorted and shifted, and segregated spatially according to one or another set of interests,

but chiefly they are distributed to the blocks and streets according to their abilities to pay rent. The slum *itself* is but an aggregate of smaller areas as varied in nature as the types that occupy them. Thus, to mention only a few, we have Chinatown, Greektown, Hobohemia, the rooming house slum, crime and vice areas, Black Belts and other areas of race as well as a medley of family slums. Each tends to have its own social values, its own universe of discourse; in short, culture patterns of its own. But it is equally true that the life of the slum, regardless of the nature of the slum, if it is to function at all in the larger life of the entire city, must gear into that larger life or be an embarrassment to it.

ORIGIN OF THE SLUM

The slum as we know it is no older than modern industrial society of which it is a part and into which it is anonymously integrated, though superficially it may seem to be detached in its life from the rest of the city. We may say that while areas of the city become more highly integrated and bound together in their impersonal relations, in their associational relations they become more isolated. The

extremes of society become strangers to each other, which is illustrated by the fact that before the industrial revolution had passed through one generation slumming had come into vogue. The poorest habitation areas had become so strange and removed from the general life of the city that visiting them was nothing short of adventure, and serving the slum was nothing short of heroic.

The slum was discovered to the rest of the city during the middle decades of the last century. It was brought to our attention by the newspaper seeking human interest stories and literature seeking fresh themes of life. That period which gave us a Dickens was followed by a period of more critical attention when people began to see problems and wrestle with cures. From philosophy they turned to social service, and out of this yearning to serve we got the beginning of social science. The conscience of the university was touched and as a result a flood of intellectuals went into the slum establishing settlements. New York has no less than a dozen settlements that were started by the colleges and universities during those years. Students of society began to look for "laws" of social control. The social survey came into vogue; first as a sentimental investigation not unlike muckraking and gradually developing into painstaking factfinding. During the "humanitarian" eighties and nineties dozens of organizations for the "improvement," the "betterment," the "rescue," the "reform," the "correction" or the "protection" of the poor were set up. In half a century many of these old approaches to the slum have changed; old interests have been replaced by new ones. Crusading and slumming are yielding to science; all of which calls for a re-definition of the slum in more objective terms.

KNOWN ASPECTS OF THE SLUM

About the slum, its inhabitants, its relations to the city, its continuance and the problems it presents, there is much to be learned. Doubtless there is much to be unlearned as well. However, there are some things about which we are sufficiently certain that we may label them facts. We know, for instance, that the slum is not a thing apart but a segment of a larger arrangement; that whatever its nature it fits and functions in the life of the city. Obvious as this may be, housing reformers and slum removers have generally failed to recognize it. They have regarded the slum as a disease instead of the symptom of a disease. Take the poorest sixth of the population of any city, or the richest sixth, living at the opposite extremes of habitation areas. By isolating either, the life of the whole city would be paralyzed. Each segment of the population as well as each area of the city is a functioning part of the whole city. If we carry over to sociology the Gestalt concept, which is not new to psychology, we have difficulty in viewing any part of the city, whether Broadway, Park avenue, the Bowery, Wall Street or Hester street as detached unities.

Another significant fact is that the slum, like every other part of the city, is the creature of and derives its nature largely from shifting land values. Frequently it is a borderline residential occupancy wedged in between a retreating use of space for residential purposes and an advancing change of use. It is residential space the least in demand for residential purposes though it may have a future for other types of occupants, depending upon its availability and demand. Like parts of the East Side in New York it may enter a new residential cycle, or like other parts

of the East Side, it may be taken over by commerce or industry. In a rapidly growing city any residential area in the path of change may degenerate into a slum and any slum may be wiped out for more acceptable uses. The faster the city grows the faster these transformations take place.

This brings to our attention a third fact about the slum; that of movement and occupational succession. In the modern city changes pursue one another in disturbing procession. New occupants are constantly invading and old ones are being crowded out. Occupational succession is a fact not only of the slum but the whole city. No area is immune. Movement is both up and down the social scale, but generally the bulk of it is from areas of less advantage to areas of more advantage; from the slums at the heart of the city to the suburbs at the periphery. The slum is a point of invasion and hence a center of population increase. Most of the plain folks the city acquires come to it through this port of entry displacing the occupants they find in the slum. The displaced occupants move to a region of more advantage farther from the center there displacing some other occupants who in turn move farther out. The whole is a wave-like migration outward while any given residential area passes through as a result, a series of occupations; each occupation being of lower social and economic status than the previous. Ultimately there is in any given house a final and least occupant whose presence is tolerated until the situation permits or requires a change of use.

AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF THE SLUM

Any house in the city and any residential area in the city where the value is ultimately determined by the site value of the land and the improvements on the land, may experience such a succession of occu-

pation and such decline in status. This is equivalent to saying that any residential area in a changing city may finally become a slum. The slum may then be regarded as a migrating phenomenon of the city. This is amply illustrated in our larger cities. In New York City the East Side is changing very rapidly. Settlements and community houses that established there three decades ago are now being stranded. The poor have gone to the Bronx and the Brooklyn shore of the East River. Many former East Siders have dared to move into Flatbush and former Flatbush residents have fled to the suburbs. They say that the East Side is becoming respectable. Certainly it is becoming colorful and there is plenty of evidence of building revival. It would be very interesting to find out how much this change has been brought about by the presence of hundreds of welfare agencies on the East Side and how much is it the natural result of changing land values and the shifting forces of city building. It would be interesting to find out if this area which we call the slum, the beggar area of the modern city, has been helped or hindered at any time by welfare moves against it or for its betterment. So long as we have a poorest population and relatively lowest rents and the least favored of social and economic classes may we expect to have slums? To press the queries on the other side: what can we hope for in the way of social direction and control from the social sciences? How can we so perfect the processes of human salvage so that, even though the slum continues in some form, the waste involved is reduced to a minimum? Finally, what resources and methods has sociology for arriving at a sane and scientific interpretation of the slum?

Obviously, this is a subject on which most thinking has been emotional. Nor

are we helped much by the many books that have been written any more than we are helped in our study of the city by the many books that have appeared on that subject. The decks need to be cleared of a great deal of rubbish and on this as on other matters with which sociology must deal we need to take our cue from the

physical sciences and start at the beginning. And then we need to study it in relation to all other facts that incorporate it into the life of the city.

In ten years more than a third of the population moved out of the West Side of Chicago. They say that the East Side and the West Side are becoming respectable.

THE COMMUNITY FUND AND THE COMMUNITY

CECIL C. NORTH

THE most significant development in the community life of American cities during the past decade has been the development of the community fund movement. Previous to 1917 there were some beginnings of the movement in several cities. Cleveland and Cincinnati in particular had begun a joint method of financing their social work agencies, and the Jewish group in a number of cities had achieved a federation of their social work activities. The incidence of the war, however, brought to all American communities the problem of raising large amounts of money quickly for the welfare activities of a number of national agencies. The so-called war chest was the device chosen. In some cities the local social work agencies were included in the drive for funds to support the national agencies.

These war chests set the community fund movement ahead much farther than a decade of peace-time activity could have done. After the close of the war community chests for local agencies appeared rapidly in a large number of cities and continued to grow in numbers until at present there are approximately 300. Boston, New York, Pittsburgh, Washington and Chicago are at present the only large cities without some form of one.

While the stimulus of the war chests had much to do with hastening the movement, it cannot in itself explain the completeness with which it has spread over American cities. We must seek the explanation in the nature of the problem that has existed in American cities and in the approach to it which the community fund has provided.

In its inception the community fund has been fundamentally a reaction of the business man to the financial problems presented by the support of a great variety of social welfare agencies. These problems pertain both to the number of agencies and to the difficulty of evaluating their work. The development of social work in American cities during the past twenty-five years has brought into existence a bewildering array of organizations. The only limitation on their creation or continued existence has been the ability to collect funds for operating expenses.

While probably no one person had to listen to the appeals of all these separate agencies, many business and professional men undoubtedly were compelled to give considerable time to this process and, in many cases, as members of boards of directors or committees, they were asked to

assist in raising the funds of different agencies. Moreover, the difficulty of knowing the quality of the work of all those who appealed for support was quite as troublesome as was their number. Among them undoubtedly were many whose claim for support was based on exceedingly poor grounds, but the time required to investigate their merits would generally cost more than a subscription.

It was inevitable that under such circumstances the business man would be appealed to by a project that promised to reduce the number of appeals for support to one, and to inaugurate a system of inspection and approval of agencies that would guarantee to him that his money was properly expended. The community fund, coming with such a proposal, was manifestly in harmony with the general movement in industry and business toward consolidation and efficiency in management.

Moreover, the size of the total fund and the imposing organization of the campaign appealed to the imagination and interest of the man who thought in terms of finance and business organization. That this appeal to the point of view of the business man and industrial leader is the chief explanation of the rapid extension of the movement is evident from the character of the arguments used in the promotion of the project in many cities and in the identification with the local community fund organizations of many men who previously never showed any interest in the social work of their communities.

But support of the community fund movement has not come merely from that part of the population who are primarily interested in finance and business organization. There have been many others, among them a considerable number of the outstanding social workers and members of boards of directors of social agencies,

whose interest in the organized life of the community reaches much farther than the problem of efficiency in finance. To this group the community fund movement has meant an effort to secure a unity and coherence of the forces of the community working for human welfare. For this group the essential weakness of the social work of American cities has been the wasting of spiritual resources and the failure to secure effective results, because of an entire lack of efficient organization and coöperative effort. To them the community fund has meant an attempt to see community needs in their entirety, to present a united front to these needs, to utilize to the fullest all community resources. In short, centralized finance, for them, has been merely a device through which the city could become a community with respect to its social work.

It is from this point of view that we must evaluate the community fund. As a device to make the raising of money more convenient or to promote efficiency in accounting, it undoubtedly has some value, but no large importance. Its relation to the communal life of the city is its justification for its recognition as a significant movement.

What then has the community fund to contribute to the promotion of a genuinely coöperative and communal program in social work? Several definite contributions may be enumerated:

1. It greatly increases the number of contributors and volunteer workers, and thus makes social work a more real expression of the interest and responsibility of the whole community. In practically all community fund cities the proportion of the population contributing has very greatly increased as compared with the situation previous to the establishment of the fund.

2. The community fund has the power

to make coöperation between social agencies more effective than it can be without a financial foundation. Coöperation is an easy word to repeat and there are many gestures in its behalf which do not go far towards accomplishing results. The councils of social agencies that existed in many cities previous to the inauguration of the community fund movement accomplished a great deal in the way of developing acquaintance among social workers and promoting good will among the agencies. But without any power of controlling action not many of them got far in changing the actual practice of agencies. Budgetary control gives to a council of social agencies the necessary power to enforce its decisions. Whether the question is the division of labor between agencies, or the relative scope of the various agencies, or the supplementing of the work of one by that of another, or sharing the financial support of the community, the public opinion of the community, as represented in the council of social agencies, has little chance of getting itself translated into action without some such power as is found in budgetary control. This control need not be arbitrary if the machinery for reaching decisions is representative and the methods of administering the decisions is intelligent and tactful, but control there must be or coöperation becomes merely an empty phrase.

3. A community fund, having financial resources at its disposal is in a better position to round out a community program of social work by filling in gaps. In every city where social work has developed on an individualistic basis, and this is true of all American cities, there is much unevenness in the way different needs are met. Some fields are especially well taken care of, possibly having a surplus of agencies, while other needs are not

met at all. Besides, new needs are constantly appearing in any developing city.

A non-financial council of social agencies with the requisite staff might discover these needs and advise their being met. But without money at its disposal to finance the work, most of them would wait for long periods before being taken care of. If this council has the power of presenting these unmet needs to the community and thus find a support for them, the process of rounding out a more complete community program goes forward. This may be done by expanding the work of some existing agencies or by creating new ones.

Not only is the progress faster in filling the gaps, but it is done in a manner more consistent with good community organization than when each agency is left to expand in accordance with its own ambitions. The combination of facilities for seeing the community in its wholeness and the financial ability to secure support for new enterprises is necessary for any well-rounded program. A new clinic in a neglected part of the city, additional nursing facilities, a children's bureau, or an organization for research may be the item needed. In fact, every city is in need of a considerable number of enlargements or new agencies. Which should come first? Only the united judgment of the whole group of agencies backed by sufficient finances to give effect to their judgment, can direct a well-balanced program.

4. In the difficult task of stimulating the development of public departments, a community fund gives the private agencies a more strategic position than they otherwise would have. The creation of new public departments of social work or the expansion of old ones or raising their standards of work, are tasks that call for a high type of statesmanship combined with

effective means for securing results. The development of public departments does not take place automatically. It requires much painstaking and well-directed effort. The group of private social agencies should be the center of the movement in every city for carrying on the campaign. This involves the development of a public opinion that will force the desired development, but it also calls for something more. In carrying on negotiations with public officials a wise statesmanship and effective power are needed.

If the public official is anxious to go as far as public opinion and his financial resources will permit in the direction of better public work, he needs the support and backing and counsel of an influential group of citizens who understand the problem. If he is slow to respond he may need the pressure that such a group can exert. In such situations a group that has the united financial backing of business men such as a community fund has, can wield most effective influence, certainly more effective than could the separate agencies acting in an individual capacity. Unity of command is as necessary here as in a military enterprise.

5. The community fund is able to discover community needs and to promote the education of the community in social work more effectively than can the separate agencies working alone. The most fundamental need in social work in every community is a more complete understanding by the citizens of the needs that exist and of the means and methods which social agencies are using to meet the needs. The extreme complexity of modern city life conceals a multitude of needs vitally related to the family life, the health, the character and citizenship, the happiness, of many of the citizens. Every increase in the size and complexity of the city makes these

needs less apparent though the need itself may be more urgent. The normal impulses of people are ready to respond if these needs are known. But few citizens have any opportunity to know the problems which are faced even by their neighbors living in close proximity to them. Menaces to health, obstacles to a proper development of childhood, breakdown of family life, cases of maladjustment that, neglected, go on to crime and community loss and personal failure, physical and mental torture, all abound in the modern city while the neighbors who could help and would desire to help go their way wholly unaware of the tragedies that go on unrecognized. What is frequently regarded as the cruelty and indifference of modern urban life is in most cases simply an unawareness of the needs that exist.

Modern social work is an expression of the organized good will and neighborliness of the city. It seeks through organization to make available the sympathy and compassion of the citizen who wishes to do his part to meet these urgent needs, but who in his individual capacity is ignorant of them and helpless. But although many needs are brought direct to the social agencies, many others are never recognized, at least until great harm has been done, much of it irremediable because the problem was not taken hold of in time. There is a very great requirement, therefore, of some means of discovering needs in their incipiency, of throwing out sentinels and outposts to discover lurking dangers to social and individual wellbeing, of analyzing critically the hidden factors that menace as well as the obvious problems that press for attention.

Individual social agencies may do much in fulfilling this function of discovery and analysis of needs, but the task can never

be done adequately until it is centralized and the facilities created to see the welfare problems of the community as a whole. Health and recreation and family life and child protection have so many lines that cross and recross that the challenge that they present to the modern city cannot be properly understood if the different aspects of the situation are attacked singly. The community fund with centralization of finance and facilities for community-wide study is the only means yet found for meeting the situation.

It seems clear from the advantages of the community fund indicated above that the movement represents a real advance towards a more thorough organization of the social resources of American cities than has heretofore been achieved. It is thoroughly in harmony with the general trend toward consolidation and coördination that characterizes so many other phases of modern life. But it is equally evident that the advantages of centralization are always accompanied by some very real dangers. Coöperation and coördination are not ends in themselves. They are merely devices for securing more intelligent service and a more effective utilization of resources. There are many examples of communal unity which purchase their unity at the expense of the vital forces of the community.

As indicated above the community fund movement has met with wide approval from the business and industrial world. And this is undoubtedly true because the business man has seen in it many of the characteristics of the organization of modern business and industry. But social work is a profession, or at least aspires to be one. And representing, as it does, the interest and support of large numbers of people its success rests fundamentally on the initiative and creative thought of many people. Professional skill and a

widely dispersed moral support cannot be organized on the autocratic principles that at present prevail in business and industrial organization. In these fields centralization means dominance by a small group with most of the creative thinking done at the top. The danger in the community fund movement is that it will be assumed that the same principles of organization should apply in it. The danger is more real since the business man necessarily plays such a large part in its organization and there is not yet developed a strong professional personnel in social work whose standing in the community can successfully withstand a powerful opposition if a conflict should ensue. The creation of power is always dangerous unless there exists an adequate control. It is the fear of an inadequate control of the power represented in the community fund that has made so many thoughtful people question the community fund movement.

There are four things that particularly call for safeguarding under such a system as the community fund provides: 1. That the control exercised shall be representative of the whole community or of that part of it which has an intelligent understanding of social work. 2. That the creative thinking and initiative of the separate agencies shall not be seriously limited. 3. That there shall be freedom for the inauguration of new and possibly unpopular forms of welfare activities. 4. That the relation of lay citizens to social work shall continue to be one of vital interest in the activity of social agencies, rather than merely in their financial processes.

1. Representativeness of Control. No democracy, whether a state or a smaller group, has ever succeeded in bringing all members of the body into actual participation in the control of group policies in

proportion to their abilities. This is an ideal toward which all democratic organizations strive but which never yet has been achieved. It would not be practicable to expect that the welfare work in American cities should achieve a degree of democracy in control far beyond other aspects of our community life. The ideal would be that every citizen should make some contribution to the social work of the community and that he should, at least through his vote and his discussion, participate in shaping the policies and programs of the social agencies. In practice we must be satisfied with much less than that. The recent discussions concerning the number of voters in municipal elections should keep us from being too pessimistic concerning the participation of the citizen in so definitely a spiritual enterprise as social work.

Practically, the interests of the community will doubtless be best served if the control rests in the hands of those who most thoroughly understand its objectives and its methods. There is a problem of finance in which the voice of the business man is needed and frequently the business man who knows little about social work can render much assistance in this field. But that a person who has had little or no contact with the actual processes of social work through membership on boards or committees should have a controlling voice in shaping programs is exceedingly dangerous. Every city has a large number of persons, drawn from business, industry and the professions who through service in connection with social agencies have developed a vital interest in and at least some understanding of social work. Undoubtedly it is in this group, together with the professional social workers that the control of policies and programs should lie. These persons may be regarded as representative of the social

welfare interests of the community and a control by them is as near a practical democracy as it is possible to attain. It will of course, be true that if the educational work is properly done this group will be a constantly increasing one. Social work can never be kept progressive without the constant addition of new blood in the boards and committees.

2. *The Initiative of the Social Agencies.* If centralization of the machinery for raising money is to be accompanied by a centralization of the planning of social policies, then all the advantages of the community fund are purchased at too high a price. C. M. Bookman, of the Cincinnati Community Fund well says:

However socially minded individuals may be, no small group can do the social thinking for a community and no small group can long maintain the hearty coöperation of the social forces of a community unless those forces feel themselves to be necessary in formulating as well as in executing social programs. Social service agencies will not and should not consent to surrender their place at the social service planning table.

Both the executives and the board members of social agencies must have the sense of personal responsibility if they are to do any creative work. Commodities may be manufactured or sold by persons directed from a central office. But families cannot be rebuilt, children protected or new bulwarks built against disease and crime, unless those executing the task are also planning it and working with the sense of original creation. Work which is essentially spiritual in character can never be successfully controlled from the outside. Any attempt to do so must result in making the work mechanical or in building up such an opposition to the central authority that it ultimately will fail.

3. *Freedom of Starting and Maintaining New Forms of Service.* Social work at its

best has always had a forward look and the spirit of the pioneer. New paths must be opened and new causes championed. Many of these causes must be unpopular with a large part of the community, at least in their earlier stages. Some of them will have the opposition of certain influential sections of the population. It may be that the community fund cannot itself espouse some of these unpopular enterprises, in justice to the established agencies. But it can at least refrain from making it impossible for such causes to get support. Any community which makes it difficult for new and unpopular causes to get a foothold is putting an iron clamp on social progress. It would be deadly to the spiritual life of a city if a situation were developed whereby only those activities could be supported which had the endorsement of the financial and business leaders. If the community fund is to serve the larger interests of the community it will leave the way open for independent activities to secure support and carry out programs which represent minorities. Many of these may ultimately find a place within the fund, when they have built up an adequate understanding and appreciation of their work. Others may dare to continue as free lances, battling against the entrenched powers of the community but keeping alive a point of view that the community greatly needs. A democratic society can never see the door closed upon the right and the opportunity of such movements to exist.

4. *The Maintenance of an Actual Interest in the Work of the Agencies.* The community fund substitutes for gifts to particular agencies, gifts to a general program of social work. By releasing the agency from the necessity of interesting givers in its work it creates the possibility of the givers losing interest in that work and

giving money without a proper appreciation of the specific uses to which their money is put. Moreover, the big campaign, the elaborate system of accounting, the introduction of methods of saving money, all appeal so strongly to the interest of many citizens, particularly business men, that there is a danger of the financial side of the program looming so large in their eyes that they will overlook the real ends for which the machinery exists. The essence of social work is that it is a spiritual adventure, a giving of the time and efforts of people to serve the needs of their fellowmen. Whenever this service becomes mechanical or the interest is detached from the specific ends for which social work exists, the fundamental spirit is lost and the program must soon languish.

The danger that exists here is a very old one, namely, that the means shall be exalted unto an end and obscure the real end. A financial organization whose existence and promotion detracts from an appreciation of the actual program of work for which it was created, may create a huge monster which ultimately will destroy itself and wreck the foundation of support whereon the agencies rest. A few people can always be found who give out of motives very far removed from a real interest in social work. And many people can for a time be raised to a pitch of emotional enthusiasm for a vague and indefinite objective. But a support of social work that does not rest upon an intelligent understanding and appreciation of the actual objectives of the agencies, must be temporary and insubstantial from the very nature of the enterprise.

It does not follow from this that all or a majority of the supporters must maintain an actual connection with all the agencies represented in the fund. Such a

goal is of course, highly impractical. But an active interest in the work of even one agency will give a definiteness, a sense of reality, a vitality to one's conception of the whole program that cannot exist if the interest attaches merely to a financial organization or to a vague, generalized system of programs. It is true that the community fund has the capacity greatly to enlarge the vision of the person whose interest has been limited to merely one agency, and to give him a larger and communal point of view. But if the net result is to detach that interest from this particular agency and center it upon some mere piece of financial machinery, there has been a loss rather than a gain.

The question may now be raised, Are these safeguards being provided? In practice has the community fund movement succeeded in protecting itself from these dangers or has it succumbed to them? No answer can be given which applies generally. In one middle western city of nearly three hundred thousand population, the control of social work policies has been centered in the hands of a small group of business men the great majority of whom have had no connection with social work, and who have shown no particular interest in the work of individual agencies. The largest agency in the community, employing the greatest number of trained social workers and having a record of twenty-five years of acceptable work in the community, was

dropped from the fund and forced to cease operations because its policies were not acceptable to this central group of business men. In another city of approximately the same size two leading social workers asserted that the community fund had made impossible or exceedingly difficult the inauguration and support of new forms of social work and had made it almost impossible for social workers to register public support of measures that had the opposition of large givers or influential persons. In other communities it has been asserted that the point of view of the business manager has become supreme in the direction of social work.

On the other hand there are many cities where the community fund has the hearty endorsement of the social workers and where a fine spirit of civic interest and coöperative effort has been injected into practically all lines of the social work of the community. The outstanding examples of repressive measures and oligarchical control have been exceptional rather than general. Ten years is not a long enough period in which to determine the results of a social movement. We must recognize that the community fund movement has tremendous possibilities for promoting the communal life of American cities and also that it is beset with many dangers. The direction that it will ultimately take undoubtedly will depend largely on the type of leadership that it gathers to itself.

ONE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY CENTER AND THE OTHER COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

At the National Conference of Social Work, a round table addressed by a representative respectively of the settlement, Y. M. C. A., Y. W. C. A. and the community center, developed several differences in point of view and methods of approach to the neighborhood. The Y. W. C. A. and the Y. M. C. A., as was to be expected, have adopted methods more or less determined by the religious nature of their organizations. The settlement, according to the discussion, seems to be more devoted to the adjustment of immigrants to American customs and the effort to bring to the under-

privileged the benefits of the city, including all the values of health, recreation and culture. The community center represented vigorously that its function was not so much to hand down traditions, values, principles nor morals, but rather to form a matrix in which new values could be worked out by neighbors facing a new social situation. Its work, the contention ran, is therefore not to be judged by standards of the past or even of the present but rather by its efficiency in adapting groups of people to changing civic and social life.

THE RELATION OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY TO THE PRINCIPAL FACTORS OF PUBLIC OPINION

W. S. BITTNER

LOCALITY is a tangible fact with measurable metes and bounds. It is not so with the community and public opinion. These latter concepts are abstractions whose limits are set by arbitrary definitions and imperfect, semi-scientific analysis. Consequently generalization on the problem of the factors of public opinion and their relation to the community is likely to be unsatisfactory until sociology has either fixed upon dependable concepts whose meaning is unmistakable and has applied them for verifiable statistical interpretation or until concrete, detailed, specific, factual data on a given group behavior situation have been assembled and mapped in sufficient quantity that similar maps of other situations will almost of themselves reveal the essentials of understanding.

It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt a critical analysis of concepts and definitions but rather to point a rough course which may promise a way out of the frustration of a too facile handling of the problem. There is no clear cut road to an understanding of any social phenomena—social science is too young to have marked many paths. Whatever public opinion may be, whatever the community may be, in any significant sense they must be placed as links in a chain of related facts, in a series of events, parts, aspects, or factors of collective behavior. The road to be followed is that series, those sequences.

The basic factor of public opinion is the social mind. The local community may have a fairly distinct mind of its own but it is also part of the larger social mind. The relation is complex, for the larger

whole is as varied and intricately constituted as humanity itself.

What is the sort of content that may be discovered and classified for the purpose of filling out the vague outlines of the social mind? At the risk of seeming to propose merely another concept not much more precise than the former, there is justification in pointing to the possibilities of translation into refined concepts of cultural patterns. The concept of pattern as an aid to understanding of culture is coming into use not only by anthropologists but by students of several of the social sciences. The pattern is merely a fairly definite scheme of opinion in which the specific opinions tend to fall into associations or relations to each other because of semi-historical causes and because of the dominance of either traditional ideas or of interest grouping and are pushed about variously by the process of rationalization. There is a partial analogy implied, since patterns ordinarily suggest design for copy and orderly if not logical arrangements of units into wholes. But it is not an adequate analogy because it obscures for one thing the relatively unselfconscious action of social behavior, the lack of pre-conceived plan in forming opinion, and for another it over-emphasizes the rôle of imitation. The pattern, as I see it, is very simply *a way of looking at certain objects*, a way that in rough outlines is commonly taken by certain groups of persons more often than other ways by other groups.

Application of the pattern concept has of course some precedent; it is foreshadowed in the folkways and mores of Sumner and in the term "culture" itself.

Also Cooley's "social mind" suggests pattern, for as Ellwood says it is "in accord with Cooley's view that human nature is group nature, or a phase of the group mind. This latter expression, by the way, becomes immediately understandable as soon as we substitute for it the word 'culture.' What the sociologists have called the group mind or the social mind, is manifestly the culture of the group seen from its mental side in any given situation."¹

Anthropologists do not quite take this position but the Tylorian definition which is generally agreed to be fairly accurate is not inconsistent since the acquired habits and capabilities of humans are primarily mental products of one kind or another. Wallis' definition of culture includes more than does Tylor's but it too insists that culture is the result of that human achievement which implies such mental creations as knowledge, the arts, beliefs and ideals.

If culture implies mental pattern, what is the place of culture traits? And how does a complex of traits differ from a culture pattern?

A trait in anthropology seems to be almost anything from a word or an opinion, to a system of social organization, from a stone implement to a modern skyscraper,—in short, any particular creation of man as a culture building animal, any element of his culture. A tribe or group or community, has its own totality of culture in the sense that, taken as a whole, it differs from that of other tribes, while in detail, in the possession of particular traits, it shares or possesses traits found in other tribes. And it also shares culture complexes, which are clusters, smaller groupings of individual traits. But how these traits and the complexes are related in manner and meaning is the problem of culture pattern.

¹ *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*, p. 16.

The concept of the trait is made clear particularly by Goldenweiser, Boas, Herskovits, Lowie, and Wissler. These writers "show that each trait of culture has its own history and that it is out of these disparate units that culture is compounded. . . ."²

"What is implied is . . . that any given single trait may be taken by an extraneous culture, and this without taking any of the traits which were associated with it in the culture from which it was borrowed."³

This principle applies with groups and individuals in a matter of opinion. Many cases exhibit a kind of picking of opinion out of the air; opinions, phrases, words are borrowed just as a child borrows them,—taken from he knows not where, used, discarded or held on to, without any real understanding of their original significance, sometimes given new meaning, sometimes kept like a pearl in an oyster. Two persons or two groups of persons may have seemingly the same opinion and yet the outward resemblance may have little conformity with the actual attitude and the opinion as it really is if it can be run down and clarified.

The functionalist school of anthropology sharply insists upon the interrelation of aspects of culture and especially upon the psychology of the individuals who are being studied. This point of view leads logically to an attempt to define pattern in psychological terms. It tends too to find statistical measurement, plotting of geographical distribution, and enumeration of traits in strata and time sequences inadequate.

Not only is it necessary to analyse culture into traits, especially the complexes and delimit the geographical or culture

² Willey and Herskovits, *Psychology and Culture*, p. 258.

³ Willey and Herskovits, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

centers and areas; "there still remains to consider the *form* of the culture within the area—the manner in which these complexes are interrelated, and the importance they assume in the lives of individuals. It is a consideration of this problem that leads to the concept of culture pattern, perhaps the most important aspect . . . for the psychologist. . . . Bartlett has shown the relation of the pattern of the society to the process of borrowing, while the functionalist Malinowsky also knows and by implication accepts the pattern concept."⁴

Any opinion, any expression of public opinion in a community, may be profitably regarded as a trait and can be dealt with as an element in a cultural pattern. Such a method yields several suggestive conclusions: an opinion on any community problem has a special meaning in a given situation; the opinion is understandable only in relation to its complete setting; groups of ideas or opinions arrange themselves in definite ways with particular meanings for different groups of people in the community; the verbalization of individual attitudes (opinion) while often ostensibly a unit product of an independent person actually has peculiar personal shadings and at the same time larger social implications—in both, the reality is to be found in the pattern; the totality of attitudes and opinions of the groups in any one community has a peculiar system of arrangement and a special meaning for that community.

Additional suggestions may be taken from the anthropological method. The chief device employed by the anthropologist, the theory of diffusion, is aided by the historical implications of pattern, but on the other hand is impeded by the realization that psychological factors

render uncertain attempts to gauge the speed, direction and rate of acceptance of diffusing opinions. Also an opinion once borrowed and accepted may be in effect a totally different trait in essential meaning after it is used by the receiving culture. The cultural conditions include existing localized patterns which may not accommodate new elements.

Since pattern implies attitudes, sets, position, bearing, it would seem that individual psychological factors emerge as of predominant importance. However, if attitudes are taken not as static things but as tendencies to act, as behavior, the factors are clearly social. As Wallis has pointed out the pattern psychology is *supra-individual*. This is an old problem in a somewhat new guise, that of the initiative of the individual in the face of cultural pressure. (It is new only in the sense that the pattern idea re-emphasizes the relatively incalculable personal factor, the subjective elements of culture traits.

Superimposed on the cultural elements, which are *supra-individual*, institutional, artificial, historically continuous, and often merely material, are the individual, personal elements. These latter inextricably combined with the former build ever varying structures of attitudes which cast their shadows as opinions. An expression of public opinion is the product of collective action on a varied background of culture.

The attitudes and opinions, being at one and the same time aspects of the social whole and particle products of personal activity, tend to fall into patterns whose outlines are now traceable in individual now in social or cultural schema. These individual behavior patterns and social or cultural patterns serve as the chief factor of particular manifestations of public opinion.

Within the community it is usually

⁴ Willey and Herskovits, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

taken for granted that public opinion, at least on so-called "local" matters, is accounted for by local factors. Such an assumption is warranted if it means only that local, special geographical, historical, or other conditions must be taken into account in certain cases. It is not warranted if it implies that the significant, basal factor is to be found "at home." On the contrary by far the most important determinants of public opinion are those cultural patterns built up by groups or publics which are significant largely in their extra-community extent.

With the rapid expansion of communications, especially in our own time, in the immediate present, the local, geographical community and neighborhood bonds and compulsions are less significant than those which are operative from outside in accounting for typical expressions of public opinion. Indeed it is difficult from the anthropological point of view to grasp the ordinary "common sense" conception of the local community at all, for that view imputes a fictitious, mysterious value to degrees of latitude, names of places, the labels of persons and groups, the occasional habitats of parts of institutions.


Contemporary culture is composed of numerous patterns which interweave among each other in what seems now inextricable fashion. The number of patterns which the different overlapping groups of peoples have in any one culture area, nation or even community, are as numerous as the groups themselves and in addition transcend the groups because individuals in any modern community are parts of other groups which are not contained by localized boundaries.

Certain mental patterns are world wide, coincident with the farthest limits of civilization, and there are other more localized patterns as attitudes toward

immigration and population control, play, recreation, professional codes, occupational standards, etc., but still we can find parts of the patterns recognizable in some degree in wide areas. Then in addition each one breaks up into smaller units of design depending upon the numerous publics to which individuals belong or on the mediums of communication in varying "universe of discourse." And always some parts of the patterns are older than others, or are maladjusted to new features recently imported.

It follows that when a community group is faced with the need for deciding an issue, initiating a welfare project, passing judgment, we have to do not with a simple situation explainable by blanket terms like crowd-mind, group interests, propaganda, leadership, "local conditions," common knowledge, community spirit, etc., but with particular categories of any one or all of these and with, in addition, the innumerable individual behavior patterns of members of the group and the more generalized social patterns of various culture heritages and the problem is further complicated as we realize, with Walter Lippmann, that community affairs are often only in small part matters for "public opinion" at all.

Social psychology has made great progress in understanding the nature of personality; it remains, as Dr. Bernard has pointed out, for sociology to keep pace by a thoroughgoing analysis of the social environment. The anthropologists' method of culture description and analysis must be adapted to contemporary data and applied in the intensive study of specific communities. There is no such thing as a mysterious "public opinion with pantheistic powers," instead there are many public opinions which may be, but often are not, important in determining what gets done in the community.



RACE, CULTURAL GROUPS, SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

RACE PREJUDICE: FRANCE AND ENGLAND

RICHARD T. LAPIERE

WHEN, during 1918, many thousands of American Negro soldiers were sent to France they were surprised and delighted to find that the French people received them on a basis of equality with their white brothers. They were not Negroes now but American soldiers and no special prohibitions were forced upon them. They could eat in any cafe, sit in any station, ride in any part of any train, and talk to the same girls who talked to the white soldiers. They could do these things just so long as their white brothers would let them. These white brothers were, of course, thoroughly disgusted with the spectacle of Negroes associating with what appeared to be decent French people, a situation which they could not justify or comprehend. The Negroes, apparently, did not search for the cause of this unusual situation. They reveled in it, exhibiting in many cases those excesses which seem to accompany every sudden removal of restriction. They became intolerably arrogant and remarkably successful in the competition for the good graces of the French, or so it seemed to the white troops. It was no uncommon sight to see a black sitting in a little cafe enjoying the solicitous attentions of the entire French family, a position which, of

course, belonged by rights to the white soldier.

Two explanations were generally advanced by the American white soldiers for this strange situation. Many were of the opinion that the French themselves were of inferior caliber and flattered the Negro in order that they might more easily obtain his money. Others believed that the French treated the Negroes as equals in order to show their great appreciation of America's aid in the war for democracy. The latter explanation, however, did not hold good when, on further observation, they found that African colonial troops were also given full social recognition. Consequently their conclusion was that the French must be inferior to Americans who, to their minds, correctly recognize the Negro's real character. A somewhat similar explanation is often given by American and English travellers visiting Paris when they see, as they occasionally do, French people accepting blacks as equals.

It is obvious that such explanations exhibit a lack of penetration which is as shallow as it is superficial. Nevertheless, the vital question of the non-existence of racial prejudice in France cannot be as easily dismissed. If race prejudice arises from inherent biological aversion to color

differences, the French must have such prejudice. If its origin is to be found in social conflict the French must have missed such conflict with black people or else developed prejudices which escape ordinary observation. In an attempt to unravel some of the complexities of the problem a comparative study of color prejudice was made in France and England during this last year.

I

In order to determine as accurately as possible the general attitude towards colored people the sampling questionnaire method was resorted to. Since it is impossible for a foreigner to submit formal questionnaires to total strangers and expect to get true reactions, the method of approach and the form of questions used had to be varied according to circumstances. Generally a casual conversation was opened with the person to be interrogated, a thing much easier to do with the friendly French than with the diffident English. After friendly relations had been established the subject of conversation was as tactfully as possible turned to the Negro. Fortunately advertisements using a picture of a Negro were much in evidence throughout France and these aided greatly in making a natural transition to the subject, while in England the race problem in America was often used to open the subject and usually aroused interest immediately.

In France 428 people were questioned regarding their attitude. As often as possible some variant of the question, "Would you let a good Negro live at your home?" was asked. In order to get the widest possible distribution not more than ten or fifteen people were so questioned in any village or city; in all 41 towns, villages, and cities being represented in the results. No effort will be made to classify

replies according to the districts sampled, but they include most of France with the exception of the isolated peoples of the interior of Brittany and of those living north and east of Paris who, for various reasons, could not be considered as representative. For convenience the attitudes found have been classified, very arbitrarily, as falling into one of three groups. The first of these classes includes all those who received the questions without surprise and either definitely replied that they had no objection to living with colored people or else indicated their freedom from prejudice in other ways. In the second group have been placed those doubtful cases who gave no definite indication of a lack of prejudice, yet at the same time did not show resentment on being asked the questions or express definite aversion to the suggestion of living with Negroes. The third group is composed of those who resented the suggestion of close association with colored people or otherwise indicated their refusal to consider such an eventuality.

The results from rural and urban France are:

	TOTAL	WITHOUT PREJ- UDICE	DOUBT- FUL	WITH PREJ- UDICE
Rural.....	227	181	38	8
Urban.....	201	106	58	37
Total.....	428	287	96	45

Every effort was made to sample throughout the economic classes. For example, since fellow travellers in railway compartments were a fruitful source of information different economic levels were tapped by occasionally alternating while travelling by railway between first, second, and third, class accommodations. Similarly, a like procedure was followed in the choice of hotels, cafes, and restaur-

rants. The people interrogated have been classified in economic groups on very superficial grounds but the only ones available. A person encountered in a first class hotel or railway carriage was placed in the upper group; travelling men, hotel and other business proprietors, French motorists, etc., were put in the middle group; while the rest, including small hotel and cafe keepers, village tradesmen, industrial and rural workers, etc., were lumped in the lower group. The lower group should not be thought of as in any way a "depressed" class such as might be expected to give an abnormal reaction. Furthermore, the term "lower group" is not a searching one but includes the mass of the French people. None of the results represents that class of people which is ambiguously labeled "Society" by news writers the world over. The reader will recognize the difficulty of obtaining information from this source and of how, in this study, such information would be of little value.

The results arranged into economic classes are:

PREJUDICE MEASUREMENT

CLASS	TOTAL	WITH-OUT	DOUBT-FUL	WITH
Upper.....	36	3	9	24
Middle.....	141	76	60	11
Lower.....	257	220	27	10

Classified by sex:

SEX	TOTAL	WITH-OUT	DOUBT-FUL	WITH
Male.....	332	228	76	28
Female.....	96	59	20	17

Since the reactions designated as "doubtful" are cases where neither a positive nor a negative response could be obtained to the questions, they tend to repre-

sent the more thoughtful persons who pass deliberate judgments and endeavor to weigh the various factors involved. With such people it is probable that the personality of the Negro would be the deciding factor in situations of actual contact. The economic groups show remarkable difference in the relative numbers of such people, the middle group having 42 per cent, the upper group 25 per cent, and the lower group 10 per cent of doubtful cases. Other causes than the thoughtfulness of the person questioned were operative, of course, but the general tendency towards a more rational attitude in the middle group is indicated by these figures.

Paris, with its heterogeneous population, presented a difficult problem and only by living for some time in a French working-class district was it possible to obtain a "sample" of the French attitude here. Only 60 people were questioned but the results show no marked difference from the rest of France, 37 being without prejudice, 8 with, and 15 doubtful. Two remarkable deviations from the average are found, however, in the results from the cities of Marseilles and Bordeaux, which are:

	TOTAL	WITH-OUT	DOUBT-FUL	WITH
Marseilles.....	14	3	7	4
Bordeaux.....	18	2	8	8
Total.....	32	5	15	12

In both these cities the results were obtained largely from people encountered in cafes, restaurants, and small family hotels, representing the lower middle and lower groups almost exclusively.

If the results obtained from Marseilles and Bordeaux, and also those classified as being in the upper economic group, are removed from the total figures the

result is overwhelmingly in favor of the general observation that the French have little color antipathy. This disregard of the upper group as being a factor disturbing the "normal" or "general" attitude would seem to be justified, for the causes of the upper class attitude towards Negroes do not differ from those affecting economic superiors elsewhere. The larger number of prejudiced cases in this group would seem to be an expression of "social" status and comparable in origin to the attitudes taken by them towards their white economic inferiors. A complete study of class differentiation would be required, therefore, before it could be understood. It might be noted, however, that among the clientele of some of the more expensive Parisienne cafes, restaurants, etc., one may see colored people associating with whites on what appears to be a basis of equality. These whites should be distinguished from what is termed here the upper class, for while they are economically superior they do not represent the stable, conservative elements of French culture. The exceptional cases of Marseilles and Bordeaux are based upon such slight data that only because of the close correlation between them do they become significant. Both are sea-ports and receive considerable direct contact with the Negro sailors who come in with colonial ships. Local color prejudice may have arisen through conflict from these relationships. Such contact is much greater in Marseilles than in Bordeaux, and taken alone it would not seem sufficient to explain the attitude found in the latter city. A hypothetical explanation is suggested by the fact that Bordeaux was the center for the large numbers of American Negro troops used during the war as dock labor. A more searching study of these two cities would be required before any conclusions could be made, but it is evident that disturbing factors are

present here which have modified the "normal" attitude and for this reason it is thought justifiable to disregard them. Removing the data obtained from Bordeaux, Marseilles, and the upper group, the results for France strongly support the general opinion that the French people lack color antipathy.

TOTAL	WITHOUT	DOUBTFUL	WITH
360	279	72	9

Yet to base any conclusion regarding color prejudice on such scant data as that given above would be dangerous, indeed. Whatever our attitude on the validity of "verbalization" may be, it must be recognized that any study of attitudes through direct questioning is open to serious objection, both because of the limitations of the sampling method and because in classifying attitudes the inaccuracy of human judgment is an inevitable variable. In this study, however, there is corroborating evidence on these attitudes in the policies adopted by hotel proprietors. Nothing could be used as a more accurate index of color prejudice than the admission or non-admission of colored people to hotels. For the proprietor must reflect the group attitude in his policy regardless of his own feelings in the matter. Since he determines what the group attitude is towards Negroes through the expression of that attitude in overt behavior and over a long period of actual experience, the results will be exceptionally free from those disturbing factors which inevitably affect the effort to study attitudes by direct questioning. When 31 hotel managers were asked whether they would admit colored people to their establishments 24 replied in the affirmative, usually with some qualification that the Negroes be "good" negroes. Evidently this qualification is the same that is applied to whites

by every hotel clerk in America. It would be difficult to find an American white who, under such circumstances, would distinguish between good and bad Negroes.

Of the 24 hotels to which Negroes would be admitted, 13 were small village establishments such as cater to tradesmen, travelling salesmen, and French motor tourists. In one such establishment the writer found two North African Negroes, engaged in a tour of the country, enjoying the fullest freedom and mingling with the other guests without causing friction or resentment. This would not seem to be an exceptional case. At one summer resort, on the north coast of Brittany, a colored girl was found living and associating with the guests of an unimpeachable "pension-famille" which is patronized by middle-class French families. Of the other hotels allowing colored guests one was a Paris "pension" of good standing, and the remaining nine were second-class establishments in large cities. It should be pointed out that these hotels seldom have to cope with Negroes, yet the fact is, one experience in which the admission of a Negro conflicted with the attitude of the other guests would be sufficient to determine future policy. The situation is quite different in the case of hotels patronized by American and English tourists. These hotels are distinguishable from those catering to the French and the management of seven such hotels situated in the larger cities (four in Paris) was questioned. Five reported that they could not permit colored guests, while the remaining two gave evasive replies, indicating that their attitude would depend upon circumstances. It should be noted that these questions concern guests only, for of course provision is always made for servants, white or colored, who may accompany them. The four Paris hotels gave negative replies but as they cater almost exclusively to

foreign visitors the reason for such a policy is evident. The fact that, with the exception of tourist hotels whose policy is adjusted to foreign, not French, attitudes, French hotel proprietors do not object to colored guests certainly indicates that the French people as a whole are not adverse to associating, at least impersonally, with dark-skinned peoples.

II

The study of color prejudice made in England reveals a very different attitude from that found in France. The methods used in collecting data were similar to those followed in France although in England only three distinct districts were sampled and 315 people questioned regarding their attitude. In this case the question, "Would you let a good colored person come to your home?" was modified, after a number of tests, to some variant of, "Would you let children (their own or other white children as the case might be) associate with those of good colored people?" The particular questions asked depended, as it did in France, on the situation, for every effort was made to prevent any suspicion arising as to the purpose of the questioning. The same method of classifying the attitudes that was used in France was followed in England in order that the results could be used for comparative purposes.

The results according to districts are:

	PREJUDICE MEASUREMENT			
	TOTAL CASES	WITH-OUT PREJUDICE	DOUBT-FUL CASES	WITH PREJUDICE
London.....	137	8	23	106
Birmingham				
City.....	43	2	7	34
Country.....	25	0	6	19
North Wales.....	28	1	3	24
Liverpool.....	82	3	8	71
Total.....	315	14	47	254

Classified according to sex:

SEX	TOTAL	WITH-OUT	DOUBT-FUL	WITH
Male.....	259	10	38	211
Female.....	36	4	9	43

Two factors disturbing these results should be noted. The figures for London include those for 21 English university students of whom 10 gave doubtful reactions. This accounts for the relatively high number of doubtful cases in the London data. Likewise, three of the four women listed as without prejudice are students of social sciences. They all reported that their attitude had brought them into considerable conflict at home.

Since the lines of class cleavage in England are even more complex than elsewhere, the effort to classify the results according to the economic level of the informant is very unsatisfactory. However, in order to get some basis for comparison, well-to-do business men, professional men, clergy, etc., have been put in the upper group (a lumping which would be quite unsatisfactory to the average Englishman); laborers, servants, and skilled artisans, placed in the lower group; while all others, including students, were lumped in the middle group. Upon such a classification the results are:

CLASS	TOTAL	WITH-OUT	DOUBT-FUL	WITH
Upper.....	44	5	7	32
Middle.....	174	8	31	135
Lower.....	97	1	9	87

While the data given above may seem almost too biased to possibly represent the normal attitude, it is believed, nevertheless, to be a fair sampling of the general feeling in England towards colored people.

Moreover, the results from a study of 20 hotels in these districts confirm this belief. The question asked was, "Does the management permit either African or Indian natives as guests?" In some cases the replies were apologetic; most, however, were emphatic. The results are:

DISTRICT	TOTAL	WILL NOT ADMIT COLORED GUESTS	WILL ADMIT COLORED GUESTS
London.....	8	6	2
Birmingham.....	4	4	0
Liverpool.....	6	5	1
North Wales.....	2	1	1
Total.....	20	16	4

The four cases in which colored guests would be accepted are worthy of note. In none of these were the replies definite but only implied that under certain conditions they had taken and would take such guests. One of these was a "first" class hotel in London where possible admission was restricted, of course, to Indian nobility. The second was a fourth rate establishment in the same city; the third was a second class hotel in Liverpool; while the last was a village public-house in Wales. The proprietor of the latter remarked that he had once had a very nice colored man stay with him. Although in 80 per cent of the cases the replies were negative, an Indian student has reported that he has had little difficulty in obtaining accommodations while travelling in England.

III

When the data obtained from France and England are compared the contrast existing between the color prejudice of these two peoples cannot be doubted.

COMPARATIVE COLOR PREJUDICE

	TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE QUESTIONED	WITHOUT PREJUDICE	DOUBTFUL CASES	WITH PREJUDICE
France.....	360*	279	72	9
England.....	313	14	47	254

	NUMBER OF HOTELS QUESTIONED	ADMIT COLORED PEOPLE	DO NOT ADMIT COLORED PEOPLE
France.....	31	24	7†
England.....	20	4	16

* Exceptions as above.

† All tourist hotels.

It would seem justifiable to conclude that relative to the English the French lack color antipathy. However, when discussing attitudes such as color prejudice, it must be borne in mind that any distinction of attitudes between individuals tends to be quantitative rather than qualitative. Thus it follows that in all the above tables the effort to segregate and classify people into one of three groups on a basis of their color prejudice is entirely artificial because of the qualitative nature of such classification. Within any white group there are, of course, continuous quantitative degrees between the extremes of those whites who are violently prejudiced against colored people and of those who are more or less prejudiced in favor of the dark skinned peoples. Somewhere in between these extremes will be a neutral zone in which prejudice or bias does not exist. Therefore, any general conclusion regarding group prejudice must be based upon a recognition of the quantitative nature of such phenomena. Thus in making the statement that, relative to the English, the French lack color antipathy it is not intended to lump the varying individuals of a nation or to abstract the "average" attitude. It is simply a convenient way to suggest the conclusion that if the attitudes

of all the French people could be classified and reduced to a curve of distribution that curve would be skewed towards the "color acceptance" end, while on the other hand, a similar curve for the English would be skewed towards the opposite, or violent prejudice, end. Whether the French people would accept a Negro of comparable culture on a basis of absolute equality in all social relationships it is impossible to determine. The writer believes, however, that in such contacts the determining factor would be personality and not color difference.

The above conclusion has been arrived at by a much less involved and far more vital method by an American Negro. This man, formerly an American soldier, was living in a small French village with a white wife and three children. He appeared to have been absorbed into the local culture and, although evidently enjoying the opportunity of speaking English, scoffed at the suggestion of his returning to America. His attitude can best be summed up by his reply to that suggestion. "Boy," he said, "over here I's a man, over there I's a nigger."

Why do the French lack this color prejudice which is so strong in England? The direct contacts that these two peoples have had with colored races does not shed much light on the problem. In the main the attitude of the average Frenchman towards the Negro must be called "derived," for with the exception of the war period, no large number of colored troops are stationed in France and the permanent Negro population is negligible. During the war, however, African colonial soldiers were used extensively and contact with these must be considered the chief source of direct contact influence upon the French attitude. How far these contacts modified previous attitudes it is impossible to say, but had there been any considerable

antagonism before the war those war contacts would have served to increase it, for soldiers invariably present the worst aspects of the culture which they represent. Three of the villages which were visited had had colonial troops stationed with them for a considerable period, yet the results obtained in these villages do not differ appreciably from the average for all of France. While most of the people questioned implied or stated that they had actual acquaintance with Negroes, the validity of such claims may be questioned on the grounds that once having expressed an attitude, few are likely to admit lack of knowledge regarding the subject. This much may be assumed, however: practically every man who served in the French army had direct contact with colonial soldiers and, since those who served in the army include most of the men now between the ages of twenty-seven and fifty-five, it would seem probable that most of the male informants had had such direct contact. Had this contact led to ill-feeling that ill-feeling would have spread and would have gone to make up the general attitude towards colored peoples.

The English have had even less direct contact with colored peoples than have the French. The colored population is negligible and consists chiefly of East Indians. Many of these are students in London most of whom are well educated in the customs of the English, economically independent, and evidence no cultural differences which, in themselves, would lead to antagonism. The other source of direct contact is with African and Indian seamen and, in small numbers, with colored dock labor in the larger ports. Such contact would affect only a very small part of the population, as these laborers and seamen seldom leave the immediate vicinity of the dock districts.

As far as attitude or prejudice is concerned, the English seldom discriminate between the African and Indian natives. Of the 254 English informants who showed strong prejudice towards colored people, 93 were asked some variant of the question, "But, surely, you are not thinking of the Hindu?" Fifty-one of those so questioned recognized no distinction; 23 made a rational distinction between the Indian and African but had the same emotional reaction to both; while the remaining 19 evidenced some slight modification of attitude where the Hindu alone was concerned. As has already been indicated, these attitudes are what may be termed "abstract" and generally have not been hardened by direct contact. That is, direct contact with colored people has seldom been sufficient to permit the development of any clear-cut, typical, behavior reaction in situations of such contact. That this attitude is, however, a strong conditioner of behavior may be seen by observing Indian students in England.

The Indian students in England are in a difficult position. Usually they are well-educated men brought up in a position of social and economic distinction. It is probable that in their earlier contacts with the English, in India, their status, often that of the high-cast Hindu, is recognized and, except for nationalistic feeling, no strong antagonisms are engendered. In England, however, they are classed to a large extent with the African natives, as black. This places the Indian, who is very sensitive to such feeling, in a defensive position. While at Oxford they associate more closely with the English students, due to the organization there of small college groups, in London they generally segregate themselves and live in groups, which tends to insulate them from outside contacts. Some social intercourse

between the Indian and English student is carried on, but this seldom develops into friendship, and outside the university circle the contact is decidedly limited. The relatively few African natives who come to England for study are even more isolated, as degree of physiological difference seems to play some part in the contact relation. The most evident indication of the strained relations between the Indian and English students is a strong tendency on the part of the Indian students to what is sometimes termed a superiority-inferiority "complex." The Indian, educated in the tradition of superiority, finds himself looked upon, in England, as an inferior and his defensive reaction often takes the form of insulated superiority. The most evident behavioristic indication of such an attitude is found in class or other group discussion where he may become violently argumentative, taking up a strong defensive stand on some trivial point. The writer has seen a considerable number of such cases where the self-wrought emotional condition was patently not the outcome of the point in question but, rather, a protest against an unacceptable social situation. It must not be supposed, however, that the English students are unsympathetic nor that the general public evidence a violent distaste for contact with colored people. There is little of that open, active, dislike which makes our own problem in America so difficult. The problem in England has never been one of direct contact.

It has been suggested that the present lack of color antipathy in France is due to the historical tendency of the "Latin Races" to look upon Africans with less racial antagonism than the "Nordics" do. In other words, that the French recognize, because of earlier historical contacts, a closer blood relationship with these blacks than do the so-called Anglo-Saxons. It

would not be denied that the early contact of the French with North Africa has been greater, but it is questionable whether such early contacts can in any way account for present attitudes and wholly deniable that those contacts have led the French to consider themselves less white than do the English. Without going into an analysis of the real physiological differences between various white and dark skinned peoples, for, indeed, these real differences play little part in the making of racial attitudes as witness the lumping of Indians and Africans by the English, it should be pointed out that there is nothing in the racial coloring of the French which would, of itself, lead them to place a lower valuation on a white skin than the English. No one, no matter how unobserving, would ever mistake even the lighter skinned Indians for native Frenchmen, while a considerable portion of the English are, so far as physiological "type" is concerned, but little different from the French "type." Moreover, the conditions of direct contact are quite the reverse of what might be supposed from a study of attitudes. Most of the direct French contact has been with African natives having physiological characteristics comparable to those of our American Negroes. The direct English contact has been, however, chiefly with a high type of East Indian whose physiognomy is far more comparable to whites than to Africans. The French should have, assuming race prejudice to arise from inherent psychological dislike of differences and on a basis of direct contact, the strongest anti-color feeling.

The question of cultural differences is no more enlightening than that of physiological differences. French social organization does not differ *essentially* from that of the English. The particular ideals and valuations which are developed do, of course,

differ in degree just as they differ between England and America, but nothing in the process, itself, by which the personality is developed can explain the lack in France and the existence in England of color antagonism. Neither is there anything in the culture of the French which is more comparable to native culture than in that of the English. In this, as with physiological differences, the direct contact of the French has been with natives whose cultural "distance" is far greater than that between the English and the natives which have made up the greater part of their direct contacts. The study of direct contacts would seem to offer little help in explaining the difference between French and English attitudes towards colored peoples. On a basis of the physiological and cultural differences found in these direct contacts one would conclude that the French, not the English, should have the strongest color prejudice.

The English attitude towards the natives is a derived one; that is, the general public has been subjected to the prejudices of colonial settlers, administrators, travellers, etc., whose attitudes are more or less the result of direct contact. For some reason the French have tended to remain "normal" in their attitude towards the colored races. The problem becomes, then, one of determining what there has been in English colonial contacts which differs so greatly from that of French colonial contacts that it could give rise to a strong antagonism in England, expressed as color antipathy, while this antipathy

has not developed in France. A careful study of this problem should throw considerable light on the conflict elements which make for race prejudice.

One fact stands out from this present study which has a general application to the problem of racial prejudice. Since the French people have no general antagonism to, or distaste for skin color, that fact definitely precludes any concept of race prejudice as arising from or on an inherent psychological valuation of white skin by the whites, and a "natural" revulsion for dark or black skinned peoples. Such evidence is not, one would think, at present needed, but this empirical proof should at all events serve to dispel, even to the most skeptical, any doubt of the social origin of color prejudice. If it be protested that the evidence presented here does not conclusively prove the lack of such prejudice in France the writer is only too willing to admit that such proof does not exist. However, it is not claimed that the French people do not evaluate white skin above black, though indeed there have been specific cases where the reverse has been true, but rather that a relative absence of such valuation is found in France and that to whatever extent such a valuation may exist it has not resulted in color antipathy. This fact forces one to the study of social, not biological origins where color prejudice is found. Moreover, no biological explanation can account for the difference found between France and England in their attitudes towards colored peoples.

SEX INFERIORITY

RUTH ALLISON HUDNUT

THE idea of a superior and inferior sex is subtle and far-reaching. It is camouflaged and denied. The so-called superior sex sends out a barrage of flattery extoling motherhood, wifehood, beauty, sweetness, innocence, and declaring that no work is as sacred as the home-maker's, but strangely enough a man with these virtues or aptitudes is regarded as "feminine," an opprobrious term when applied to him. It might be argued that male virtues in the female are also condemned, but is this true? Honesty, courage, strength, intelligence, dominance are among the traits man likes to call his own. A woman has to have them in overwhelming measure to secure for them recognition. When she does she is considered a "man" and the term is not one of contempt.

An examination of the modern novel reveals how universally women are still tacitly thought to be the inferior sex. In a recent study of the status of women in the modern novel, covering some sixty odd novels chosen at random from well-known contemporary American and English authors, I found sex inferiority permeating the material. It was an idea held by both sexes, disclosed by a general preference for male children, by the remarks of the characters, and an emphasis on woman's appearance rather than on her intelligence.

Illustrations will make these points clear. Many babies were born in the Irish community in which the Callahans and Murphys resided, and all the young mothers hoped for boys rather than girls.¹ Mrs. Bradley cared more for her sons than her daughters and with some reason, for

the sons were cleverer.² Mr. Grammont "despised and distrusted women generally," and made clear to his daughter that it was a grave error for her to be a daughter instead of a son.³ Bernard, father of three children, wondered what he had really secured from life and was comforted when he thought of his only son.⁴ Richard Callender wished a divorce from his first wife partly because her one child was a girl, and he and his mother passionately desired a boy to inherit the family fortune. When his second wife was pregnant everyone hoped and prayed for a son. It had to be. It was.⁵ Maartje never caressed her daughters, but Selina saw her fondling her son and thought, "She loves him best."⁶ This same preference for the male was shown by Pervus De Jong when he told Selina of his first marriage. His wife died in childbirth, the child also. It was a girl, but then he was always unlucky.⁷ Evelyn, thinking of the baby she was going to have hoped it would be a boy.⁸

In none of the novels were there passages of a similar nature indicating a preference for female children.

Ina "revered her husband's opinions above those of all other men. In politics, in science, in religion, in dentistry she looked up to his dicta as to revelation."⁹ The Professor did not expect to find mind in his wife. His romance with her was

¹ Sedgwick, Anne D., *The Little French Girl*, p. 45.

² Wells, H. G., *Secret Places of the Heart*, p. 182.

³ Gale, Zona, *Preface to a Life*, p. 193.

⁴ Bromfield, Louis, *Possession*, pp. 311, 312, 335, 465, 486.

⁵ Ferber, Edna, *So Big*, pp. 61-62.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁷ Parrish, Anne, *To-morrow Morning*, p. 249.

⁸ Gale, Zona, *Miss Lulu Bett*, p. 74.

¹ Norris, Kathleen, *The Callahans and the Murphys*, pp. 102-103.

one of the heart. His romance of the mind and imagination was with a man.¹⁰ Govett thought "the minds of women . . . were totally different from the minds of men. Simpler. Without exterior obligation."¹¹ Joe Easter assured the man who ran away with his wife that there was no ill-feeling. "No woman that ever lived is worth giving up a real friendship for," he said.¹² Sondra was socially superior to Clyde and for that reason he looked up to her. She sensed his submissiveness, "that of the slave for the master, and in part liking and in part resenting it, since like Roberta and Hortense, even she preferred to be mastered rather than to master. . . ."¹³ Although Gabriella had an immoral and worthless husband, "against men as men she had never thought of cherishing a grievance. All her life she had looked to some man as to the saviour of the family fortunes, and her vision was still true enough to perceive that, as a human being, Archibald Fowler was finer and bigger than his wife, that Billy was finer and bigger than Patty."¹⁴ The doctor was convinced that women could not produce ideas, but he thought they might be encouraged to respond to ideas and become for men "mistress-mothers," persons who would care for them, their work, their honor more than for aught else, receptacles for the creative male mind.¹⁵ Sempack, the philosopher, wrote a letter of advice to Mrs. Rylands about her husband. He told her to consider their differences. "You are a finer thing than Philip but you are—slighter. . . . He has the mak-

ing of a far bigger and stronger and more effective person than you can ever be. . . .¹⁶ Philip is your job. . . . I see no other job in the world for you to compare with it or to replace it. . . . Women are for men and children are a by-product."¹⁷

A reference to a man as a woman is considered an insult. Frank Shallard of today is as incensed as Arthur Kay of yesterday at being called a female. Frank was glad to leave the ministry in one way, for other men could no longer think of him as "an old woman in trousers."¹⁸ But preachers even if only "old women in trousers" gained the respect and worship of the women—perhaps because of the trousers. Elmer's mother wanted him to become a preacher, because she had such awe of them.¹⁹ Elmer never tired of standing around looking "impressive and very male for the benefit of lady seekers." And all of them responded whether "spinsters with pathetic dried girlishness" or "misunderstood wives."²⁰

Even the most successful and dominant women have moments of weakness in the novels when they think themselves inferior because they are "only women." Sharon, the revivalist, the one woman who really dominated Elmer Gantry, and the leader in their partnership said to him, "I'm a woman. I'm weak. I wonder if I oughtn't to stop thinking I'm such a marvel, if I oughtn't to let you run things and just stand back and help you? Ought I?" Elmer was quite overcome by her good sense and assured her that perhaps it would be wise. Of course she was as clever as he, but a woman was not built to

¹⁰ Cather, Willa, *The Professor's House*, p. 258.

¹¹ Hergesheimer, Joseph, *Tampico*, p. 182.

¹² Lewis, Sinclair, *Montrap*, p. 269.

¹³ Dresier, Theodore, *An American Tragedy*, vol. I, pp. 376-377.

¹⁴ Glasgow, Ellen, *Life and Gabriella*, p. 181.

¹⁵ Wells, H. G., *Secret Places of the Heart*, p. 76.

¹⁶ Wells, H. G., *Meanwhile*, p. 107.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 112-113.

¹⁸ Deland, Margaret, *The Kay's*, p. 10; Lewis, Sinclair, *Elmer Gantry*, p. 386.

¹⁹ *Elmer Gantry*, p. 29.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

SEX INFERIORITY

RUTH ALLISON HUDNUT

THE idea of a superior and inferior sex is subtle and far-reaching. It is camouflaged and denied. The so-called superior sex sends out a barrage of flattery extolling motherhood, wifehood, beauty, sweetness, innocence, and declaring that no work is as sacred as the home-maker's, but strangely enough a man with these virtues or aptitudes is regarded as "feminine," an opprobrious term when applied to him. It might be argued that male virtues in the female are also condemned, but is this true? Honesty, courage, strength, intelligence, dominance are among the traits man likes to call his own. A woman has to have them in overwhelming measure to secure for them recognition. When she does she is considered a "man" and the term is not one of contempt.

An examination of the modern novel reveals how universally women are still tacitly thought to be the inferior sex. In a recent study of the status of women in the modern novel, covering some sixty odd novels chosen at random from well-known contemporary American and English authors, I found sex inferiority permeating the material. It was an idea held by both sexes, disclosed by a general preference for male children, by the remarks of the characters, and an emphasis on woman's appearance rather than on her intelligence.

Illustrations will make these points clear. Many babies were born in the Irish community in which the Callahans and Murphys resided, and all the young mothers hoped for boys rather than girls.¹ Mrs. Bradley cared more for her sons than her daughters and with some reason, for

the sons were cleverer.² Mr. Grammont "despised and distrusted women generally," and made clear to his daughter that it was a grave error for her to be a daughter instead of a son.³ Bernard, father of three children, wondered what he had really secured from life and was comforted when he thought of his only son.⁴ Richard Callender wished a divorce from his first wife partly because her one child was a girl, and he and his mother passionately desired a boy to inherit the family fortune. When his second wife was pregnant everyone hoped and prayed for a son. It had to be. It was.⁵ Maartje never caressed her daughters, but Selina saw her fondling her son and thought, "She loves him best."⁶ This same preference for the male was shown by Pervus De Jong when he told Selina of his first marriage. His wife died in childbirth, the child also. It was a girl, but then he was always unlucky.⁷ Evelyn, thinking of the baby she was going to have hoped it would be a boy.⁸

In none of the novels were there passages of a similar nature indicating a preference for female children.

Ina "revered her husband's opinions above those of all other men. In politics, in science, in religion, in dentistry she looked up to his dicta as to revelation."⁹ The Professor did not expect to find mind in his wife. His romance with her was

¹ Norris, Kathleen, *The Callahans and the Murphys*, pp. 102-103.

² Sedgwick, Anne D., *The Little French Girl*, p. 45.

³ Wells, H. G., *Secret Places of the Heart*, p. 182.

⁴ Gale, Zona, *Preface to a Life*, p. 193.

⁵ Bromfield, Louis, *Possession*, pp. 312, 312, 335, 465, 486.

⁶ Ferber, Edna, *So Big*, pp. 61-62.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁸ Parrish, Anne, *To-morrow Morning*, p. 249.

⁹ Gale, Zona, *Miss Lulu Bett*, p. 74.

one of the heart. His romance of the mind and imagination was with a man.¹⁰ Goyett thought "the minds of women . . . were totally different from the minds of men. Simpler. Without exterior obligation."¹¹ Joe Easter assured the man who ran away with his wife that there was no ill-feeling. "No woman that ever lived is worth giving up a real friendship for," he said.¹² Sondra was socially superior to Clyde and for that reason he looked up to her. She sensed his submissiveness, "that of the slave for the master, and in part liking and in part resenting it, since like Roberta and Hortense, even she preferred to be mastered rather than to master. . . ."¹³ Although Gabriella had an immoral and worthless husband, "against men as men she had never thought of cherishing a grievance. All her life she had looked to some man as to the saviour of the family fortunes, and her vision was still true enough to perceive that, as a human being, Archibald Fowler was finer and bigger than his wife, that Billy was finer and bigger than Patty."¹⁴ The doctor was convinced that women could not produce ideas, but he thought they might be encouraged to respond to ideas and become for men "mistress-mothers," persons who would care for them, their work, their honor more than for aught else, receptacles for the creative male mind.¹⁵ Sempack, the philosopher, wrote a letter of advice to Mrs. Rylands about her husband. He told her to consider their differences. "You are a finer thing than Philip but you are—slighter. . . . He has the mak-

ing of a far bigger and stronger and more effective person than you can ever be. . . ."¹⁶ Philip is your job. . . . I see no other job in the world for you to compare with it or to replace it. . . . Women are for men and children are a by-product."¹⁷

A reference to a man as a woman is considered an insult. Frank Shallard of today is as incensed as Arthur Kay of yesterday at being called a female. Frank was glad to leave the ministry in one way, for other men could no longer think of him as "an old woman in trousers."¹⁸ But preachers even if only "old women in trousers" gained the respect and worship of the women—perhaps because of the trousers. Elmer's mother wanted him to become a preacher, because she had such awe of them.¹⁹ Elmer never tired of standing around looking "impressive and very male for the benefit of lady seekers." And all of them responded whether "spinsters with pathetic dried girlishness" or "misunderstood wives."²⁰

Even the most successful and dominant women have moments of weakness in the novels when they think themselves inferior because they are "only women." Sharon, the revivalist, the one woman who really dominated Elmer Gantry, and the leader in their partnership said to him, "I'm a woman. I'm weak. I wonder if I oughtn't to stop thinking I'm such a marvel, if I oughtn't to let you run things and just stand back and help you? Ought I?" Elmer was quite overcome by her good sense and assured her that perhaps it would be wise. Of course she was as clever as he, but a woman was not built to

¹⁰ Cather, Willa, *The Professor's House*, p. 258.

¹¹ Hergesheimer, Joseph, *Tampico*, p. 182.

¹² Lewis, Sinclair, *Mantrap*, p. 269.

¹³ Dresier, Theodore, *An American Tragedy*, vol. I, pp. 376-377.

¹⁴ Glasgow, Ellen, *Life and Gabriella*, p. 181.

¹⁵ Wells, H. G., *Secret Places of the Heart*, p. 76.

¹⁶ Wells, H. G., *Meanwhile*, p. 107.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 112-113.

¹⁸ Deland, Margaret, *The Keys*, p. 10; Lewis, Sinclair, *Elmer Gantry*, p. 386.

¹⁹ *Elmer Gantry*, p. 29.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

carry on things the way a man could.²¹ Two men who heard Sharon speak admired her gift of oratory, but one of them observed, "Same time though, tell you how I feel about it: woman's all right in her place, but takes a real he-male to figure out this religion business."²²

Imogen said to her aunt, Miss Creswell, when they were both in danger of succumbing to the magnetism of Peter Khar-koff, the Jew, a kind of superman, "If there's one thing I hate more than another it's the worshiping woman. Every callow curate has his fatuous worshipers, every vicar, every bishop, every known man, be he writer, painter, pianist, politician, or merely one of the Rudins of the world, a talking windbag." Yet this very modern young woman finally succumbed to the Jew's charm and worshiped like the others, saying to him weakly, "D'you know I think I must be a very weak vessel? Perhaps most women are."²³

Ellen Tulliver was a successful woman, yet during the war she thought of herself as "merely a woman whose men were at war, a woman who could do nothing, who must sit behind and suffer in terror and doubt."²⁴ And at another time she termed herself "only a poor, weak, feminine creature."²⁵

Joanna Godden was a dominant woman, managing a large farm and controlling her hired men, yet her baby boy was too much for her. He made a scene at a fair, and Joanna could not handle him. "The spectators were predominantly female—they whispered and nudged and clucked—four male years were able to hold them at bay." Suddenly a man stepped into the crowd, picked up the yelling child

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 223.

²³ Hichens, Robert, *The Unearthly*, pp. 196, 452.

²⁴ Bromfield, Louis, *Possession*, p. 357.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 396.

and carried him off under his arm, while "the three women followed, trotting helplessly."²⁶

Bernard told Alla, "You're as honest as a man," and thought it was a compliment.²⁷ Berazov also thought he was praising Imogen when he said, "I'm almost afraid of your honesty. . . . Why are you being so honest? That's not like woman."²⁸ Bernard believed any woman who was competent and independent was a "man."²⁹ Jessica also felt that because she had these qualities she was too much of a "man" to please the ordinary male.³⁰ Although Dorinda's stepson was a cripple and dependent on her, "he shared . . . with all males who were not milk-sops, the masculine instinct to domineer over the opposite sex."³¹

If women have not men's brains, if they are weaker and subordinate, waiting to be absorbed, they must have some appeal that will induce the masculine sex to absorb and master them. The novel shows that appeal comes through beauty, something that must be cultivated, the chief object of successful womanhood. "The girls of the world are divided into two classes: the pretty ones" and those "who are not pretty. The latter have undoubtedly their compensations. They have pretty hands, hair, or shoulders, they have brains, or talents, or charm. They have no bloom to lose in early middle-life, and frequently they have actual beauty to gain;" yet "life has done them an incurable injustice."³²

In comparing the importance of brains

²⁶ Kaye-Smith, Sheila, *Joanna Godden Married*, etc., pp. 93-94.

²⁷ Gale, Zona, *Preface to a Life*, p. 321.

²⁸ Hichens, Robert, *The Unearthly*, p. 386.

²⁹ Gale, Zona, *Preface to a Life*, p. 320.

³⁰ Herrick, Robert, *Chimes*, p. 174.

³¹ Glasgow, Ellen, *Barren Ground*, p. 475.

³² *The Callabans and the Murphys*, p. 174.

versus beauty for female characters of the novel, beauty was three times as important in the earlier novels and twice as important in the later novels as brains. Although both men and women writers emphasized beauty, the former did so more often than the latter, and the latter were more inclined to give weight to brains.

The novel, that mirror of life, written from the training and experience of human beings, is cluttered with sex inferiority. Men and women writers speaking through male and female characters show a definite concept of male superiority. The idea

must be a handicap to women, a retarding force in attaining equality with men. If men consciously or unconsciously look upon their own sex as possessing the greater intelligence and brains, they will be loath to give women equal economic opportunities. As men now control the economic life of the nation and economic power resolves itself in the ultimate analysis into the right of self-maintenance, men are in a dominating place. This higher position causes their superiority complex which helps to keep women secondary, and the whole resolves itself in a vicious circle.

THE NEGRO AND THE CHANGING SOUTH

W. S. TURNER

I

FROM the very beginning of her "peculiar institution," the South has seen danger in every social and economic movement destined to affect the status of the Negro. There ever have been those who believed that his status should remain fixed even in a dynamic world. John C. Calhoun, the inspired voice of the South, declared that Negro slavery was indispensable to a republican form of government, that without slavery the foundations of government itself would crumble. Calhoun's fears of freedom were not altogether groundless. The Negro in fact at a single step moved from the plane of chattel slavery to the responsibilities of citizenship, theoretically at least. But the South survived this and arose to new visions of life, increased wealth and power. We are still learning that social change with the Negro as the center of gravity does not mean necessarily death to Dixie.

Through the years since freedom the Negro has been the Alpha and Omega

of social problems. The Negro question would not down in the South's vote on prohibition and the woman suffrage issue. It will not down yet in legislative councils, considering child labor laws, compulsory school laws and penal reform. Nevertheless, the South lays an especial claim upon the Negro. Migrations may come and go, but it retains a constantly increasing Negro population. To begin with, geographical influences linked definitely the life of the Negro with the South, a section of sparsely settled communities, vast stretches of land owned by the few, rendering impossible the community contacts that gave New England experience in self-government. Slavery was an economic adjustment. The social and economic aftermath of slavery, accentuated by differences in the color of the races, is the Negro problem. The Civil War with its constitutional and legislative enactments, did work a temporary revolution, but with the exception of the physical emancipation of the Negro—and that not complete—

it did not affect radically the social life of the South. But the old order could not remain. The day of its passing was hastened by the recent Negro migration which undermined the semi-feudal economic foundations of the South as no other single movement since the Civil War.

II

The emancipation of 1865 did mean, however, the release of social forces for the beginning of a new cultural life in the South and in the nation. No one at any time should have expected the Negro to remain forever inert in the South where he was placed. Even during the dark days of slavery with its power over life and death, adventurous Negroes occasionally escaped to the North, as evidenced in the exploits of the "underground railway." With the coming of freedom and improved methods of transportation, Negro migration became an historical inevitability.

From emancipation until the Great War the shift was continuous, though not heavy, on the average about 10,000 migrating annually. It was, however, as everybody knows, with America's full entrance into the Great War and the call of northern industry for workers of every kind that the migration movement gained such momentum as to threaten the economic well-being of the South.

Negro migration, it was thought meant the passing of the only source of hard labor, the ruin of agriculture and the advance of wages, the latter a thing greatly to be feared at that time. The loss in crops alone from the migration in 1917 amounted to more than \$200,000,000. The dominant South thought it its bounden duty to preserve civilization and to save the Negro from the dangers of freedom even as it had attempted to do in the face of the impending conflict of the Civil War. Just

as it had been argued that the Negro with a mind utterly impervious to booklearning, was ordained by nature for slavery, so it was now argued that the Negro must be kept in the canebrakes and cotton fields where he and his fathers had wrought. If he ventured forth from beneath the sunny skies of Dixie, icy winds would blast him and ruthless competition would crush him. The Negro was asked to consider reason. Moral suasion from ministers' unions, white and black, was supplemented by severe legal enactments from city councils and proud states. Railroad presidents were appealed to to stop the northward transportation of Negroes. The President of the United States was called upon to use his good offices to keep the South as black as possible.

But we know now and some knew then that the trouble at that very time was owing not to Negro migration, but largely to the complications of a surplus Negro population. It should be clear now to all that a gradual shift, not a mass movement, of Negro population from the South works for the better interests of both races. Opposition to Negro migration, however, came generally from the sections that needed it most as a means of establishing social equilibrium.

III

The political implications of Negro migration are more far-reaching than the country realizes. We have had and shall continue to have the solid South for some time to come because we have a black South. Lest the South should get completely in the saddle, the rest of the country seeks security and power through a political solidarity in some instances as rigid as that of the South itself. This is especially true in presidential elections. The South, as generally observed, is penalized consequently. If it does not get all the

way into the saddle, it may be kept out entirely. No man in his right mind, especially since the daring adventures of Roosevelt and La Follette, counts on a third party just now. But with the present shifts in industry and the urbanization of Negro population in the South, as Woofter's recent studies have shown, new political attitudes will develop. The South, as Frank Tannenbaum suggested a few years ago, is about to get other scapegoats, is learning to despise the Negro a little less and other race groups more, perhaps. To quicken this process and to break the domination of the Democratic party, Dr. Edwin Mims mentioned the nomination of Al Smith for President. Certainly, a fight over liquor and the Pope of Rome would mean a display of feeling and freedom in politics for a season, leaving untouched basic racial and economic causes. A people cannot be frightened into political independence. With the social and economic transformations wrought by the movements of Negroes and capital, Republicans may fight increasingly for something beyond federal office and Democrats may build platforms with diminishing fears for white supremacy.

IV

Significant is the changing attitude of the South toward work and industry in relation to the Negro. For instance organized labor in Memphis, Tennessee, recently petitioned the school board of that city to take the mechanical arts out of the curriculum of Negro schools. Labor that was first stigmatized by slave labor and subsequently by cheap Negro labor can now be done by white men. A changing technique in industry with increased wage rates is in part the explanation of the new attitudes toward the entire question of work. In the South of slavery work was thought as associated only with

Negroes and poor whites. For young ladies to boast that their fingers had never touched dough was a true sign of aristocracy. This concept of work in the very nature of things survived the type of society that produced it. For instance, Negroes were the barbers for the master class, and are still for the upper class whites in many southern communities. But the labor viewpoints of the changing South have led many whites to crowd Negroes out of work once considered too menial for the touch of white men. The upper class white man disdained to accept the services of a white man who would descend to take the job of a Negro. The attempt of the city fathers of Atlanta to restrain Negro barbers from serving white women and children is an instance of what economic competition can do and of the new social viewpoint towards jobs long considered the black man's by right and tradition.

Major Moton of Tuskegee Institute relates an account of a western farmer who moved to Alabama some time before the War to raise cotton. The Westerner, as was his custom, carried his daughters along with him when he went to work in the fields. Immediately a delegation of white citizens called upon him with the information that he had violated the community code by having white women to work in the field. Such might have been the conception of work in many communities of the South. Anyway with the migration of Negroes, white men and women, unaccustomed to do dirty work, went forth in large numbers to work on farms in factories and elsewhere. Despite the migration of 1,200,000 Negroes since 1917, the South produced its banner crop of cotton, 17,977,374 bales, in 1926. Cotton mills continue to come this way. For the first time in 1927 more than half of the spindles in the country were in the

South. The Negro may lose or gain in the industrialization of the South. He may be forced out of certain "race jobs," but on the other hand he may find compensation in new lines of industry as he is beginning to do already, especially in the North.

V

Wealth and a complex civilization require law enforcement. The South, acquiring these, is with the possible exception of Mississippi, it would seem, about to make up its mind to put an end to lynching. This jungle form of executing justice with a vengeance not long ago was defended as a primary social necessity by southern statesmen in the halls of Congress. Now even the unbridled Senator Blease can find something else to talk about, and is engaged in introducing bills for the establishment of Jim Crow street cars in the District of Columbia. Alabama, though in the black belt and flogging a number of white people, managed to get by in 1927 without lynching a single colored person — a sign of the weakening of the Negro complex. No one can travel, even through the remote provinces, without noting a growing civility on the part of white people toward Negroes. Good roads and other improved methods of transportation have inescapably led whites and blacks from backwoods cabins and farms into the swifter currents of civilization. This means among other things a slight increase in racial tolerance.

The professional social equality bogey howler is losing his function in the changing South. Young white men and women, receiving better learning in modern colleges and universities cannot be scared by stories of black reconstruction when "barbarous Negroes" threatened with destruction the foundations of white civilization. Such an appeal failed to impress white

voters last year in the regular municipal election in my town, Raleigh, North Carolina, a southern town in which in this year of grace every qualified person, including Negroes can vote. Certain politicians who had fought for the disfranchisement of Negroes in 1900 and who were inclined to wave the red flag again, joined forces with the city's morning paper, an influential organ, against what some called the terror of the return of Negro domination. But the young generation paid no attention to this racket, gave the alarmist a licking, and the city proceeded with its business as usual. The old tactics did not work because a new social situation had developed since the reign of the "Red Shirts" and with it a different community mind, a more objective attitude toward politics and other questions.

VI

Meanwhile, the Negro himself has undergone a change as stated above, in the South and in the country as a whole. His gradual advance in business in almost every southern city, whether as a banker, insurance promoter, merchant or what not, has lifted him in the scales of American values in spite of color prejudice. The Negroes who migrated survived the competition of northern industry, and demonstrated to the world their ability to adjust themselves in the on-going-process of modern civilization. This industrial experience meant self-discovery to many and the privilege of voting for the first time in their lives. Those carrying with them the Charleston, the Black Bottom and other culture traits from the backwoods of our South, were welcomed with open arms to New York, amid the birth of the new Negro in Harlem.

As a rule the more prosperous and better educated Negroes remained in the South

and these tend to remain here. The Negroes migrated inversely with their stake in the land. Amid the social change incident to immigration, the Negro has seen for himself the nation-wide implications of the race problem. His social reactions are changing with his environment. Education has shown no signs of turning him radical as some prophesied it would. On the contrary, education and wealth together with society's changing attitudes toward him, have lowered his voice and mellowed his tone. Thanks

to the better behavior of the South, the *Crisis*, the acknowledged defender of the colored man's rights, now uses former fighting space to tell of the achievements of the black business world, teas and frolics of society belles, the splendor of fraternity dances. Evidently, the Negro agitator is on a vacation. The Negro at present, as some one has suggested, is more interested in a red roadster than in radicalism. Anyway, there can be little question concerning his increasing Americanization, South and North.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE GROUP


AN overwhelming number of boys' cases that appear in our guidance clinics are highly individualistic personalities. It is rarely that a gang or group leader, or a boy with a healthy group adjustment is seen. Those having any kind of group relationship usually present a problem arising out of an unsocial behavior pattern, a symptom such as stealing, for example, to gain the attention of the group. In attempting to explain this, if it be true, we soon reach the place where we declare in orthodox fashion that the reasons for the bad group adjustment are certain individual problems which must be solved or resolved in order to make the individual's behavior more socially acceptable. We are apt to view our problem as fundamentally one of individual adjustment, and build our treatment on this basis.

Wawokiye Camp was set up as an experiment primarily in group work. Briefly the plan was to take a group of thirty boys camping for a period of five weeks. Most of them were behavior problem boys selected by the Cleveland Child Guidance Clinic. In the first place the camp naturally expected to do some valuable individual treatment. There has already appeared evidence that considerable success has been met along these lines. In the second place, the camp provided an excellent means (which I am beginning to believe is an indispensable means) of checking the social behavior and the diagnosis under an extremely important condition,—namely that of the psychology of play and recreation. The conduct of the boy becomes as nearly moral as possible in the sense of being that which the boy evidences when he is free at play.

The social case history is a none too reliable source of data on the social behavior of the individual. If you want to be sure about a portion at least of the boy's social behavior, you must observe it. Much new light was shed on the boys, and in a number of cases the previous diagnosis had to be greatly modified.

The third objective was to see what particular treatments were successful in handling the various behavior patterns. If the behavior problem boy represents an exaggerated and magnified pattern or group of patterns present in modified form in the so-called normal boy, then by treating enough cases it is hoped that the *principles* back of successful treatments can be ultimately isolated, thus providing valuable teaching material for those who are to handle the everyday group of boys. An attempt to divide and describe treatment in three forms was made. One was called an individual treatment, i.e. one from the counsellor to the boy privately. A social treatment was one by the counsellor in the presence of one or more others. A group treatment was one by the group to the boy, either with or without the manipulation of the counsellor.

As one goes through life the vast majority of human beings today face the problem of group relationship. Unless we have related that special ability to group life we can't solve the boy's problem. Again and again the tendency to go right straight to the heart of the individual's difficulties starts us off on the basis of an individual solution. Of course there are undoubtedly cases where this is the wisest way out. But if it is socialization we are working for we cannot stop with these individual solutions.—*W. I. Newsletter.*



GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

CINEPATRIOTISM

KENNETH M. GOULD

I
THE film was *Abraham Lincoln*. We watched it march across the screen of a small-town "movie palace" in the Pennsylvania lumber region. A physical awareness of close-packed human beings possessed us. Their response to the pictured incidents welled up uninhibited, discovering to us the poverty of their native emotions of citizenship. Old doubts disturbed us, for we had seen Griffith's *America* and others like it with the same questionings.

What price patriotism—the patriotism that these films evoke? Here in one brief quarter century of technical progress has grown up the most formidable engine of mass control the world has seen. No more perfect art could be consciously devised to color the soul of a state. For good or ill it has acquired a power over the generality of men that the printed page, four centuries older, has never wielded. When it confines itself to the popular themes of romance and adventure, it may be trivial, vulgar, trite, sensuous, but the worst that can be said is that it moulds the surface habits of the community on a model of pinchbeck materialism.

But when it steps, heavy-footed, into

the province of historical fact, its playthings become social axioms that ramify in class, race, and national prejudice. Not only have scenarists and producers discovered this peculiar fascination of history manhandled *ad hoc*. Those in high places who wish to fix a pliant consciousness in any group have found a new tool. The Federal Immigration Service now places patriotic films in the steerage of the Atlantic liners. And the public school system is open to capture by any "constitutional league" or veterans' club that has the funds to coat its philosophy with celluloid.

The historical moving picture has become a best-seller. For years producers avoided these themes as high-brow. *The Birth of a Nation* was a nine days' wonder in 1913. It did more to solidify half-buried racial antagonisms among the whites of the North than the Reverend Thomas Dixon has accomplished in his life time by teams of print paper. But even Griffith himself could not have foreseen the flood of quasi-historical films that followed in its wake. Today such vivid narratives as James Cruze's *The Covered Wagon* or King Vidor's *The Big Parade* are better box-office attractions than cow-puncher serials or the orgies of Parisian

debauchés. Leaving out of the reckoning historical exotics like *Deception*, *Cabiria*, *Passion*, *Monsieur Beaucaire*, *Intolerance*, *Ben Hur*, *The Eagle*, *The Four Horsemen*, and *The Volga Boatman*, which capitalize the American's gaping wonder at other peoples, other ways, the arbiters of popular entertainment have given us in the past half dozen years such purely American productions as *Janice Meredith*, *Betsy Ross*, *The Last of the Mohicans*, *The Littlest Rebel*, *The Copperhead*, *The Crisis*, *Barbara Frietchie*, *The Iron Horse*, *The Pony Express*, *North of '36*, *The Thundering Herd*, *The Vanishing American*, *Old Ironsides*, and many another. It is significant of the new prestige of the patriotic film that in the popular vote among readers of *Photoplay Magazine* for the best picture of each year, where formerly such sentimentalities as *Tol'able David* led the balloting, historical subjects have now stood first for the past three years (*The Covered Wagon*, *Abraham Lincoln*, *The Big Parade*).

II

The technique by which the historical brand of hokum achieves its effects is not greatly different in essence from that of any other of the super-popular "lively arts"—the jazz ballad, the comic strip, the tale of the great open spaces, the Hebraic-Hibernian farce comedy. They draw their enormous publics because they appeal to certain eidolons—"stereotypes," Walter Lippmann calls them—that embody for the moment recognizable variates of popular beliefs. We like Joe Jinks and Andy Gump because even the deafest of us hears echoes of their shortcomings and their triumphs in his own secret breast. They demonstrate the great equalities before our eyes. "One man's as good as another"—and stands as good chance of fame, fortune, and excitement. The heroes of the strips and films provide the

same escape from reality as the Napoleonic images we should all like to be. With half a chance, any of us could strike gold or lead an army. No college professor or stevedore but feels a pleasurable glow when he detects his kinship with the elect.

Without the doings of celebrities, these films could not exist. The public interest in its national leaders, no matter how vague its knowledge of them, makes it imperative that great men shall be the pegs on which the action hangs. Any historical novel or drama is cramped by its refractory subject matter. The odds against the successful vitalization of the dead past are great. There is a rigidity of contour, a dearth of social "background," an absence of breathing human emotion, that must be overcome by imaginative ingenuity. A scenario that depended on the authorized biographies for flesh and blood would be dry stuff. Hence the interweaving of the familiar outlines of great men's lives with a tissue of unknown or commonplace characters for "heart interest," "sex appeal," or comic relief. In *America*, for instance, the dominant plot deals with the adventures of an aristocratic Tory family of Virginia, neighbors of Washington, but unmentioned in history, whose daughter is wooed by an obscure New England post-rider. In *Lincoln*, while the life of the Emancipator furnishes both the central theme and the love motif, there is a generous infusion of semi-legendary personages, like Jack Armstrong, the bully of New Salem. It is these who provide the touchstone for Lincoln's humanity.

The producers have an unerring talent for the catch events and maxims that every schoolboy knows. The scenarios must be written with one eye on the primers. For only an audience infiltrated with the anecdotal theory of history, and in which the eighth grade is the highest common

denominator of enlightenment, could know so well the appropriate responses to this photographic liturgy. Whether apocryphal or not—and of course there is a basis of fact for many of them,—these episodes invariably elicit volleys of applause, just as the best-worn clichés of Hamlet or Romeo set off audible murmurs of recognition among well-bred playgoers. No patriotic film could succeed that did not use this perennial appeal of the familiar. Washington on his knees at Valley Forge; Warren's "Don't fire till you see the whites of their eyes!"; Lincoln at the old slave block in New Orleans; Lincoln and the boy soldier condemned for falling asleep on guard; Lincoln's whimsical request for the brand of Grant's whiskey; Stanton's sententious epigram, "Now he belongs to the ages": all these scratch some deep vein of piety or paganism in the breast of the average American.

In the theater of the spoken drama applause is the token of proficiency in the acting art. Even in emotional climaxes when a Miss Barrymore declares her independence of lesser breeds and sweeps grandly from the room, the burst of hand-clapping is incited less by sympathy for the defiance she has sounded than by appreciation of her histrionic talent. Applause in the legitimate theater is not rare, indeed, for restrained or even minor passages of skilful acting. And I have seen a little theater audience acclaim spontaneously the artistry of a stage setting when the curtain rose on Schnitzler's *Paracelsus*.

But movie "optiences" live on a more sensory plane. They are not moved by a discriminating judgment of reality or beauty. The ineffable unexpectedness of human living is lost upon them. Their not infrequent applause is tell-tale of their most primitive instincts and their most fatuous sentimentalities. Mr. Vachel

Lindsay, in his interesting speculation, *The Art of the Moving Picture*, draws a fruitful contrast between photoplays of "action," of "intimacy," and of "splendor." The action film, he says, should be interpreted as "sculpture-in-motion," the intimate film as "painting-in-motion," the splendor film as "architecture-in-motion." Mr. Lindsay's plea is a counsel of perfection to those few producers who conceive their function in the esthetic spirit of, let us say, Verrocchio, Vermeer of Delft, or Henry Richardson. But even he, granting the great technical advance in the decade since he wrote, would be forced to admit the chasm between aspiration and fulfilment. One looks in vain at the modern photoplay of action for the balanced control of masses and surfaces that informs the sculptor's art in the Elgin Marbles, the more active yet no less ordered motion that Paul Manship infuses into his tenser media of metal. In practice the American motion picture tends to subordinate the rhythmic mood of sculpture to the explosiveness of wriggling bodies. An audience brought up on melodrama finds the conversational monotones of Shaw or Tchekhov dull stuff. Just so the movie-goer is anesthetic to the subtleties of screen composition—of abstract arrangements of the human form. He demands his action straight. Every foot of film must have its inch of feud. For to him conflict is the highest form of activity.

In the patriotic film the man of action is always the master of the man of contemplation. Even the better films contain their knock-down and drag-out fist fights, and so superior a technician as Griffith is not above employing this motive. Lincoln must prove his manhood by a stone-age duel. The publicity of a recent film success makes capital of the fact that its leading women characters come to blows in the first reel! And Terry Ramsaye, in

his monumental history, has shown how the modern story film was born out of the attempts to screen the pugilistic triumphs of Corbett, Fitzsimmons, and Jeffries. In what successful written drama of the twentieth century would such crude solutions of the hostilities of the protagonists be tolerated? Yet no episode more instantaneously arouses a movie crowd to fever pitch.

Gunfire, the next higher stage in the calendar of pugnacity, has become a screen commonplace. We must expect that patriotic films will concern themselves with war: specifically with the entire roll-call of American wars. None of them need ever bring blushes to an American cheek. The etiology of a given war harrows no conscience. Did not Lee fight at Chapultepec, Lincoln against Black Hawk? The American hero can do no wrong and any neighboring "backward" people that gets in his way may expect no quarter. But when this militant psychology is carried over into civil life, we may justifiably harbor misgivings. The plowshare, after all demands another craft than the sword.

The modern directors have learned, too, that mass movements in unison are more effective than individual action. There is an old fable that a violin string, bowed at a certain sympathetic pitch, will awake such vibrations as eventually to shake down a bridge. The rumbling of legions of army trucks over the Rhine has caused serious damage to Cologne Cathedral. So, in the physics of the social man, large rhythms do affect a crowd. The patriotic photoplay, by Lindsay's foot-rule, is essentially the spectacle of "crowd splendor." Volume, movement, and repetition are the three factors of its equation, and the greatest of these is repetition. Pile up, then, your foot soldiers, rifles, horses, camions, mitrailleuses, caterpillar tanks, airplanes, in endless sequences of self-same

units. In the movies such spectacular fugues can tune the house to an avalanche of patriotic cheers.

The Freudians, with their esoteric meanings for falling, flying, and other kinesthetic dreams, might contribute an illuminating monograph on the symbolism of horseback riding. Let them take as data the fact that any form of riding, from Paul Revere waking the burghers of Lexington to a cavalry charge at Five Forks, is the signal for hysterical enthusiasm in a movie house. Here is one oasis in the modern world where the despised equine still lords it over the machine. It is strangely true that a fleet of Chevrolets or Cadillacs would draw less applause from the film fans than a herd of Arabian chargers. And of all feats of horsemanship, none is so potent as riding to rescue. Aware though we may be that the salvation of the beleaguered stockade, of the outnumbered battalions, of the about-to-be ravished damsel is as certain as the solar eclipse, yet the beat of galloping hoofs still provides the supreme thrill of moviedom. The visual image alone is usually enough to ignite the spark. But when reinforced by the inevitable accompaniment of Sousa's "Light Artillery" on the Wurlitzer, the detonation overwhelms us.

The social significance of this concomitant movie music is greater than has been realized. The cinema has dramatic precedent on its side. In Greek tragedy, in pantomime, in opera, the sister art is called in to heighten emotional impressions that the thin texture of the stage action cannot efficiently carry. But the advanced critics of the motion picture, e.g., Mr. Gilbert Seldes, believe that visual and auditory versions cannot be successfully teamed. To them the perfect photoplay theater would have "no sound but the hum of the conversing audience." The

motion picture is rightly an experiment in pure optics, in which even the title-maker is an intruder, as *The Last Laugh* demonstrated. The recent attempts to marry film and voice may presage the birth of a bastard art—the "phonofilm." And quantity production may universalize this as it has the unsupported screen—to the detriment of the true pictorial art.

But willy-nilly, the Rothafels have habituated us to musical accompaniment with our movie meals. Here arises a dilemma. A print from a first-run film, barring slight differences in operating equipment, gives virtually the same performance in the backwoods village as in the Broadway houses. But the amateur jazz girl at the tin-pan piano cannot compete with the trained symphony-orchestra. Except in the metropolitan centers, the musical accompaniment must suffer, not only in technique, but in range of repertoire, coördination, and imaginative interpretation. The patriotic film is no exception to the banalities of the average motion picture organist. With it she has less freedom of choice. The glory that has immemorially perfumed the stench of war is compounded not a little of the thrill of martial tunes. They have stiffened the vertebrae of thousands of luke-warm combatants. They are no less suggestive to the civilian movie-goer. *Dixie*, *Yankee Doodle*, *Maryland, My Maryland*, *The Battle Hymn of the Republic*, *The Star-Spangled Banner*—each in its own mood turns the corner grocer into a paragon of chauvinism.

The softer catagories of "sure" situations are not peculiar to the patriotic film. There are certain universal human reactions on which the conventional scenarist can rely. Mothers in sacrifice, the helplessness of little children, lovers victorious over obstacles, the awe of death and birth—noble themes in the hands of a Euripides or a Browning—rarely fail to sway

the house. They have been sucked dry of their dignity in many a western thriller. Certain technical tricks of the trade, like the close-up, the fade-out, and the cut-back, have had, on the whole, pernicious effects in the cheapening of emotion. Scenes of carnage in war invest such situations with a degree of sanctity that cries for a chastely temperate art. But they are oftener accepted as a mandate for unrestrained bathos. They transcend the comic or the sentimental only when the creative artist, holding his emotions in a moving equilibrium, sees his material *sub specie aeternitatis*. Something of this timeless quality emerges in Renée Adorée's fine performance in *The Big Parade*.

The early accretion of characteristic myths about the focal personalities of history is a phenomenon against which modernist historians have railed in vain. We have been diverted of late with numerous crusades of the "new biography" to strip the tinsel from the skeletons of our Washingtons, Franklins, Boones, and Barnums. They have confirmed the sophisticate in his suspicions, but have slid neatly off the backs of the wider public. That the patriotic film should seize upon and magnify such fables is ineluctable. Thereby it broadens the abyss already cleft in the schools between the popular interpretation and any rational understanding of national affairs. The manufacture of absolutes, the painting out of all nuance, leaving only the blacks and whites of virtue and villainy, goes on apace. The net impression of these movies is that the figures of the Revolutionary and Slavery periods were men of a different clay from our contemporaries—giants of intellect, character, and disinterestedness; that these leaders enjoyed the support of an enthusiastic, united, and uniformly intelligent people; that economic interests and class distinction somehow failed to

dry of thriller. Like, like the cutting, vicious motion. The situation it cries out they for un- and the when the in a social sub- time- lorée's

eristic of his- which vain. numer- "ay" to of our and Bar- phisti- neatly

That an and table. already popular under- manu- of all whites apace. ries is ery and ferent ents of edness; of an y in- terests ed to

operate then, if indeed they are not the inventions of distorted academic brains. How wide of the mark this picture comes has only within the past decade or two become patent to students of our history. The chisels of men like Turner, Osgood, Cheyney, Beard, Alvord, Becker, Barnes, Schlesinger, and James Truslow Adams, though of diverse temperaments and specialties, have chipped away at these encrusted legends until the motives and influences at work behind them begin to appear.

A single specimen will serve to illustrate what has happened: It is the fashion of liberals to hold up the Bill of Rights as the cornerstone of our liberties. Bourbons in industry and politics may ignore or violate it with impunity, but still, we like to feel, it is an American institution, to be invoked *in extremis*. One might suppose that every citizen of the new-born state would have displayed a lively interest in this Magna Charta of his privileges. Yet the debates and hearings in the First Congress on the passage of the first ten amendments were dismissed in the New York and Philadelphia gazettes of 1789 with only the barest mention, buried in columns of ephemeral advertising, and couched in language as desiccated as the contemporary *Congressional Record*. The amendments were tacked on as an after-thought of the states' rights group, with but tepid support from the conservative Federalists who dominated the Constitutional Convention. These democratic urgings were attended by a strangely modern apathy among the masses, and were enacted largely by the insistence of a militant minority. Such iconoclastic versions of the great Revolutionary events are the contribution of the "new history."

Granted that no one wants pedantry in his entertainment, have the movies any obligation to respect the historicities es-

tablished by the grubblings of this new critical research? There may be such a thing, of course, as a straining after the letter of verity that slays the spirit of truth. If the observers could be inducted into a genuine experience of the emotional context of the historical film, we could afford to dispense with accuracy of detail. But such a wedlock between scholarly integrity and pictorial art has been achieved but once in American historical films—in the distinguished series of the "Chronicles of America Photoplays" undertaken by the Yale University Press. And be it noted that this monumental project is a subsidized venture, distributed largely through educational agencies. No private producer would have dared attempt it. The commercial motion picture industry, either unconsciously or deliberately, is forced to cater to modern prejudices. It is compelled to adopt the protective coloration of its habitat, the minds of those who support it. And the insidious fact is that this appeal wears the garments of primitive patriotism. What is the mental mechanism that has wrought the change?

III

Consider the process known to the psychologists as the "conditioned reflex," or more properly, the "substitute stimulus." Technically, it consists first of a set of stimuli provoking a specific response. This "situation" may, by accident or design, come to be associated with a different stimulus. If the tripod is often enough repeated, the connection between the secondary stimulus and the reaction becomes automatic. The neural current ultimately seeks the new path as invariably as the spark leaps the gap between the cathode and the anode poles of a Crookes tube. The classic instance on a simple objective plane is the famous experiment of the Russian physiologist, Ivan Pavlov,

who devised mechanisms for measuring the salivary flow and the production of stomach juices in a dog.

This fundamental situation, as we have been abundantly informed by the behaviorists, may exist in every organism possessing a central nervous system. It is most obvious in the fields of sensory action on the borderland between physiology and psychology. But it constantly carries over into the higher cerebral activities of the human being, and lies at the base of much of our modern educational technique. Almost all fears and strong likes and dislikes of children originate in this way. Fear of dogs and other animals, fear of the dark, or of lightning, may be established by unpleasant experiences which become linked with the original stimuli. The learning of words, language forms, and such manual skills as typewriting, weaving, or bicycle riding, is only an instance of varied associations reducible to the conditioned reflex. Helen Keller learned the meaning of "water" from Miss Sullivan by the constant association of the finger-spelled word with the flow of the cool liquid over her hand. The automobile tyro, faced with the necessity of pressing the clutch pedal to keep his engine from stalling, must establish, by long repetition, an instant automatic response of both feet to any aspect of the street that calls for braking or a shift of gears.

A modified form of the conditioned reflex is sometimes called a "substitute response." It occurs when the path leading from the original stimulus to the original response is blocked by some extraneous factor. The stimulus, thus dammed up, must find some other outlet, and gropes blindly about, like a Mississippi "oxbow," seeking the easiest channel. In time it becomes attached to a substitute response as firmly as in the original

linkage. While such psychological transfers can be and frequently are established by deliberate educational intent, it is probable that they operate in great areas of our daily lives quite involuntarily. In fact, the victim is seldom even vaguely aware of what is happening to him. He is the vehicle of forces beyond his horizon—forces that he could not control even if he apprehended them.

The brilliant young psycho-economist, Carleton Parker, developed before his untimely death a theory of the genesis of the I. W. W. mind. Men with normal instincts ("unlearned tendencies" would be a better term in the light of recent research in the instinct field) may become dislocated from settled jobs and family living in a mood of youthful wanderlust. Entering the "hobo" industries of harvesting or lumbering, they find themselves caught in a treadmill of drudgery, low pay, uncertain tenure, pig-sty living conditions, and enforced celibacy. Their natural "drive" toward marriage, paternity, and the acquisition of property, balked by these economic barriers, finds its compensation in the highly emotional, irrational, and destructive philosophy of syndicalism. Most radicals are psychologically generated in some such frustration. The process is an apt example of the "substitute response" on a social level.

But the mechanism is a two-edged sword that may, with a different class, issue in reaction as readily as in sabotage. Nowhere does the substitute response work with more exquisite efficacy than in the impact of the patriotic motion picture on the emotions of its seers. The immediate objectives of the Revolution and the Civil War aroused in the partisans of their day a complex of first-hand, and in part, at least, genuinely liberal emotions. When a Tom Paine or a Patrick Henry pled for revolt against an arbitrary foreign tyr-

ann, indifferent men were kindled to resist the Stamp Act, to demand trial by their native peers, to create a radical institution of republicanism in a *laissez-faire* monarchical world. When Grant, moved by Lincolnian pity, offered a peace of conciliation instead of the Carthaginian terms that had been the traditional right of victors, the Blue and the Gray abolished their differences over clasped hands.

But in the course of a century of exploitation of natural resources, the citizen has forgotten the motives of the original American. The discovery of coal and iron, the advent of the iron horse, the gushing forth of rivers of petroleum and geysers of gas laid the foundation for the epic of American industry. Trackage crawled across the continent. Hardy, prolific stocks multiplied geometrically in days before Bradlaugh and Mrs. Sanger had upset the family formula. Castle Garden saw its thousands and its millions of European peasants pass in to dilute the thinning current of Puritan and Cavalier. Simultaneously the spiritual children of Pasteur and Lister were making America safe for human bodies. Oklahoma and the public lands were inundated by squatting homesteaders. Hard upon them came the "Mauve Decade," with its welter of trusts, rebates, automatic machinery, and mass production. Here was the perfect milieu for that urbanized decadence of spiritual fiber that has dammed the pristine mental habits of liberty-loving Americans. The poison of easy wealth and soft living is the extraneous factor that has got in the way of the original stimulus. And we need not be surprised if a "substitute response" has supplanted the authentic goals of patriotism.

Today the emotions of conflict stemming from the instinct of self-preservation remain perennially fresh. Before 1914 theorists thought they had decayed. But

they are still with us. The change has come in the objects of protest. The fine ends of civil liberty, of hatred of slavery, have faded into spurious caricatures. Imagine the contemporary butter-and-egg man a thrill to a doctrine of revolt against established authority! Picture the invoice clerk seething with the pure essence of resistance to tyranny! What to them mean "natural rights," "the consent of the governed," or the title of a people to "alter or abolish" a government? Would a disembodied version of the lives of the great type patriots of history—Kosciusko, Winkelried, Hampden, the Gracchi, Hidalgo, San Martin—succeed on the American screen?

But such emotions cannot hang *in vacuo*. They must terminate in action or a semblance of action if they are not to fritter away in neurasthenia. They must fasten upon avenues of expression that come home to the business and bosoms of Ford owners and golf players. Producers gauge keenly the quality of dogmas that will hold the allegiance of George F. Babbitt. In the veins of that 100-per-cent American, the life-blood of patriotism has been metamorphosed into a watery fluid by the spiritual anemia of his go-getting world. It still boils to fever heat, but not against the objects that spurred the indignation of his forebears. Those he does not understand because a hundred years of security and acquisition have taught him the needlessness of worry over foreign autocracy or abstract injustice. A Rooseveltian trumpeting for the gore of insidious radicals "within our own household" is the picture that rises to his mind's eye when the "Sons of Liberty" seek to root out the loyalists who honeycombed the colonies in 1775. Instead of "liberty and union, one and inseparable," good old Anglo-Saxon supremacy is his reaction to the conflict of color. "Americanism"

means "American methods" of running his own shop, without benefit of unions or walking delegates. The rattle of machine guns when "our boys" are on the business end, against bolshies in Archangel, greasers in Chihuahua, or niggers in Port-au-Prince seems to him one with the shot that echoed from Concord Bridge to split in twain the eighteenth century world.

IV

The Washington lobby—a congeries of hundreds of organizations, each with its own private ends, intent on shaping legislation—now has its counterpart in Hollywood and its satellites. No one can object when the National Committee for the Prevention of Blindness produces a film to explain to parents the dangers of *ophthalmia neonatorum*. But a group with an anti-social motive has equal access to the cinema technique. If the motion picture has become the supreme vehicle of propaganda, it can only be a corollary to the fact that motion picture audiences have plumbed the nadir of credulity. One feels at times that the patriotic film is better than its audience deserves. For these pictures frequently have a considerable infusion of intelligence. The mere trucious effects may be read into them or exaggerated by the qualities of the crowd. The cleansing skepticism, the ability to discriminate wool from shoddy, the nice sensitivity to values that would identify a base motive for what it is, are not there. We are reluctantly driven to record a wholesale decline toward the mob soul from that old-fashioned American individualism that knew its own mind, however narrow, and spoke with the forthrightness of its pioneer heritage.

The movies are no longer the recreation of the unregenerate few. In one week the 15,000 motion picture theaters of America

play to an aggregate audience of over 50,000,000—nearly half as large as the entire population. Nineteen nights out of twenty the movies are the only entertainment that offers in most rural regions. If the church once frowned upon the dubious influences of the "nickelodeon," it has learned the virtue of compromise. Auction bridge may still be hovering beyond the zone of universal tolerance. But not the cinema. From the youngest high school flapper to the leader of the Brotherhood Bible Class, they all go, and usually in couples and families. It is part of the normal routine. The shrinkage of the province of the legitimate stage has left the cinema the one universal pastime, only remotely approached by even the musical comedy and the vaudeville. It is patronized by the well-to-do, the professional man, and the college graduate as well as by the mechanic and the shop-girl.

But the leaven that these more privileged groups should bring to an uncritical audience is submerged in the general pastiness of the dough. What are the inner resources of a movieized population? Are they capable of a creative use of leisure? How many books a year do they read, granting even Ethel Dell and Zane Gray standards? What are their notions of art, of science, of religion? What spiritual potencies do they instill in their children? The eye-and-ear impact of movie, jazz, radio, and confession magazine has leveled the American mind to a nondescript mass that no longer distinguishes between courage and bravado, public spirit and witch-hunting, self-defense and imperialism. The fresh and virile thinking that alone begets a more than parochial idealism cannot coexist with this process.

In the flux of the twentieth century, nationalistic patriotism seems destined to play a diminishing rôle. This would be

small cause for mourning if it brought with it a crescendo of world tolerance and individual freedom. But the movies, international as they are in their diffusion, have thus far offered slight ground for such a confidence. Provincialism and authoritarianism are the twin idols of the movie ritual. The jingo and the junker

have too long had free rein in the American studios. A virgin field lies open to some impresario of universal emotion, some Griffith of social chivalry, who can yoke the language of the changing world with the prayer of Ann Rutledge: "Bloom forever, O Republic, from the dust of my bosom."

THE LABOR TURNOVER OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

RALPH AND MILDRED FLETCHER

THE membership of the United States Congress presents a problem in political behavior over a period of 130 years for statistical analysis. A graphic picture of this behavior is obtained by calculating the rate of change in membership, or the labor turnover of Congress. The index constructed in this study is a ratio of the new members of each congress to the total membership. Every man sworn in as a member of the Senate or House is counted in the total membership. The data for the study were obtained from the *Biographical Congressional Directory, 1774-1911* (Senate Doc., v. 56:61st congress 2d session) and in the congressional directories published for the separate sessions since 1911. Before the ratio was calculated corrections were made for the admission of new states into the Union, for the return of representatives and senators from the southern states after the War of 1860, and for the reapportionments in the House of Representatives.

Chart I presents the labor turnover of the House of Representatives centered in the election years. According to our system of electing a total new House every two years this ratio might vary from zero to 100 assuming the turnover to depend merely upon reelection or failure of re-

election. From the figures prepared the actual turnover of the House varies from 20.3 per cent in the 69th congress to 71.9 per cent in the 28th congress (Table I). The average turnover from 1790 to 1924 is 44.0 per cent. From 1790 the curve rises until it reaches a peak in 1840 and 1850 where it begins a steady downward trend with an average turnover from 1900 to 1924 of 28.4 per cent. The average turnover in the ten states of greatest manufacturing wealth for the period 1900-1924 is 32.2 per cent as against 24.1 per cent for the 38 states remaining. Plotted at the base of the chart is a bar diagram of the periods of depression and prosperity from 1790 to 1924 (Thorp, *Business Annals*, pp. 94-95). It will be seen that there is a tendency for the peaks of the turnover to be associated with periods of depression and that a similar relationship exists between the lower rates of turnover and periods of prosperity. This relationship is very slight as Mr. R. Clyde White in an article, *Prosperity and Political Parties* (SOCIAL FORCES, September, 1927) has demonstrated by another method of analysis. In the period 1792-1922 there are 33 presidential elections, sixteen of which are followed by an increased turnover in the succeeding non-presidential election

TABLE I
RELATION OF OLD MEMBERS TO NEW

NUMBER OF CON- GRESS	SEN- ATE	HOUSE			NUM- BER OF CON- GRESS	SEN- ATE	HOUSE				10 IN- DUS- TRIAL	NON- INDUS- TRIAL¶	
		Total	North- east*	South†	Mid- west‡		Total	North- east	South	Mid- west			
2	22.2	45.0	45.7	46.9		36	24.3	53.7	62.1	50.0	46.0		
3	36.4	31.5	27.0	38.2		37	35.6	58.8	60.6	66.7	48.5		
4	45.0	43.0	50.0	34.1		38	23.7	60.4	62.4	50.0	53.2		
5	33.3	47.8	47.6	48.1		39	26.3	49.5	42.6	63.2	53.3		
6	32.4	40.9	42.0	39.6		40	23.2	43.4	46.7	57.7	33.8		
7	48.6	50.9	50.8	50.9		41	29.2	49.0	46.2	56.4	45.6		
8	41.0	39.1	43.7	33.3		42	21.3	52.8	52.7	55.7	46.2		
9	27.0	36.9	43.7	29.4		43	27.8	52.1	50.0	55.6	50.6		
10	31.6	35.8	41.2	29.2		44	34.6	62.2	68.0	61.2	56.4		
11	33.3	41.6	48.8	33.8		45	27.8	47.5	56.1	36.5	49.0		
12	14.7	44.1	47.4	40.1		46	27.2	43.5	50.0	29.5	50.5		
13	51.2	48.4	61.8	30.4		47	29.1	39.6	42.9	34.7	40.8	43.2	35.8
14	37.2	51.0	55.9	46.4		48	17.7	52.4	59.3	42.6	56.2	57.3	47.4
15	31.7	65.4	67.0	62.9		49	21.4	43.0	43.4	39.8	42.7	47.1	38.9
16	30.4	51.0	61.5	37.3		50	29.4	40.6	44.3	43.0	35.9	41.5	39.8
17	28.0	51.1	61.1	40.7		51	10.0	41.1	51.5	33.6	39.5	40.0	36.5
18	23.5	46.0	51.5	41.9		52	22.4	46.0	51.5	33.9	55.4	50.0	52.6
19	42.6	42.4	47.7	48.7		53	21.3	41.8	41.2	37.4	46.3	42.9	45.7
20	19.2	41.0	43.5	37.1		54	15.9	48.7	51.0	44.6	59.1	35.2	59.4
21	22.4	47.0	55.6	37.8		55	21.9	43.6	31.4	49.6	43.8	30.0	36.7
22	32.7	42.0	51.0	34.1		56	16.0	33.9	40.6	25.2	33.1	55.0	31.2
23	30.2	50.0	57.1	44.4		57	21.5	28.1	57.4	28.2	20.3	27.8	31.6
24	28.6	44.7	41.4	46.9	34.4	58	18.3	31.5	33.0	25.2	30.6	55.0	28.9
25	26.8	53.4	65.5	35.6	55.9	59	19.4	24.8	26.1	18.6	29.5	22.7	30.4
26	22.8	52.4	56.1	46.0	59.4	60	20.0	26.6	26.8	21.1	31.0	28.6	27.9
27	34.0	52.2	57.1	46.1	53.1	61	24.0	23.1	20.5	19.8	27.5	27.3	21.4
28	28.6	71.9	84.0	51.8	85.3	62	18.6	35.8	46.0	22.8	38.8	38.1	40.7
29	33.3	54.1	56.8	56.7	43.7	63	27.7	32.6	51.7	19.2	29.0	29.2	23.5
30	32.4	56.2	60.6	50.6	57.1	64	11.0	32.0	49.2	19.7	31.5	33.3	41.2
31	28.4	59.3	66.7	56.2	50.9	65	26.6	22.7	25.6	17.4	26.0	18.2	19.0
32	30.1	56.7	68.7	38.4	62.7	66	16.4	28.8	32.3	24.1	32.0	27.3	30.4
33	31.4	66.0	70.5	61.0	64.0	67	22.9	29.5	30.7	27.9	30.6	27.3	32.1
34	28.1	62.1	71.3	51.8	61.0	68	18.8	32.4	42.0	20.0	37.1	27.3	38.2
35	29.4	51.2	58.8	35.7	59.0	69	22.8	20.3	23.2	17.2	20.8	20.6	21.8

* North Eastern States: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.

† Southern States: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Oklahoma.

‡ Mid-Western States: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin and Missouri.

§ Western States: California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, Nevada, and Washington.

|| Industrial States, the ten ranking industrial states as determined by the Census from 1880-1920: New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Michigan, California, Indiana, Wisconsin.

¶ Non-Industrial States, includes the remaining 38 states.

year. Twelve of these instances occur in the period of the last seventeen presidential elections, 1856-1922.

Chart II presents the labor turnover in the Senate centered in the election years. The ratio could vary normally from zero

many state offices. For example in the 13th congress 50 per cent of the turnover is due to resignations. The average turnover in the Senate, 1790-1924, is 27.2 per cent. Since 1812 the Senate turnover has exceeded that of the House only three




CHART I. LABOR TURNOVER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES




CHART II. LABOR TURNOVER OF THE SENATE

to $33\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The actual turnover ranges from 51.2 per cent in the 13th congress to 10 per cent in the 51st congress (Table I). The more than $33\frac{1}{2}$ per cent turnover in the early period is accounted for by the great number of resignations. A senatorship was not as important as

times—1908, 1916, and 1924. Examination of the bar diagram at the base of the chart will show that the Senate turnover seems to bear slight relationship to economic conditions. The Senate turnover in the non-presidential election years has exceeded that of the preceding presidential

election in only nine instances and these are not grouped in one period as in the House.

Although this analysis indicates that the turnover in the House and Senate bears no significant relation to economic conditions, certain other interesting features developed in the process of the study. The fluctuations in both series decreasing in the later years may indicate in the case of the Senate the increasing importance of a senatorship. Perhaps the high turnover in the House from 1840-1850 reflects the idea of rotation in office preached by the Jacksonians or the third party condition that existed from the break-down of the Whigs until the Republican party was securely established after 1860. Certainly the development in both the Senate and House since 1900 indicates that the people seem to change representatives less

often than in the earlier period. The increased turnover in the House in non-presidential election years in the period 1856-1922 may mean that the electorate expresses disappointment with the administration or perhaps it means more independent nomination and voting in those years. The greater rate of turnover in the House of the manufacturing states should be reflected in their committee memberships since the members of committees are ranked in terms of service. Certainly the more experienced members will be from those states who return their representatives to congress. The popular election of Senators does not seem to have changed the amount of turnover, although two of the three instances in which the turnover of the Senate exceeded that of the House have occurred since 1914.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP

SEBA ELDRIDGE

THE rubric community organization is applied to a great variety of efforts designed to promote community welfare, but have little in common except their claim to a common term and a common purpose. The underlying theories, administrative arrangements, and other features of these undertakings present endless diversities that defy logical classification. This means, among other things, that the practitioners of community organization are not agreed as to the nature of this process, or of the community welfare it is supposed to achieve. Most often, however, community organization means the organized efforts of professional social workers and their supporters for the community at large, or for certain "underprivileged" elements thereof. It usu-

ally means, in addition, the more or less systematic coördination of these efforts. Many assume, however, that community organization means the organized effort of the community itself in its own behalf, including the efforts of social work agencies that may be fitted into this more democratic type of organization. Apparently a few would reject the offerings of such agencies altogether.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the more significant contributions of community organization as thus characterized to the development of citizenship in the United States, and to point out limitations thereof that should be considered in the investigation of citizenship problems.

Community organizations may be classified in various ways, but for the present

purpose a basis of classification offered by J. F. Steiner seems most serviceable.¹ This is found in the various theories of community organization which he distinguishes. These he designates, respectively, as the theories of (1) individualism, (2) supervision, (3) federation, (4) democratic participation, (5) paternalism, and (6) amalgamation. It will be found, by consulting Steiner's analysis, that the practical applications of all these theories except the fourth one are dominated by *social workers* or *social-work agencies*, and that they have been influential in many applications of the fourth theory. We may cite as single illustrations of these several theories in their practical applications (1) the charity organization society, (2) the American Association for Organizing Family Social Work, (3) the council of social agencies, (4) the community club or improvement association, (5) the financial federation dominated by the larger contributors, and (6) the county department of public welfare. These illustrations do not of course suggest the diverse sub-types of organization comprehended by the major types indicated. Nor do they suggest the various kinds of control to which social workers themselves are subjected in their direction of activities thus classifiable. But the classification as thus illustrated will serve the purpose in hand, that, namely, of indicating the nature of the relationships between community organization and the body of citizens that actually constitute the community.

The main point is that all the major types of community organization excepting the fourth one are dominated by social-work agencies, and are indeed designed to correlate the activities of these agencies in order to enhance their efficiency in the pursuit of their objectives, whatever these

may be. The significance of community organization, with the exception noted, will therefore not be independent of that of social-work agencies themselves, though it has distinctive elements of its own. We may accordingly indicate what appears to be the major contributions, both actual and potential, of these agencies to the development of a more competent citizenship and to the solution of the citizen's problems. The distinctive contributions of community organization itself can then be considered.

Social-work agencies furnish a medium of expression and activity to socially-minded citizens who find the political party or other established institutions unadapted to this purpose. They have made substantial and, in some instances, far-reaching contributions to the solution of the citizen's problems. These agencies may assume greatly increased importance in the future; indeed, after their possibilities are fully revealed, they may be adjudged as significant a development in our social and political history as, for instance, that of the political party during the last century.

But serious limitations on their usefulness may be pointed out. These relate to their treatment of the more fundamental political and economic problems, especially those affected by powerful group interests. Two limitations are particularly serious: (1) Agencies proposing to treat those problems by the social-work technique are generally unable to secure adequate funds for the purpose, except where, as is rarely the case, the object in view makes a popular, more or less sentimental appeal. This is because people of large means, who contribute the bulk of the funds for the maintenance of social-work agencies, are not, as a rule, interested in problems of that class and indeed generally oppose attempts at thoroughgoing solutions of them. (2)

¹ *Community Organization*, Chap. XXI.

So far as social-work agencies attempt genuine solutions of those problems, their efforts can be largely neutralized by antagonistic interests, which are usually able to command superior political and financial resources for this purpose. Both undertake to enlist public opinion in their support, by the use of propagandist methods, but social work agencies are rarely a match, in such a contest, with powerful special interests opposed to them.

The social-work procedure offers no way of overcoming these limitations, for the basic source of the latter lies in an uneducated public subject to the rule of propaganda, and social work of the prevailing type does not comprehend a civic education of the public equipping it critically to judge proposals by social-work agencies and by their opponents. The absence of an enlightened citizenship organization embracing the entire community and providing a thorough education in its problems is the fatal weakness of our institutions that condemns to comparative impotence the efforts of social-work agencies to deal with fundamental political and economic problems.

These limitations do not vitiate so seriously the social workers' efforts to solve leisure time, public health, child welfare or other problems unaffected by such powerful special interests, or else making a popular appeal sufficiently strong to neutralize the opposition of the latter. Social-work agencies achieve their most substantial success in such fields.

Coordination of these agencies under one or another form of community organization is capable of mitigating but not of abolishing these limitations. Effective organization eliminates duplication of effort, working at cross purposes, and sheer neglect of needed services. It may also strengthen the appeal for financial sup-

port, and focus more effectively the pressure of the organized agencies for social legislation, more adequate local appropriations for welfare purposes, or other measures of common interest. But, so far as I can see, it does not greatly enhance the effectiveness of these agencies in working for such measures as a child labor amendment, the adoption of a social insurance program, the expansion of the merit system, or the extension of public ownership, since the federative or other co-ordinative organization of these agencies brought to bear on such objectives can be and normally is countered by co-ordinative organization in opposition to their efforts. We have our manufacturers' associations, our industrial councils, our chambers of commerce, our interlocking political machines, as well as our councils of social agencies and our conferences of social work. Community organization, however, may and does enhance the effectiveness of the co-ordinated agencies in promoting child welfare measures, the "rehabilitation" of dependent families, the extension of public health services, the "constructive" use of leisure time, and other undertakings not encountering such powerful opposition from vested interests.

I have reserved for separate consideration forms of community organization representing applications of the fourth theory distinguished by Steiner, that of "democratic participation." These include federations of special-interest groups with lay memberships, such as churches, women's clubs, parent-teacher associations and labor unions; various sorts of community councils, welfare clubs and neighborhood associations; and, perhaps more significant than any others, the community center and the social unit organization, the latter experimentally tested in the Mohawk-Brighton District of Cincinnati a few years ago. Some of these may also

be classified under other types of community organization than our fourth one.

Churches, women's clubs, parent-teacher associations and other special-interest groups with lay memberships labor under limitations somewhat different from those affecting social-work agencies, so far as they undertake to deal with public questions. We may say that, in general, these groups are limited by the inadequate education of their members in civic questions; that their appeals to the public in behalf of their programs must, under present conditions, be largely of a propagandist character; that such appeals will often if not commonly be effectively countered by the pressure of vested interests when the antagonism of the latter is aroused; and that many groups of this type are themselves dominated or at least greatly affected by such special interests as well as by conventional prejudices and traditions current in the community at large. Federative organization can mitigate these limitations to some degree, but cannot eliminate them. For they are traceable, in the main, to our defective civic education and our inadequate organization of citizenship in general, factors that are but slightly affected by the co-ordinative organization of these lay groups.

The community council is a type of organization extensively applied in rural districts. It is a federation of other agencies, and considered the most suitable form of rural community organization where a number of agencies are already functioning. The execution of programs for community betterment considered and approved by a community council is normally delegated to the constituent organization or to new agencies that may be established for the purpose. Though primarily a federation of other agencies, the community council may admit unaffiliated citizens to membership, and it often spon-

sors open meetings for the discussion of community problems.

The welfare or improvement club is considered a more suitable form of organization in rural communities not well supplied with social agencies. Its membership is individual not organizational, and open to all adult residents of the community. It carries out its programs through its own committees, but promotes the establishment of independent agencies felt to be needed, such as a farm bureau, co-operative marketing associations, etc. Like the community council, it generally sponsors public meetings for the discussion of community problems.

Rather similar to the rural community club are the civic improvement society of the small town and the neighborhood association of the larger center. The small town society has a more manageable problem, as a rule, than has the urban neighborhood association, because decisions on local problems in the large city are largely dominated by city-wide agencies, and local neighborhood associations find effective combination for the promotion of common interests quite difficult.

Undoubtedly many agencies of these types are making substantial contributions to community welfare. This is naturally more likely to be the case where able leadership is available, or where the advice of community experts, such as is supplied by the extension divisions of many state educational institutions, can be utilized. Their effectiveness also depends, of course, on the intelligence, interest and determination of their memberships in the study of community problems and the promotion of measures for their solution.

Just how much agencies of these types are accomplishing, however, appears not to have been determined. A few agencies have been reported, such as that of the Porter neighborhood under the inspira-

tion of Mrs. Marie Turner Harvey, which have accomplished about as much as, humanly speaking, isolated local effort could accomplish. But I know of no instances where such local associations have attempted, with the necessary thoroughness and intelligence, to study the political, economic and other social institutions conditioning local efforts, or to work out practical programs for the requisite control of these factors.

Nevertheless, these agencies represent types of association that could be utilized, were the requisite conditions provided, in the systematic study of community problems by the community itself, and the initiation of measures for their treatment. Even now they are making significant contributions in this direction by fostering habits of coöperation and stimulating interest in community undertakings.

Agencies of these types may maintain or be associated with centers of community life, and *vice versa*. I am discussing them separately, not because they are necessarily independent in practice, but because they serve somewhat distinct functions. Community centers may now be found in all parts of the country and in all sorts of communities. I have been unable to find any estimate of their number, but it certainly runs into the thousands.

The activities of these centers are broad in scope, and tend to become more so. Public forums, civic clubs, local improvement societies, parent-teacher associations, branch libraries, evening classes, study groups, concerts, choruses, recitals, plays, movies, pageants, celebrations, dances, clinics and many other activities are included in the list, though these are rarely all found in one center. Generally speaking, centers tend to become genuine focal points in the civic, recreational and cultural activities of their neighborhoods. Some have seen in them the promise of a

basic social unit linking up the family and the neighborhood with the city (or county), the state, the nation and organized society in general. Edward J. Ward conceives the center as, *in potentia*, an inclusive organization of all the citizens of the neighborhood, which, when integrated under appropriate forms of organization into larger units, can serve in a truly representative fashion all the functions now devolving on political parties, thus render the latter unnecessary, and eventually bring government under the control of the people.² Similarly, Henry E. Jackson pictures the community center as being or including the people's university, the community capitol, the community forum, the neighborhood club, the home and school league, the community bank, the coöperative exchange, and the child's right of way.³

There is evidence of enthusiasm here; yet many able thinkers have affirmed a belief in the pregnant possibilities of the community center for the civic and cultural development of the masses. So far, however, progress toward the realization of any such possibilities has been quite limited. It is true that the community center has afforded opportunities for wholesome recreation to many thousands of people; that intellectual and esthetic interests have been stimulated by its activities; that many local improvements have been carried out under the auspices of its subsidiary or allied agencies; that it has stimulated the development of civic consciousness and the serious study of civic questions. But none of the centers known to me have developed the type of civic education or of civic activity that, as I think, is requisite to the mastery, intel-

² *The Social Center*, Chaps. I-VI.

³ The captions under which he answers the question, what is a community center? *A Community Center*, Part I.

lectual and practical, of the citizen's deeper problems.

This is no doubt largely due to the fact that it will take time—more time than community centers have had—to induct citizens into the intensive, continuous, scientifically grounded study of their problems, and into the exacting programmatic activities based on such study, that are connected by a citizenship adapted to present needs. But it is also largely due to the fact that leaders in the movement have failed to realize that competent citizenship involves efforts of such magnitude. While a few intellectual leaders, notably John Collier, Joseph K. Hart, and M. P. Follett, have sensed these implications of the new citizenship and the functions of the community center in giving them practical effect, the movement, for whatever reason, has scarcely followed their lead. One influential leader in the movement speaks as if he thought a "weekly assembling of citizens" at the social center would furnish sufficient opportunity for the citizen's study and discussion of his problems.⁴ His conception is a fairly representative one, if we may judge from the literature and from the activities of the community center. That it is a wholly erroneous conception must be clear to any one who has contemplated the diversity and difficulty of the citizen's problems and the nature of the efforts that must be put forth by the citizen himself if they are to be handled in his interest.

Despite its limitations, the community center, like the community councils and associations, is fostering habits of co-operation and types of interest that will prove invaluable contributions to the development of a competent citizenship when well-conceived, resolute attempts at its achievement are made. More significantly expressed, the community center move-

ment is contributing to the development of a *primary-group* phase of the community and the state, which have languished hitherto because, for one thing, they are so largely constituted of *secondary-group* relationships.⁵ With a primary-group phase developed, they can successfully appeal to the individual for a substantial share of their proper interest and devotion, along with the family, the vocation, the economic class, and the church, all of which are primary groups, or embrace such groups in their organization.

The most thorough test of democratic principles in community organization recently undertaken in this country, and indeed about the only test of decisive significance, is that represented by the Social Unit Experiment conducted in Cincinnati during the years 1917 to 1920. According to Mr. and Mrs. Wilbur Phillips, the authors of the Social Unit Plan, "the organization of a community, if it is to be democratic and effective, stimulating people most to meet their own needs, should be based upon the following three principles:

"1. The organization of the citizens of the community should be by sufficiently small primary units of population so that those living in each unit may have a general acquaintance with the problems, conditions, and personalities in that area, and so that the elected representative of each primary unit may become, in the best sense of the word, a neighbor, familiar with the conditions and needs and responsive and responsible to the wishes of the other residents.

"2. The organization of those who are serving the community because of especial knowledge or skill, in a direct or an advisory capacity, should be with reference to units of population served, so that they may be more closely in touch with the representatives of the citizens and with the citizens themselves.

⁴ Ward, E. J., *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁵ A primary group is one in which communication between the members is predominantly of a direct or face-to-face type; a secondary group one in which, by contrast, communication is predominantly of an indirect, long-distance type.

"3. There should be an organic and coördinate working relationship between the representatives of groups having special knowledge or skill for service to the community and the representatives of the residents."⁶

In accordance with these principles, the Mohawk-Brighton Social Unit Organization was composed of:

"*A Citizen's Council*, consisting of 31 block representatives (or "block workers") each chosen by the "Block Council" of one of the thirty-one blocks, or primary units of the District. Every person over eighteen was eligible to vote for the Council of the block in which he lived.

"*An Occupational Council*, consisting of the elected representatives of the physicians, the nurses, the social workers, the clergymen, the teachers, a representative of the business men of the District, and also a local representative of the Central Labor Council of the City (and later a representative of the recreational workers of the District).

"*A General Council*, consisting of the Citizens' and Occupational Councils, together, which was the governing body in the affairs of the neighborhood organization."⁷

The services undertaken by the organization were practically all in the field of public health, and included, in the order of their development, an infant welfare service, pre-natal supervision of mothers, general bedside nursing service, health service for pre-school children, nursing supervision of tuberculous and pre-tuberculous patients, and medical examination of adults. Nursing supervision of school children and of patients with venereal diseases was also developed, but more gradu-

⁶ Dinwiddie, Courtenay, *Community Responsibility*, p. 2. This monograph, published by the New York School of Social Work, is a review of the Cincinnati experiment by one closely associated with it.

"According to the Unit theory such occupational organization, and the election of representatives of the occupational groups, would lead to a dual representation of every citizen—*first*, in a geographical and, *second*, in an occupational group. This was far from being realized in the Unit experiment." *Ibid.*, p. 2, footnote.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

ally and informally than the other services. These services included clinic examinations, home care, and hospitalization as needed, besides the coöperation of social workers in handling problems falling within their province. The nature of the services undertaken accounts for the prominence of physicians, nurses and social workers on the Occupational Council. Other vocational groups in the district, while sympathetic for the most part with the work of the organization, took little active part therein.

Some details on organization and finance may be added. The plan favored by the initiators of the experiment called for single executives of the various councils, including the block councils, the various occupational councils, the Citizen's Council (composed of the executives of the block councils), the Occupational Council (composed of executives of the specific occupational councils), and the General Council (composed of the Citizens' and the Occupational Councils). This arrangement proved satisfactory, but its merits compared with possible alternative arrangements were not tested. The block workers, besides constituting the membership of the Citizens' Council, served as intermediaries between the residents of their respective blocks and the specialists engaged in the health services. They received a moderate compensation for their work. The physicians, nurses, Council executives and necessary assistants were also remunerated for their services. Mr. and Mrs. Phillips served as joint executives of the General Council for the greater part of the experiment, as well as of the National Social Unit Organization, and the Cincinnati Social Unit Organization. The latter was formed to promote the application of the Unit Plan to the city at large, but accomplished little in this direction owing largely to a bitter political

attack on the experiment by Mayor Galvin. This incident occurred during the second year of the experiment and seriously interfered with its development. The experiment was well financed, the national Social Unit Organization contributing \$90,000 and the city of Cincinnati half that amount for the purpose.

All competent observers of the experiment agree that it demonstrated the soundness of the principles upon which it was based. The Citizens' Council proved highly successful as a policy-forming body. It gave intelligent consideration to plans submitted by the Occupational Council, brought these plans before the residents of the neighborhood for suggestions and criticisms, offered modifications in the light of opinions thus elicited, and made decisions on the basis of this procedure shown by subsequent experience to be, in the main, sound ones. The procedure involved a coöperative education of and by the block workers, the residents of the neighborhood, the physicians, nurses and executives that proved most effective. As a result, the health services undertaken by the Unit were of an exceptionally high standard, the interest in and understanding of health problems on the part of the neighborhood were almost unprecedented, and health conditions were improved in a most remarkable manner. The education of the block workers as a result of their experience in the organization was specially striking.

The educational value of the experiment to the specialists participating therein was also remarkable. The coöperative consideration of problems by physicians, nurses and social workers fundamentally modified their viewpoints on many of these problems, and led to revision of methods applied in the treatment of the latter. For instance, the somewhat divergent views of nurses and social workers

on their common problems gradually merged, and as a result their work was more closely integrated. Again, the experiment demonstrated the desirability of a shift from specialized to generalized nursing in the public health services of the district, but, on the other hand, the advantages of greater specialization in the work of the physicians. The organization of medical and nursing services was modified accordingly.

Even more significant was the marked development of neighborly relations between the specialized workers and the residents of the district. Each of these groups developed greater understanding of and sympathy for the other, so that at the end a fine working relationship between them existed. This was largely the result of the *liaison* services performed by the block workers.

Summing up, the experiment demonstrated that, under such conditions at least, self-government by the citizen is feasible; that coöperative relationships between the specialist and the public can be established, and that efficient service under democratic citizenship organization is quite practicable. Perhaps the most significant factor in these developments was the direct, purposeful contacts among those concerned in the undertaking, and especially between the residents and their elected representatives. These contacts were predominantly of an individual character, since group meetings, though a number were held, played little part in the experiment. Mr. Dinwiddie regards this, and especially the infrequency of neighborhood forum meetings, as one of its weaknesses.⁸

⁸ The exceptional significance of this celebrated experiment and the importance of appraising its contribution to fundamental problems of citizenship may be offered as a justification for this fresh and somewhat detailed exposition of it.

The applicability of the Unit Plan to larger areas and to problems of a different character could only be determined by further experiment. One cannot tell in advance whether a system of representative government based on the type of unit organization tested in a small district would prove successful. Such a system would necessarily include representative assemblies and administrative officers that could not be in such close touch with, or under such direct control of their constituencies as were the Citizens' Council and its executive. This, however, is a necessary feature of any representative system serving a large area. The dual form of citizenship contemplated by the Plan also raises questions which can hardly be solved in advance of more extensive experiments designed to test them. These questions are now debated, in a speculative fashion, by the proponents and opponents of such a representative system, notably by the guild socialists and their critics.

Although the Unit Plan would seem to be applicable to leisure time, child welfare and other problems that, like public health problems, are relatively concrete and understandable ones, it seems doubtful whether it could be applied, in the form demonstrated, to fundamental political and economic problems. Real solutions of such problems could not be initiated without a preparatory study by citizens that would necessarily be a prolonged and intensive one, and the educational methods applied in the Cincinnati experiment would hardly be applicable to that purpose. Systematic group study and discussion would be indispensable. The health services in the Mohawk-Brighton District did not in themselves involve such institutional reconstructions as are implied by problems of that sort. It is significant, however, that the novel type

of social organization applied on a small scale in that experiment incurred the hostility of Mayor Galvin and the covert or open opposition of other conservative leaders, with the result that the experiment was seriously jeopardized, and its extension to the city at large forestalled.

We may say, by way of summarizing this brief survey of community organization, that at present it is largely dominated by and applied to social-work agencies, and that, *pro tanto*, it shares the limitations characterizing their efforts, though serving to mitigate these in greater or lesser degree. We may say, further, that more democratic types of community organization, as illustrated by community councils, clubs and associations, represent an advance on the social-work types in eliciting a more democratic participation in movements for community welfare, and in their greater independence of the wealthy contributor; and that such organizations are fostering habits of co-operation and types of interest that will constitute invaluable contributions to the new citizenship. The community center, in turn, offers contributions similar to those of other democratic types of community organization, and represents significant beginnings in the development of a primary-group organization of the community and the state. None of these various undertakings, however, offers at present a model for the type of intellectual and practical activity involved in the adequate organization of citizenship. Finally, the Social Unit Experiment is a noteworthy contribution to the thorough testing of democratic principles in community organization, and of special significance both for the light thrown on problems of citizenship and as an illustration of the intensive experimentation essential to the definitive solution of those problems.

small
l the
covert
ative
e ex-
lized,
large

izing
aniza-
domin-
agen-
s the
orts,
reater
that
y or-
unity
present
es in
ation
fare,
f the
or-
co-
will
o the
nter,
er to
com-
ents
ment
the
hese
s at
tual
the
Fin-
ote-
test-
nity
nance
s of
the
the

SOCIAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

THE FAMILY AS A UNIT OF SURVIVAL

WARREN S. THOMPSON

IN THE course of working over the data obtained in a study of the size of families from which college students come, I was impressed with the fact that families, seemingly in the same economic and social group, differed considerably in the number of children. It occurred to me, while pondering over this fact, that some information might be gleaned from our schedules upon the subject of family survival. There has been a marked tendency to emphasize group or class or national survival in many recent discussions on population. The extreme eugenists, of course, generally do this and all those who talk of Nordic survival do likewise. Besides many who do not consciously accept this group concept of survival show by their method of treating these problems that they think of survival as the attribute of these larger groups or classes.

Under our present social organization, not the class or the group, but the family is the unit of reproduction. It would seem well then to pay a little more attention to the differences between families as regards survival and less attention to class and race. When survival is looked at from this angle, it is clear that all families, having less than three children born in

them, are dying out; those with three children are increasing slowly; while those with four or more are increasing quite rapidly. Of course the actual rate of increase of families of different size depends upon the death rate, as well as the number of children born, so that families with four children and of comfortable economic status will increase faster than families of the same size, but of low economic status. In this study only families with children in college are considered, consequently a comfortable economic status may be assumed.

Table I shows the percentage of families from which students came (called students' families in what follows) by occupation of father for the different sections of the country, also the percentage of families from which their parents came (parents' families, hereafter) which had one or two children. It should be said that our data for the New England, Middle Atlantic and Pacific States are rather inadequate so that the percentages for them should not be given much consideration. The fact that they accord fairly well with other well-established facts gives them greater value, but they must be used with circumspection.

The Southern States show the lowest percentages of non-surviving families and the Middle West, west of the Mississippi, is next lowest. This is what we would expect from the comparison of occupational groups. If agriculture has the lowest percentage of non-surviving families, then those parts of the country which are still rural would naturally reflect this condition in their populations as a whole. That agriculturists should have only about one-third as many non-surviving families as people engaged in

found in this study, the probable percentages of infertile marriages in these different groups, five to six per cent for agriculturists and 15 to 18 per cent for the managerial, professional and commercial group, we find that about 17 or 18 per cent of the former families are not reproducing while about 50 per cent of the latter group are dying out. Even moderate success in those callings, distinctive of the city, is attended by a more or less rapid dying out of the family in half of the cases of those who marry, to say nothing of the large

TABLE I
PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES HAVING 1 OR 2 CHILDREN

	STUDENTS' FAMILIES				PARENTS' FAMILIES ALL OCCUPATIONS
	All occupations	Agricultural	Managerial, trade, Professional	Skilled	
New England.....	35.9	20.7	37.3	21.4	18.9
Middle Atlantic.....	36.2	25.2	38.3	34.9	14.1
East North Central.....	33.6	19.5	38.6	30.3	9.9
West North Central.....	25.2	9.6	32.3	33.9	7.8
South Atlantic.....	16.5	6.8	22.9	22.0	8.5
East South Central.....	18.8	10.3	25.1	19.2	7.2
West South Central.....	19.1	9.1	25.8	31.3	9.5
Mountain.....	31.9	14.5	39.1	33.8	11.8
Pacific.....	33.3	22.7	37.3	37.5	11.4
United States.....	27.5	12.4	33.7	30.1	9.9

managerial, professional, and commercial occupations will probably surprise many who have not followed our trends of growth. The real surprise to the author, however, was the high percentage of non-surviving families among skilled laborers. This may not be representative, due to the fact that but few students seem to come from the families of skilled laborers. As compared with the parents' families the number of non-surviving students' families increased almost three-fold.

If we add to the non-surviving families,

TABLE II
PERCENTAGE OF GIVEN FAMILIES HAVING SPECIFIED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

SIZE OF FAMILIES PARENTS COME FROM	NUMBER OF SUCH FAMILIES	NUMBER OF CHILDREN				
		1 or 2	3 or 4	5 or 6	7 or more	
Father 1 or 2 Mother 3 or more }.....	681	34	34	19	13	
Mother 1 or 2 Father 3 or more }.....	659	31	39	18	12	
Both parents 1 or 2 }.....	133	41	36	10	13	
Neither parent 1 or 2 }.....	7,545	26	32	21	20	
All families.....	9,018	27	33	21	19	

percentage of celibates found in these groups.

Another tabulation was made showing the relation between the number of children in the family into which parents were born and the number of their own children. The results of this tabulation are given in Table II. It appears from this data that being born into a small family (one or two children) increases to a marked extent the likelihood of having only one or two children. Where one parent was born into a small family, slightly over

one-fifth more of their own families were small families than where neither parent was so born; and where both parents were born into small families, the percentage of those having small families was about 58 per cent greater.

This same tendency is shown in other ways also. The average number of children per family, where one parent was born into a small family, is 3.84, where both parents are from small families, it is 3.46, while the average in our whole group is 4.32. In comparing the proportion of the parents of our college students, who themselves had families similar in size to those in which they were born, we found that whereas 29.3 per cent of those born into one and two child families reappeared as parents in families of this size, only 12 per cent of those born into families of three or more appeared as parents of only one or two children. Thus it seems that the likelihood of the people in this study having small families is more than doubled by their being born into such families.

These tabulations were made, not because it was believed they would prove anything conclusively, but rather in the hope that they might add a little to our knowledge of the selective processes in family survival. In making use of these data, there are several factors of which account should be taken. In the first place, there is an error of 0.5 of a child, on the average, in the size of the families into which the parents are born, due to the fact that a good many students do not know all the infant deaths that occurred among their parents' brothers and sisters. (This figure was arrived at by having about 400 Miami students and their parents answer the same questions.) Just how much this would change the figures given, I will not attempt to estimate, but it seems clear that the likelihood of small

families reappearing in the second generation would be increased if this error could be eliminated, so that these figures probably understate this tendency. In the second place, what is true of the families in this study may not be a general tendency, but peculiar to the group sending children to college. In the third place, we do not know what proportion of the children from the different sized families did not marry or married and were childless. Even if we knew exactly the likelihood of people from small families having small families and could further calculate the rate at which they are dying out, we should still be unable to assign causes without more detailed data for more than the two generations.

It may not be out of place, however, to suggest some of the factors which might possibly tend to produce families of like size in the two generations. One is that there is a true hereditary factor which predisposes to small families. If such a predisposition exists, it probably manifests itself in the form of a weak desire for offspring, or even an aversion to children, as well as in an abnormal functioning of the generative system. In any event, people having this predisposition in any form would be eliminated from the population very rapidly under present circumstances.

Another explanation may be that the very fact of being reared in a small family tends to fix this type of family in the mind of the child as the desirable norm and with the development of the voluntary control of births, it is comparatively easy for anyone so desiring to conform to this norm. Another possible explanation is that similar conditions of living in the two generations have led to rearing small families in both.

The matter of chief importance in this connection, is whether the surviving

families, varying from about 82 per cent among the farmers of our study to about 50 per cent among those in the better paid city occupations, are the families having the qualities which will make for a high type of civilization. Any definitive answer to this question must be based upon much more abundant and detailed data than have yet been gathered. It seems to me, however, that it is sheer assumption to maintain that the people, who labor under an hereditary handicap in raising families, or who succumb so readily to the blandishments of personal success and the desire of easy living, that they have not the will to devote time and energy to reproduction, are the best stock in the nation. There is great danger of confusing the best stock with the type of individuality calculated to attain large personal success under present conditions. It must be clear that there is no necessary connection between these qualities. Any given stage of civiliza-

tion, or any social group may put a premium on personal qualities which are highly prejudicial to the welfare of the great body of the people. If these personal qualities are such that they lead to the dying out of a large part of the classes who are in control of society at a given time, this process may be all to the good from the standpoint of mass welfare. Since this is the case, it should not be so readily assumed that if a powerful class taken as a unit is dying out, society is a great loser. It may be that the portion of that class which is reproducing is the better portion, when looked at from the long-time point of view. It is a mistake therefore to think of social classes as units from the standpoint of reproduction. The family is the unit which should be studied and when we know more accurately what is happening in it, we may be able to tell more nearly what biological change is likely to occur in the population of a given country.

WELFARE AND PROFIT MAKING

FRANK T. CARLTON

WHAT are the goals of business in general or of a particular establishment? Is it the aim of a business to make profits, to produce a serviceable and needed product at a fair price, or to give employment to wage workers at fair wages and under good working conditions? There is no simple dogmatic answer to these questions. Certainly, an industry must make profits—get a larger return than it pays out for running expenses—or it cannot long continue to serve either the community or the stockholders. Doubtless, many business firms have not formulated well-defined purposes; and different elements in a

business such as investors, active managers, skilled workers and unskilled workers, will not agree as to goals.

Given certain ends or aims upon which employers—investors and managers—and employees agree, it will not be difficult to unite in regard to the method which should be used to accomplish those results. But a scientific method may be used to accomplish results which may be held to be good or to be undesirable. Science may be utilized for destructive as well as for constructive purposes. The prime difficulty in regard to the introduction of scientific methods into industry and into the management of men, will come be-

cause of differences in regard to aims, goals, or purposes. If the fundamental purpose is increase in dividends and, as a consequence, greater subordination is required of workers, we may expect a rising tide of antagonism on the part of the working group, or at least a lack of enthusiastic co-operation with the management.

Are individuals and groups in the United States gradually developing a sense of interdependence and of responsibility for social wellbeing? Are there visible forces operating today in the economic field which tend to reduce social irresponsibility? If so, can a national policy be outlined which will help in directing the pursuit of private wealth, income, and profits into channels which lead to the improvement of national and social wellbeing? Or, is it feasible through governmental action or through the efforts of private associations to develop regulations which will make easy the way toward greater emphasis upon social good? President Glenn Frank has well said: "The American business man is at one and the same time profit maker and civilization maker." Can the conditions under which profit making occurs in the third decade of the twentieth century, be made to aid in civilization building? These are important questions which are not to be answered in a spirit of undue optimism or complacency. It is urged that a calm and deliberate consideration of the problem will disclose certain positive forces or influences which are tending at the present time to direct the old and powerful profit-making motive into channels leading toward community wellbeing. It is the purpose of this article to call attention to a group of forces or influences which are guiding industry toward goals that look desirable to management, employees, and consumers.

i. Business management is gradually

evolving into a profession. Manual workers since the Industrial Revolution have been separated from the ownership of the instruments of production. In recent decades, management is likewise becoming divorced from these instruments; management and ownership are being separated. The corporation easily makes it possible to separate ownership from management, to allow one group of men to own stocks and bonds, to be silent and absentee partners, while another, and usually a smaller, group drawing salaries has the active management of the industrial activities of the organization. The hired executives and the industrial experts who have little or no investment in the industry with which they are connected, are comparatively new and attractive figures in the business world; but industrial evolution is tending definitely to separate the investor from the managerial element. Management is becoming more and more hired management; it is taking the professional point of view. A new type of management is being developed which is salaried and not directly dependent upon risk taking and profits for its income.

For good or for ill, we are beginning to develop and accept new theories of managerial responsibility to employees, to customers, and to the public as well as to the stockholders and bondholders of a corporation. The new type of management is emphasizing regularity of operation, good quality of output, and excellent working conditions for workers. It approves of stability of business and of returns; it is primarily interested in productivity and service rather than extraordinary pecuniary profits. The field in which the profit-making motive holds undisputed sway is being narrowed. The idea that industry can and should be improved and stabilized from within by the

application of scientific methods and the acceptance of the long-run point of view, is being looked upon with favor by more and more hard-headed business men. Science is being linked with business, and speculation is no longer looked upon favorably by the new leaders of industry. Science and trained industrial managers are together reducing risk and stabilizing business. The members of the investor group are primarily interested in getting as large a return as is consistent with security of investment. But, in basic and established industries, the typical dividend return is diminishing as the risk decreases. Except in new and experimental industries, the tendency is toward a standardized return. The speculative element is becoming less and less prominent. Great fluctuations in business and an abundance of speculative opportunities have made for inefficient and careless management. "The days of profit margins sufficiently wide to absorb the mistakes of faulty management are rapidly drawing to a close"; a new era is at hand. The automobile industry is getting out of its initial and speculative stage. For example, the engineers of a large company assert that as a result of scientific methods in regard to the utilization of materials, machines, and personnel, \$3,500,000 were saved in the first nine months of 1925.

Progressive executives today are especially interested in reducing costs and in stabilizing business. Only trained executives who are not watching the fluctuations of the stock market, can bring about remarkable reductions in costs. Speculation is a stubborn foe of efficiency, of stabilization, and of science in business. The American nation has been paying too much for speculation. In the era of super-competition which many students of business affairs believe lies just ahead, the speculator is almost useless; he is indeed

a menace to our industrial stability and progress.

The professional point of view in the case of the business man will mean more emphasis upon the needs and welfare of the buyer of the product and of the worker in shop, mine, or store. When the management of a business gets the professional point of view it will not cater solely to the interests of the investor. The management will consider itself to be the representative of the buyer and of the worker in the service of the company as well as of those who own stock in the corporation. The manager of a business will aim to produce a serviceable product at reasonable prices, with well-paid employees working in attractive and healthful workshops. It should not be overlooked, of course, that the words, "reasonable" and "well-paid," are ambiguous and subject to varying definitions; but it is not impossible to attain a fair amount of agreement.

Persons inclined toward pessimism will at once remark that the business man cannot take the point of view of the professional man; business is not a profession and never can be. The answer is that he must be prepared to take that point of view or suffer very great interference on the part of governmental commissions and bureaus,—or governmental ownership of many industries. Let us recall that industry has changed greatly in recent decades. The corporation now dominant in many important lines of endeavor—railway service, banking, manufacture, etc.—is of comparatively recent growth. The public service corporation—electric lighting, railway, etc.—is operating under conditions which a few years ago would have been considered impracticable, even impossible, by many business men. The United States Steel Corporation is operated very differently from the village black-

smith shop. Henry Ford has gone far toward educating business men to accept the idea that high prices are not essential in successful business.

One of the most significant movements in the world of business is the rapid development of schools of business administration in connection with our colleges and universities. Scientific methods and the professional spirit are replacing the crude, rule-of-thumb, profits-only methods. It is true that many of these departments for business training do not as yet foster the professional spirit. It is quite true that many are not doing much but developing high-pressure salesmen and shrewd business men of the old-fashioned type who care little for the public or the workers. But the future looks brighter. These schools presently will begin—are beginning—to train in a high and new type of business men with social outlook,—men who can see that the public and the worker cannot longer be safely disregarded,—men who see the importance of industrial peace and harmony and the significance of science in business.

The politician and the engineer or the trained business man are very different. One is a master of speech and of emotional appeal; the other is a master of expert knowledge and of practical application. The engineer rather than the politician should control industry. Again, the engineer rather than the speculator is demanded in business. Too many of our technical difficulties have come because the stock-ticker rather than technical principles have determined the course of business procedure.

2. Large corporate enterprises are planning for years to come. Management today looks far ahead; it builds for the future. The policy of a business which aims repeatedly to re-sell to its customers will be far more solicitous about the

quality of product and the needs of its customers than is the little, short-lived business which looks no farther than today's sales and profits. The dominant business purpose or aim is clearly not the same in a public utility such as an electric lighting plant, as in the case of a small grocery store or a Florida real estate firm; it is quite different in case of a large well-established department store from that which actuates the itinerant peddler who does not expect again to visit a particular town. One takes a long-time view of sales and profits; the other is alive only to today's receipts. The long-time view more nearly harmonizes the selfish motives of enterprisers and the needs of the community than does the short-run view. The purpose of a corporation organized on a fairly permanent scale is likely to be less anti-social than in the case of a business which may be expected to close down within a short period of time. One must cultivate the goodwill of customers; the other cares little about the attitude of a customer after a sale is actually concluded.

The aim of a highly speculative business will be very different from that of an old business which has regularized its method of operation. The latter will stress economical operating methods and service to its customers; the former will give little consideration to these items. The long-run point of view in a business which is fairly well regularized is quite favorable to the interests of consumers and of workers. From the long-time view of the activities of a business, profits arise out of production rather than out of monopoly and restriction. Plans are made to sell large quantities of goods at low rates of profits per unit. To succeed such a business must cultivate the goodwill of both customers and workers. From the long-run point of view it pays an industry to lay aside the let-the-buyer-beware

attitude; and it is not good business to allow employees to become suspicious of the management. The long-run point of view emphasizes the importance of the goodwill of well-paid and contented workers because only through such a policy may production costs be kept low. Industrial technique requiring subdivision of labor and interdependence is making teamwork and group coöperation more and more essential in the business and industrial world. Generations of individualistic business philosophy are delaying the development of the new business ethics in which teamwork rather than competitive conflict will be stressed; but economic forces are gradually pushing the old conflict philosophy into the background.

In legal terminology, a corporation is an artificial person; in accounting practice, the corporation is considered to be a unit distinct from the collective group of stockholders and bondholders—investors—in the industry. The interests and life of the corporation as a legal entity and as an accounting unit are pictured as distinct from that of the body of investors as well as from that of one investor or of any group of such persons. Indeed, a considerable fraction of the capital of many corporations—the portion denominated as surplus—has arisen out of the profits not distributed as dividends to the stockholders.

Why not, therefore, consider a corporate surplus as belonging to the corporation and not to the stockholders? May not such a surplus be used, as logically and equitably, to benefit the active managers, the rank and file of employees, or the consumers, as for the benefit only of absentee and drifting investors in the enterprise? Certain corporations have adopted the plan of definite limitation of dividends; and practically all corporation bonds are

limited to a specified rate of interest. A new business philosophy has been hinted at by Henry Ford. Profits should belong primarily to the business; they should be utilized to provide a sounder basis for the industry and to seek possible better working conditions and more regular employment. According to Mr. Ford, the active working and managerial force and the consumers have claims prior to those of the absentee investors. This almost inverts the customary point of view in accord with which profits belong to the investors who happen to be common stockholders.

Doubtless, the acceptance of such a concept of corporate property rights might well carry with it provisions for the utilization of a portion of the surplus to assure dividends and interest during times of depression, and, perhaps also, unemployment insurance as in the case of the Dutchess Bleachery Company. Is there any good reason, apart from custom, why an industry should pay more than is necessary in order to obtain funds to be invested in the enterprise? T. E. Mitten of the Philadelphia Traction System believes that the big returns in industry should go to those who take an active part in upbuilding the business, that is, the active management and the men. "There is no denial of property rights in this. It is a mere recognition of human rights, without which no property rights can be maintained. No individual can run one of these corporations today. His success depends entirely upon the degree of coöperation he receives from every employee of the system. In Philadelphia the men did coöperate and that is the whole story. They pinned their faith to a broken-down road and set out to make it pay. Every man who did that was in the best sense of the word a capitalist, and it is to such capitalists that the future rewards of industry more and more must go."

The plan of the Dennison Manufacturing Company places the control of the business in the hands of the active management as long as dividends are paid to the absentee stockholders.

3. A characteristic of industry in recent decades has been the increased value of machinery and equipment per worker in the normal manufacturing plant. Expensive and delicate machinery placed in the hands of inefficient or disgruntled workers is an invitation to financial disaster. Breakage, repairs, and overhead expenses bulk large per worker and per unit of output in plants where the morale of the workers is low. The goodwill of the employees becomes of increasing importance as the capital investment per worker mounts. Teamwork, contented workers, excellent morale, become the watchwords of wide-awake executives in large-scale industry. The urge of profit making in businesses having high overhead expenses inevitably turns the attention to human relations in industry. The growth of large-scale business involving high overhead or constant expenses also directs the attention of the management to the stabilization or regularization of business. It tends definitely to diminish the relative importance of the speculative element in business; and as interest in speculation fades, interest in technical processes, in human relations, and in the quality of products, grows.

4. Large-scale industry demands wide markets; mass production is literally production for the masses. High wages and a reasonable amount of leisure will mean larger markets for the output of large-scale industry. Low wages, long working hours, unemployment, and irregularity of employment, on the other hand, tend to curtail the purchasing power of the mass of workers. Since approximately ninety per cent of our trade is domestic, managers

of big business must look to the building up of markets at home for their products; and a great home market can only be built up by putting purchasing power into the hands of the great masses of the population. The phenomenal growth of the low-priced automobile industry would be possible only among a people receiving a fairly large per capita income and maintaining relatively high standards of living.

5. Greater efficiency in industry and the reduction of waste make for social betterment. In the terse words of another, "every efficient thing is humane." The employment of a machine to dig ditches, to load an open hearth furnace in a steel mill, or to hoist bricks and stones, takes a heavy burden from the shoulders of workers. Selfishness and the desire to increase profits lead directly to inventions which save time and labor and which are profitable; but the result in the long run is to improve working conditions and to make possible higher standards of living. However, in the short run, technical improvements may make for unemployment, and, consequently, for reduced purchasing power and further unemployment in other lines of industry. Technical improvements are causes of much temporary unemployment.

6. In modern times, organizations and group life become increasingly important. Each adult person is a member of several groups,—family, political party, fraternal organization, labor union, church, club, and so on. Group discipline tends to make the member think in terms of group welfare rather than of purely personal interests,—but group interests may run counter to national interests or to social wellbeing.

7. The instinctive desire, impulse, or tendency which leads men in all walks of life to prefer to do good and useful work rather than poor and useless, is a factor

upon which more and more stress may be placed as wages rise above a bare subsistence level and as regularity of employment becomes customary. Restriction of output and conflicts between management and men bulk large in an irregular industry like the building trades. The status of the clothing industry has improved remarkably since higher wages and greater regularity of work have been obtained.

8. The development of easily recognized standards of measurement of quantity and quality will make it possible for the purchaser to determine whether the article measures up to his requirements. It will tend to put a premium upon excellency of product and upon honesty.

9. A variety of trade associations are evolving codes of business ethics. By clarifying our ideas in regard to unfair business practices, the work of these associations will check the use of dishonest and questionable business methods.

10. The influences outlined above will build up public and professional sentiment in favor of the passage and enforcement of legislation outlining the rules of the business game. If properly drawn, such legislation will direct progress toward new and socially attractive goals in business enterprise. The passage of workingmen's compensation legislation in various States hastened the introduction of safety appliances and led to greater emphasis upon the education of the worker as to safety. In this case, legislation gave an added impetus to a movement already under way. In like manner, a properly drawn measure for unemployment insurance might lead to more careful and more earnest study of plans for the regularization of industry, and bring about a reduction in the irregularity of employment.

In a well-managed manufacturing plant, effective coördination of departments is attained. Over-production or over-development in one department as compared with another is prevented. In our national economy, unhappily this condition of coördination has not been reached. Much of industrial maladjustment and inefficiency is due to over-development and over-building of certain industries. Expansion in a period of optimism is often unwise, as witness 1918-1920. May not the suggestion be entertained that regulation of the allocation of capital is needed in many business enterprises? The federal reserve banking system now has the power to discourage unwise borrowing by over-optimistic business men.

A city often regulates the type of building or of business which may be built or established on a given street. Americans are very familiar with the manifold regulations and restrictions which are thrown about a railway or a municipal utility. In the interest of workers and of the public, may we not likewise begin regulating the growth and expansion of certain key industries? For example, the soft-coal industry is distinctly a sick industry. It is troubled with recurrent disagreements between employers and workers; it is over-developed,—too much capital invested and too many workers attached to the industry. Evidently, the soft-coal industry is unable alone to solve its grave difficulties,—strikes, under-employment, over-development, etc. Some constructive national policy is needed; the difficulties are distinctly of national import. Over-development is found in many other industries,—the shoe industry, the iron and steel industry, lumbering, etc. In these industries are found irregularity of employment and unemployment of both labor and capital; and unemployment is

only a visible token of profound and disquieting economic and industrial mal-adjustments. Is it not pertinent to inquire what rôle the government may play in reducing the irregularities and mal-adjustments of the business world?

It is urged that these ten forces or influences in the world of business endeavor are giving progressive and alert business managers a new conception of business

interests and welfare. If business success and community wellbeing pass in a considerable degree out of the conflict stage and into an era of teamwork, a new epoch in civilization building may indeed be just ahead. Many of the leaders of labor organizations are, in recent years, showing a commendable willingness to stress the need of arousing the interest of unionists in efficiency and productivity.

The ninth annual report on infant mortality in the cities of the country for the year 1927, published by the *American Child Health Association*, carries the following main points.

1. The infant death rate for 1927 is given for each of 716 cities of the country.
2. Of this group, 683 cities are within what is called the Birth Registration Area of the country, which includes those states having registration laws satisfactory to the United States Census Bureau, and in which ninety per cent or more of all births are officially registered. The Birth Registration Area in 1927 consisted of forty states and the District of Columbia.
3. The infant death rate for this group of cities (683) was 64.9 in 1927. In other words approximately 65 babies died during their first year of life for each 1000 born.
4. This is the lowest rate ever attained by the cities of the country as a group.
5. In 1926 the rate was 73.7.
6. In 1915, when the Birth Registration Area was first formed, and consisted of only ten states and the District of Columbia, its rate was 100.
7. Among the cities over 250,000 population (according to 1920 census) the three with the lowest rates were—Seattle, Washington 41; Portland, Oregon and Minneapolis, Minnesota, each 47.
8. In the next population group 100,000-250,000, the four cities with lowest rates were: Bridgeport, Connecticut 43; St. Paul, Minnesota 49; Oakland, California and Grand Rapids, Michigan, each 53.
9. Cities with the lowest rates each of the remaining population groups were—

50,000-100,000—	East Orange, N. J.	26.
25,000- 50,000—	Alameda, Cal.	9.
10,000- 25,000—	Summit, N. J.	15.
10. Comparing cities by population, it is the largest cities as a group (over 250,000) that have the lowest rate.
11. In addition to the 683 cities referred to above, rates are given for each of 33 cities which have satisfactory death records but which are in states whose birth records are not judged to be ninety per cent or more complete.
12. The source of all their records is the Provisional Report of the United States Census Bureau and state and local officials.
13. The year 1927 is the first that reports have been available for every city over 10,000 population in the area concerned.
14. Sixteen years ago there were only about twenty-five cities that knew what their baby death rate was because the records were so incomplete.

LIBRARY AND WORKSHOP

Special Book Reviews by HARRY ELMER BARNES, FRANK H. HANKINS, CLARK WISLER,
PHILLIPS BRADLEY, FLOYD N. HOUSE, MALCOLM WILLEY, AND OTHERS

INDEX TO BOOKS REVIEWED

	<i>PAGE</i>
Communography, Communometry, Communology.....	L. L. Bernard 153
Burkitt's <i>OUR EARLY ANCESTORS</i> ; Fosdick's <i>A PILGRIMAGE TO PALESTINE</i> ; Wood's <i>COMMUNITY PROBLEMS</i> ; Goodsell's <i>PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY</i> ; Pettit's <i>CASE STUDIES IN COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION</i> ; Lundquist and Carver's <i>PRINCIPLES OF RURAL SOCIOLOGY</i> ; Taylor's <i>RURAL SOCIOLOGY</i> ; Sims' <i>ELEMENTS OF RURAL SOCIOLOGY</i> ; Hawthorne's <i>THE SOCIOLOGY OF RURAL LIFE</i> ; Sanderson's <i>FARM INCOME AND FARM LIFE</i> ; Williams' <i>THE EXPANSION OF RURAL LIFE</i> ; Odum's <i>MAN'S QUEST FOR SOCIAL GUIDANCE</i> ; Dewey's <i>THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS</i> ; Ellwood's <i>CULTURAL EVOLUTION</i> .	
More Light on the Family.....	Ernest R. Groves 156
Briffault's <i>THE MOTHERS</i> ; Messer's <i>THE FAMILY IN THE MAKING</i> ; Haldane's <i>MOTHERHOOD AND ITS ENEMIES</i> ; Cross' <i>THE HEBREW FAMILY</i> ; Elnett's <i>HISTORIC ORIGIN AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY LIFE IN RUSSIA</i> ; Goodsell's <i>PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY</i> ; Bruehl's <i>BIRTH CONTROL AND EUGENICS</i> ; Van Waters' <i>PARENTS ON PROBATION</i> ; Neumann's <i>MODERN YOUTH AND MARRIAGE</i> ; Russell's <i>THE RIGHT TO BE HAPPY</i> .	
Some Recent Trends in Psychology and Social Psychology.....	L. L. Bernard 160
Weld's <i>PSYCHOLOGY AS SCIENCE</i> ; Perrin and Klein's <i>PSYCHOLOGY</i> ; Berman's <i>THE RELIGION CALLED BEHAVIORISM</i> ; Herrick's <i>BRAINS OF RATS AND MEN</i> ; Storck's <i>MAN AND CIVILIZATION</i> ; Alverdes' <i>SOCIAL LIFE IN THE ANIMAL WORLD</i> ; de Laguna's <i>SPEECH</i> ; Sprowls' <i>SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY INTERPRETED</i> ; Young's <i>SOURCE BOOK FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY</i> ; Thomas and Znaniecki's <i>THE POLISH PEASANT IN EUROPE AND AMERICA</i> ; Burrow's <i>THE SOCIAL BASIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS</i> ; Roback's <i>THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHARACTER</i> ; Bagby's <i>THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONALITY</i> ; Myerson's <i>THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MENTAL DISORDERS</i> ; Valentine's <i>THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONALITY</i> ; Vaughan's <i>THE LURE OF SUPERIORITY</i> ; de Man's <i>THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIALISM</i> ; Edwards' <i>THE NATURAL HISTORY OF REVOLUTION</i> .	
Sorokin's <i>CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES</i>	Floyd N. House 166
Community Churches.....	LeRoy E. Bowman 167
Piper's <i>THE COMMUNITY CHURCH MOVEMENT</i> .	
Baldwin's <i>THE NEW ENGLAND CLERGY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION</i> ; Seabury's <i>GROWING INTO LIFE</i>	
.....	Floyd N. House 168
A System of Behaviorism.....	Read Bain 169
Weiss' <i>A THEORETIC BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR</i> .	
Radin's <i>THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN</i>	Joseph Hyde Pratt 170
The Farmer and Coöperation.....	Sydney D. Frissell 171
Wabasse's <i>WHAT IS COÖOPERATION?</i> Boyle's <i>FARM RELIEF</i> .	
Fairchild's <i>IMMIGRANT BACKGROUNDS</i>	H. G. Duncan 171
New Books Received.....	173

COMMUNOGRAPHY, COMMUNOMETRY, COMMUNOLOGY

L. L. BERNARD

OUR EARLY ANCESTORS. By M. C. Burkitt. Cambridge (Eng.): University Press, 1926. 243 pp.

A PILGRIMAGE TO PALESTINE. By Harry Emerson Fosdick. New York: Century Co., 1928. 332 pp.

COMMUNITY PROBLEMS. By Arthur Evans Wood. New York: Century Co., 1928. 589 pp. \$3.75.

PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY. By Willystine Goodsell. New York: Century Co., 1928. 474 pp.

CASE STUDIES IN COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION. By Walter W. Pettit. New York: Century Co., 1928. 345 pp.

PRINCIPLES OF RURAL SOCIOLOGY. By Gustav A. Lundquist and Thomas Nixon Carver. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1927. 384 pp. \$2.84.

RURAL SOCIOLOGY. By Carl C. Taylor. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1926. 509 pp.

ELEMENTS OF RURAL SOCIOLOGY. By Newell LeRoy Sims. New York: T. Y. Crowell Co., 1928. 698 pp. \$3.75.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF RURAL LIFE. By Horace Boies Hawthorne. New York: Century Co., 1926. 517 pp.

FARM INCOME AND FARM LIFE. Edited by Dwight Sanderson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. 324 pp. \$3.00.

THE EXPANSION OF RURAL LIFE. By James Mickel Williams. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926. 346 pp.

MAN'S QUEST FOR SOCIAL GUIDANCE. By Howard W. Odum. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1927. 643 pp. \$4.50.

THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS. By John Dewey. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1927. 224 pp. \$2.50.

CULTURAL EVOLUTION. By Charles A. Ellwood. New York: Century Co., 1927. 267 pp. \$2.50.

Not so long ago it was society, then it was the group, now it is the community which holds our attention in sociology. Allport has rediscovered the individual, after the sociologists had buried him alive in the social process of Small, and the Neo-Hegelians had lost him in "culture," and McDougall and the biologists had forced him to retire into the anonymity of the "race." All of which, perhaps, means that we are about to achieve a

cycle, as Vico would have said, and start our sociology over again on a new level. In the new sociology the individual is not neglected, nor is social environment—which some of the erstwhile instinctivists find it more agreeable to call "culture"—but the individual and the environment appear as functions of each other, each conditioning the other. In this way we have achieved an equilibrium as an escape from the earlier chaos and recrimination in which some of our more confused brethren partially lost their sociological balance.

The group of books which stands at the head of this review probably illustrates as well as any other of equal size the truth of the above generalizations. Burkitt's *Our Early Ancestors*, of the mesolithic, neolithic, and copper ages, affords the first general or composite picture of this rather neglected period of human social history. As one might expect, the emphasis is upon material culture-tools and weapons—with some reference to symbolic art. But was not man, in these ages, primarily engaged in the creation of a new physico-social environment by means of which he might contend with the natural environments? Here the individual is prominent, but always as a member of a community of like men, with the inevitable and dread natural environment in the background and never far away.

Harry Emerson Fosdick's *A Pilgrimage to Palestine* brings us much nearer home, into the iron age of the Roman Empire and the steel and electric age of the great British mother of all. But even here survive reminiscences of a psycho-social environment or culture almost as old as neolithic times, in the inevitable lag of

ideas and ideals behind the more spirited (possibly more spiritual) material culture. Here also the emphasis is upon communography, a description with rare vividness of a land and its civilization, in the midst of which a voice cried out (and still cries out) with passionate pleading for a righteousness and the idealism of humanity which are never realized—which perhaps never can be realized in a world of relative values. This is a great book, however commonplace the title may be.

Arthur E. Wood brings us all the way home in his *Community Problems*. Its very title is symptomatic of the changing emphasis, of the transition from "society" to "community." It is an attempt to descend to earth, from unctious generalizations to the concrete reality of the facts of human association. Professor Wood has not, any more than any one else, lost the desire to see our social life and institutions as a whole. But, like the newer breed of sociologists everywhere, he has learned that the microscope of the scientific specialist is often more helpful than the telescope of the metaphysician. In keeping with the method of science he attempts to build up a synthetic view of society through an analysis of the problems with which one must deal in the community. His emphasis is primarily upon Housing, Health, Play and Recreation, and Americanization. From such favorable hill tops he leads us to an understanding perspective of the whole promised land of sociology.

The Problems of the Family, by Willystine Goodsell is even more of a microscopical excursion into the life of the community. If Miss Goodsell is less interesting in this book than in her former work on the family she is also less historical, general and theoretical, and more practical and analytical. Her close cross section analy-

sis of the various structures and functions of the modern family in relation to the community as a whole will be generously welcomed by all types of sociologists. E. E. Muntz' *Race Contact* performs the same service by way of functional analysis of a small unit or phase of the community life that Miss Goodsell's work performs in the way of structural analysis. Muntz has gone further afield in his search for the social environmental or cultural conditions which determine and limit racial contacts than any single predecessor. This is another example of the service of inductive analysis to the broader field of sociological generalization.

Pettit's five *Case Studies in Community Organization* are something different still, but of the same general type. Not only is the sociological microscope here focussed upon specific local communities, but only certain tissues of the specimens are selected for study and analysis—those covered by the general term "organization." This sort of study especially illustrates the tendency to turn from the verbal analysis of larger social units to the specific factual analysis of the smallest available units—a tendency as hopeful ultimately for general social theory as it is immediately for social welfare.

From these inductive studies of the community in general and of microscopical analyses of particular units of structure and function within the community, we may now turn to a group of general studies of a particular type of community—that which is distinctively rural. Lundquist and Carver's *Principles of Rural Sociology* is primarily descriptive, with some historical review and a few principles thrown in for dessert. Perhaps it is not yet possible to write a work on rural sociology to which the term "principles" can properly be applied. The quality of the work is uneven, although

the flashes of brilliancy which are so characteristic of Carver are frequently present. Somehow Lundquist's general outline seems strangely familiar to the reviewer. Taylor's *Rural Sociology* is confessedly "a study of rural problems." It is even less theoretical than the preceding book. Both of these works discuss the rural community in rather general terms, although Taylor's volume often gets down to concrete analyses and is very readable and teachable. Both of them show up-to-date tendencies by including chapters on the rural standard of living. So also does Sims' *Elements of Rural Sociology*, which likewise makes a general rather than a detailed approach to community analysis. The arrangement of subject matter in this volume is unusual. Four chapters on demography are followed by fourteen on non-material and material cultural factors and processes. Next are two chapters on economic aspects and problems and, finally, seven on historical and present day rural community structure and organization. The book is made interesting by means of illustrations and diagrams of a concrete character. The reviewer likes especially the analysis of rural mental traits.

In *The Sociology of Rural Life* Hawthorne has attempted two things not previously developed in text books in rural sociology. The first is to work out a methodology for the evaluation of rural institutions and of the behavior of rural people. The second is to draw the subject of rural sociology into closer alliance with general sociology by transforming the treatment from that merely of problems to one of principles. That he has not been wholly successful in either attempt is perhaps not surprising. But he has succeeded in introducing numerous quantitative elements into his treatment, which are not merely statistical, and of giving to it a flavor of

fundamentalness without undue abstractness or remoteness.

Farm Income and Farm Life, edited by Dwight Sanderson, is "a symposium on the relation of the social and economic factors in rural progress," and is perhaps as little superficial as a group of forty-eight separate contributions on such a wide range of themes within a total of 317 pages well could be. James Mickel Williams' *The Expansion of Rural Life* is characterized by the author's usual keenness of analysis and clear insight into rural problems of adjustment and community control. While both of these books emphasize the general aspects of rural community life, they also frequently penetrate to intensive analysis.

In Odum's *Man's Quest for Social Guidance* we return from the rural community to the larger community as a whole. Two things especially characterize this book, both of which are exceedingly valuable. The author has an unusual capacity for the synthetic viewpoint without losing at the same time an intimate touch with reality. This is a rare gift and with it great interpreters in sociology are born. The other quality is what I would call moral insight and striving, if the term were not so overdone in our day and so often misapplied. The author wishes his science to be of some use in the world, but he is not one of those who believe that any book can be of much use in these times unless thoroughly scientific. The volume covers a wide range of problems common to all types of communities and is the most general in scope of all of the works mentioned in this review.

Dewey also deals with the wider community in *The Public and Its Problems*, but much more abstractly than does Odum. While Odum is easy to read, Dewey will appear to many very difficult. Being a

philosopher, which quite as often means a lover of words and of verbal distinctions as it does of wisdom, he sometimes leads us through a maze. But this volume is also filled with much wisdom, if with little that is new. Dewey, who so long taught others, is now beginning to learn from others and sometimes he does it so neatly as to be unconscious of the fact. He finds that the public, originally a concerted defense against visible tyranny, is now disintegrating under the complex (and derivative) pressures of modern life and is dominated by propaganda instead of by sound judgment. The only hope he has of remedying this situation is to find a means of teaching the masses enough scientific fact (as contrasted with mere opinion) that they can criticize propaganda and judge men and programs for themselves. By such means they may be able to make representative democracy a fact instead of a fallacy. But he does not know whether this can be done. Neither do the rest of us, the more is the pity.

Cultural Evolution, by Professor Ellwood,

attempts to explain how the modern greater community came to be. Professor Ellwood also has learned much in recent years and perhaps equally unconsciously. The most remarkable transformation wrought in him is that he has become an environmentalist instead of an instinctivist, although he still preserves a few instincts in his vocabulary for small change. But his heart and soul are fixed upon the psycho-social environment, which, like other reformed instinctivists, he calls "culture." His thesis is that cultural evolution is a learning process by which the individual invents new adjustment techniques and these are stored in abstract language symbols and transmitted to others, especially to future generations. Thus culture (the psycho-social environment) grows ever larger and richer and organizes itself in institutions. Although this viewpoint and the content are not new, Ellwood's extensive treatment of the theme constitutes a valuable contribution to the present day rapid elaboration of the environmental aspect of sociological theory.

MORE LIGHT ON THE FAMILY

ERNEST R. GROVES

THE MOTHERS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF SENTIMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS. By Robert Briffault. New York: Macmillan, 1927. 3 Vol. \$28.00.

THE FAMILY IN THE MAKING: AN HISTORIC SKETCH. By Mary Burt Messer. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928. 359 pp.

MOTHERHOOD AND ITS ENEMIES. By Charlotte Haldane. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1928. 253 pp. \$2.00.

THE HEBREW FAMILY: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY. By Earle Bennett Cross. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927. 217 pp. \$2.50.

HISTORIC ORIGIN AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY LIFE IN RUSSIA. By Elaine Elnett. New York: Columbia University Press, 1926. 151 pp. \$2.50.

PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY. By Willystine Goodsell. New York: The Century Co., 1928. 474 pp.

BIRTH CONTROL AND EUGENICS: IN THE LIGHT OF FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL PRINCIPLES. By Charles P. Bruchl. New York: Joseph F. Wagner. 249 pp. \$2.50.

PARENTS ON PROBATION. By Miriam Van Waters. New York: New Republic, Inc., 1927. 333 pp. \$1.00.

MODERN YOUTH AND MARRIAGE. By Henry Neumann. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1928. 148 pp.

THE RIGHT TO BE HAPPY. By Mrs. Bertrand Russell. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1927. 295 pp.

In sheer bulk Briffault's volumes are impressive. The immense field he covers and

the completeness with which it is worked appears when we discover that the bibliography takes up nearly 200 pages and the index more than 100. Lord Macaulay, who chose, for literary diversion on his sailing trip to India, *Clarissa Harlowe* as likely to outlast the voyage would have found in these three volumes more reading material than in that meandering and sentimental novel of the eighteenth century. In our time when the competition for the use of leisure is so sharp, such a sizable discussion becomes for many repellent. Briffault's book will be used chiefly by many readers as an encyclopaedic source for the study of special topics—not, however, because it is lacking in interest, or does not return good profit to those who are willing and free to invest the time for a cover-to-cover reading.

In richness of anthropological material Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage* is in English Briffault's only rival, and the recent discussion is more objective, closer to modern interests in its method of developing the subject, and to one reader at least of higher literary quality. It is natural to associate the two authors, not merely because they both cover the same ground in their monumental treatment, but also because Briffault antagonizes many of the fundamental statements of his predecessor. For example, with no light touch he disposes of the idea that the gorilla is monogamous, a statement upon which he says Westermarck constructed his theory of human marriage (Vol. I, p. 175). The most important point of difference, perhaps, appears in Briffault's challenge of Westermarck's statement concerning monogamous-savage tribes (Vol. II, pp. 276-306).

Briffault's book grew out of his interest in social psychology. In the effort to draw up a list of the forms of social instincts and to discover their origin, the

author was led to the belief that they come from instincts related to the function of the female and not the male. Believing that this could not happen under the conditions of an early patriarchal society, he was driven to the conclusion that the early development of human society and its fundamental institutions and traditions are understandable only as we assume the matriarchal theory of social evolution. It is this basic idea that the sociologist will find most significant in this discussion of primitive life. It is the anthropologist who must pass final judgment upon the evidences that Briffault presents for the establishment of his theory. To the sociologist these books will be most valuable for the material they bring together concerning the family experiences of savage society. Certainly no student of the family can afford not to have Briffault's *Mothers* in his library.

The Family in the Making is a historical study of the development of the family, which has resulted from the research the author has been carrying on at the University of Wisconsin. The writer traces the family from its origin through its major historic expression until in the final chapter, "The American Frontier," she bids us look into the future. This book, curiously, also stresses in accord with Briffault, in its first chapter on "The Natural Family," the dominance of woman as possibly "the creative genius of society itself." The discussion goes forward with vigor and portrays the changing family with a skill that makes the subject-matter intensely interesting. It is a book of substance and one that starts thought.

Motherhood and Its Enemies gives a historic survey of the family in the first part of the book. The second part consists of a discussion of modern problems, including birth control and subsidized motherhood.

The author does not conceal the fact that she has opinions and is writing the book with the hope of convincing her reader that society must take more seriously the values of motherhood or continue to suffer evils that are born of a neglectful policy. Scattered through the book are discussions that force thought. For example, in her plea for easier delivery in childbirth the reader's attention takes a sharp turn when he reads "the tendency to Sadism in spinster maternity nurses is again and again responsible for unnecessary pain suffered by their patients during labor. In addition their timidity and ignorance cause further misery when they are compelled to administer drugs" (p. 248). Or again "the age of the child is approaching. The worship of the Madonna and of the infant Jesus will cease. It will be replaced by a recognition of the mother's primary importance in the social hierarchy, and of the child's importance to the individual parent and of his conditional value to the community" (p. 252). If you wish by turning aside from familiar paths to fellowship with new thought concerning family interests, read this book.

The cohesion and high level of fellowship maintained by the Jewish family under the most adverse circumstances even until now makes the early history of the Hebrew family of the greatest importance to those interested in the study of the home. Cross in *The Hebrew Family* has handled in brief space the difficult task of interpreting the evolution of the Hebrew family in the light of present-day knowledge of the Old Testament. Throughout the book he applies the results of higher criticism in such a way as to give the stages of family development their appropriate setting. The author avoids the temptation to stray into the attractive by-paths brought forward by his discus-

sion, with the result that he gives us in concrete form the clearest and most revealing picture of the history of the Hebrew family yet written.

Elaine Elnett presents in even briefer space the origin and development of family life in Russia. The Russian type of family life is little known by most Americans, and as Professor Giddings suggests in his preface to the book, only a small group of students are qualified to pass judgment on the technical scholarship of this particular discussion. The book is replete with information on the Russian family. It is obvious that in so brief a treatment only the general trend of family experience among the people that stretch over such an enormous territory as Russia can be given. All students in folkways among savage and peasant people will welcome Chapter III on the proverbs which are collected because of the light they throw upon family experience and relationship.

Dr. Goodsell's book fulfills the high expectation of those who, familiar with her former work, knew that she was writing an interpretation of the problems of contemporary American family life. The book is divided into four parts. The first traces the history of the family from its origin to its present expression in England and America. Part II takes up the social conditions that are at present acting upon the family. Here especial attention is given to modern industrialism and the pathology of family life. In Part III—"Individualism and The Family"—the chapters are concerned with the problems of birth control, giving us, perhaps, the best-balanced discussion of this difficult problem to be found in family literature. The last chapter in this division discusses freedom [in love. Here we find a critical analysis of the attack which has developed during the last

quarter of the century upon the conventional form and tradition of the American family. In Part IV we are turned toward the future in chapters that consider the promise of the childhood and family experience near at hand.

Bruehl's book gives us an authoritative statement of the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church with reference to birth control and eugenics. The author not only states the position of the church, but interprets it in the background of recent science with emphasis upon the moral principles involved in any honest discussion of birth control. The book proceeds quietly without emotion and with avoidance of an appeal to prejudice or passion. It is a book which has been much needed, and bears evidence of the necessity of keeping birth control controversy on the high level of moral principles and intellectual appeal.

In *Parents on Probation* Miriam Van Waters again reveals her rare genius in both understanding and portraying human nature in action. It is an indispensable book to those interested either in the child or the parent. Written with the charm of good fiction, it gives the reader solid facts of the utmost importance in the appreciation of contemporary parent-child relationships.

Neumann's book has issued from the recent discussion of the Lindseyan proposition of divorce by mutual consent. It deals with the moral values at stake in the crusade for a freer and more individualistic convention in matrimonial experience. It is a plea for standards and for caution as

we move into the rapid transition of present-day marriage. In spite of the author's evident eagerness to be helpful, most parents and young people after finishing the book will be left with the feeling that his position is vaguely stated and his solution even more obscure. There is not the sharp and pointed tackling of issues that in such a controversy we have the right to expect.

It is quite otherwise with Mrs. Bertrand Russell's *The Right to Be Happy*. No reader can follow her thought without clearly understanding what she regards as obstacles to matrimonial happiness, and without feeling the suggestion which issues from the implications of her position. She believes that man is not happy, but easily could be, if he were willing to make use of the resources that belong to him as a member of the modern world. She considers the rights of human beings with reference to food, work, knowledge, sex, and parenthood, and as children. Her insistence that greater happiness must be achieved by a franker recognition of sex needs and her belief that here we need to direct our attention to individual rights rather than to social restraint draws the attention of the reader to the most spectacular feature of the book and its obvious motive. In speculation it is easy enough to interpret sex as merely the individual's concern, but this practice, when translated into human flesh and blood relationships, proves stubbornly social. Happiness can never be made a right. It is an achievement. He who grasps for it, proclaiming his rights, makes a bad start.

SOME RECENT TRENDS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

L. L. BERNARD

PSYCHOLOGY AS SCIENCE. By H. P. Weld. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1928. 297 pp.

PSYCHOLOGY: ITS METHODS AND PRINCIPLES. By F. A. C. Perrin and D. B. Klein. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1926. 387 pp.

THE RELIGION CALLED BEHAVIORISM. By Louis Berman. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1927. 153 pp. \$1.75.

BRAINS OF RATS AND MEN. By C. Judson Herrick. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926. 382 pp. \$3.00.

MAN AND CIVILIZATION. By John Storck. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927. 449 pp.

SOCIAL LIFE IN THE ANIMAL WORLD. By Friedrich Alverdes. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927. 216 pp.

SPEECH: ITS FUNCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. By Grace Andrus de Laguna. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927. 363 pp. \$5.00.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY INTERPRETED. By Jesse William Sprouls. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Co., 1927. 268 pp. \$4.00.

SOURCE BOOK FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Kimball Young. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927. 844 pp.

THE POLISH PEASANT IN EUROPE AND AMERICA. By William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927. 2 vols. 2250 pp. \$10.

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. By Trigant Burrow, M.D., Ph.D. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927. 256 pp. \$4.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHARACTER. By A. A. Roback. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927. 595 pp. \$5.50.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONALITY. By English Bagby. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1928. 236 pp. \$2.50.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MENTAL DISORDERS. By Abraham Myerson, M.D. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927. 135 pp.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONALITY. By P. F. Valentine. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1927. 393 pp. \$2.50.

THE LURE OF SUPERIORITY: A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MOTIVES. By Wayland F. Vaughan. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1928. 307 pp. \$3.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIALISM. By Henry de Man. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1928. 509 pp. \$4.

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF REVOLUTION. By Lyford P. Edwards. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. 229 pp. \$3.

I

Psychology as a science is becoming highly self-conscious, but in the purposive manner of early maturity rather than in the bashful way of adolescence. Professor Weld even ventures in his *Psychology as Science* to state its problems and its points of view, but as a reporter rather than as a dictator. He recognizes that unity of viewpoint in the subject is still far from achieved. The fields of psychology recognized and treated are differential, abnormal, animal, social, and applied. Under these general headings there are of course many psychologies. For example, he divides social psychology into the genetic psychology of peoples and collective psychology. Why he omits the psychology of personality integration from this grouping is difficult to understand, unless the author has failed to realize the importance of sociology for psychology. The integration of personality is social or it is nothing, as the work of Cooley and others has abundantly demonstrated. The book is elementary, and it has other defects of conception, but it is highly suggestive and decidedly worthwhile as an introduction to the methodology of a particular body of science.

II

Perrin and Klein have illustrated better than any other text book, perhaps, the recent tendency to divest psychology of its multifold philosophical appendages and discursive proclivities and hew strictly to the line of the study of human behavior. Consequently, those interested in homilet-

ics will gasp at the omission of many good old literary discussions. The body of the text is condensed into five chapters on the biological and psychological foundations of behavior, motivation, learning, and intelligent behavior. Some of the omissions are more apparent than real, due to the arrangement of the materials around these five unfolding schemata. The whole intent of the book is to explain human behavior—its origins, its underlying drives, its modification by learning and its intelligent adaptation to en- vironing conditions. It is in this sense that the authors are thoroughgoing behaviorists, and not in any cult sense. Likewise, they make much of environmental determination and the conditioned response, and correspondingly little of instinct. They have grasped the significance of sociology for psychology, as well as the importance of concentration in presentation.

A humorous little book by an ardent and somewhat resentful rival religionist is Berman's *The Religion Called Behaviorism*. It is humorous because it illustrates so well the author's own doctrinaire dogmatism in defense of his glandular hypothesis and his criticism of Watsonianism. Dr. Berman does not seem to realize that there are two conceptions of behaviorism. The one, held by Perrin and Klein and by practically all psychologists, which looks upon it as merely the study of behavior, seems to be unknown to our author. The other, which regards it as another term to cover Dr. Watson's personal views on some metaphysical questions, is the one invariably selected by religionists and dogmatists of various stripes to bolster up their own disintegrating faiths by means of the well-known device of pronouncing vituperative anathema.

Herrick also is opposed to the extreme interpretations of behaviorism, but in no

self-righteous way. He is merely contending for the recognition and utilization of introspective evidence of behavior along with overt observational evidence; for the evidence of the inner senses and the higher logical integration of the brain along with the direct testimony of the extero-ceptive senses. Not even Watson argues against such recognition, but Watson loves his own new terminology better than harmony. And after all terminology is sometimes worth fighting for, even if it means the same thing, and especially if it means it in a better way, as sometimes Watson's does. Herrick likes the terms teleology, ethics, and ideals, but he has no mystical or mythical illusions about their origins and functions. Teleology is self-determined through experience and consists merely of getting a perspective from the present, both upon the past and upon the future, in the light of experience. Idealism is emotional attachment and sanction for a perspective of the future rationally selected in the light of experience (science). Ethics is preference for the perspective dictated by social experience. Thus might be paraphrased Herrick's viewpoint. No one could be a better behaviorist than this, for what is behaviorism (as science rather than as metaphysics) except an attempt to see conduct in the light of motivation, experience, and the limitations imposed by the conditions of life?

III

Of essentially the same outlook is Storck's *Man and Civilization*. It is a text book for an orientation course at Columbia. It is, therefore, somewhat broader than the field of psychology, for it sets itself the task of defining the world we live in as well as of showing how we came to be what we are and the making of an analysis of human nature and the mores.

The emphasis here is upon the growth of the personality and upon the environment, physical and social, which conditions this growth. It is by no means an original book, but its synthesis of the findings of other writers into a single volume renders it an excellent handbook for the student or the general reader. The tendency is to produce many books of this general pattern, outlining the growth of personality and social organization (civilization) as adaptive processes in response to the pressures of environmental factors.

A very different book is Alverdes' *Social Life in the Animal World*. If Storck represents an advancing trend, Alverdes is a survival. Here we find the apotheosis of instinct in its most naive form, and even the mysticism of the old animal lorists faintly reechoes in the pages. The chapter and topical outlines are not bad, and incidentally there are many telling facts about animal association which may be serviceable if detached from the theoretical mold in which they are cast. The author has not taken his data and observed and generalized them objectively, but has fitted them to an outworn philosophy which he has adopted ready-made. But the tendency is very strong to leave this sort of method behind.

Mrs. de Laguna's work on *Speech* represents the opposite trend. To be sure it is not a concrete study of either animal or human behavior in association, but rather an attempt to generalize the significance and modes of a certain aspect of this associative behavior—that of speech. Here again we see the sociological conception to the fore as a background for psychological interpretation. Speech is not so much an attempt to give expression to inner impulses as it is to secure response in an adjustment situation. This is true even in the emotional stages of language development, but it is much more mani-

festly the fact in the intellectual stages. Speech—or language—becomes a classificatory and naming device, by which we plot out our environment as a preliminary to controlling it and making it respond to our needs or of adapting our behavior to its demands. This is not altogether a new conception of language. Perhaps it is not so new to the sociologists as it is to the psychologists, for sociologists who are not cited in Mrs. de Laguna's text have been pointing out conclusions not wholly different from this. This valuable work could have been made more useful if there had been more cross references to the current literature. The sociological emphases of the treatment are obvious and they are almost directly opposite to those of Alverdes' work.

IV

This trend to emphasize the sociological—especially the environmental—backgrounds of human behavior is finding expression in an increasing number of works in social psychology. There are now at least a dozen text books in this field, and most of the volumes discussed in this review belong more to the field of social psychology than to that of psychology as such. Sprowls' interpretation of social psychology brings to bear the viewpoints of both psychology and sociology, and even that of biology. It is a useful book for the teachers, but scarcely within the powers of the average undergraduate. There are illuminating and incisive critical comments on such subjects as social forces, group mind, culture, group conflicts, and interaction. The analysis of types of social psychology is also excellent at points, but is not complete. There is a peculiar indecision about the question of instinct—the author being sometimes on one side of the fence and sometimes on the other—and there is an inadequate con-

sideration of environmental (conditioning) factors. In a way this volume does for social psychology what Weld's does for psychology, in attempting to see it whole and orient it. Perhaps also it will have as little success in securing complete assent from its readers.

Kimball Young's *Source Book* is (at this writing) the latest addition to the text books in social psychology. As its title indicates, it is a book of readings, for the most part excellently selected, if perhaps somewhat difficult for the more limited undergraduates. It is the completest collection of materials so far published in the field. The plan of the treatment is, allowing for a considerable rearrangement of materials, measurably similar to the text last published before this (Bernard's). This is the first time that two text books in social psychology have sufficiently resembled each other to render them comparable. Perhaps this fact of similarity indicates that there is a tendency for conceptions of the field and the emphases upon the subject matter to approach a degree of standardization similar to that in sociology, if not so marked as that in psychology.

The reissue of Thomas' *The Polish Peasant* in a two-volume edition is a fortunate event in the field of social psychology. This book remains the outstanding contribution to the case method of psychosociological analysis. Perhaps its reissue indicates a growing emphasis upon this phase of methodology. Certain it is that former students of Dr. Thomas have spread abroad in our universities and have begun to be decidedly productive in both their teaching and writing.

V

Trigant Burrow, in *The Social Basis of Consciousness*, has implied the sociological background of psychology in a somewhat

different way. Himself a psychoanalyst, he has carried the individualistic psychoanalytic philosophy to its logical conclusion. Chief of all of our repressions is that which comes from the necessity of conforming to the mores. Society imposes its standards and traditions upon us remorselessly. Hence social consciousness becomes a consciousness of inferiority, and right and wrong are moral bludgeons which smash the unity of our personalities. Conformity is the chief of the neuroses and the most moral are the most neurotic. Does the author believe that each one carries within himself the germ of true "normality" and that the only thing needful is to find a means by which this germ may unfold without external interference? How does this extension of psychoanalytic theory differ from the Nietzschean hypothesis and from the theory of the state of man's soul before the "fall?" I believe this is but a very recent edition of a very old protest of the individual against his growing pains in a socialized world. But it has an element of truth—perhaps a large one—in it after all. Not all of the social controls are justifiable, even from a social standpoint. Perhaps the conservators of ritual, obscurantist philosophy, and invidious ethics should take note of this new trend of the philosophic youth to demand a chance at life without being loaded to the breaking point with intellectual tom toms, class taboos, and the cult of the dead hand. Will science have an opportunity to plan a more rational set of social controls?

The Psychology of Character is a learned book, and of no inconsiderable value to the social psychologist. The approach is primarily historical and critical, but there are constructive chapters also. Character is looked upon as essentially the result of inhibition, but the author does not consider inhibition bad, as does Burrow.

It is important, however, to select the inhibitions wisely. Character develops in adjustment situations, and conflict is frequently a factor in the determination of effective inhibitions, since rival environmental controls are constantly struggling to dominate. On the subjective side temperament operates to supply inhibitions. On the whole, both in the individual and in the race, character develops from the emotional to the rational controls, a process which is illustrated both in literature and life.

Clearer and more helpful to the average non-technical psychological reader, because more elementary and more skilfully presented, is English Bagby's *The Psychology of Personality*. This, like most of the volumes reviewed in this section on personality, deals primarily with the abnormal, simply because more is known about the pathological. Maladjustment challenges us to efforts at cure before we can grasp the general outlines of a preventive or a constructive program. Of all this the author is keenly aware, as he is also that personality disorders are primarily the result of difficulties in making adjustments to the social environment. For this reason this interesting little volume is concerned mainly with such themes as emotional distortion, repressions, worry, inferiority complexes, rationalizations, hysteria and other defense responses.

Dr. Myerson's little treatise, in a popular way, goes more into detail with regard to some of the typical personality disorders that arise from social maladjustment, with some good suggestions for self control (pp. 71-3). His is decidedly a popular and practical handbook.

Valentine's *Psychology of Personality* is a more theoretic treatment, and leans less toward the abnormal. His central thesis is that habit is the key to personality, but there is not a corresponding insight

into the function of the psycho-social environment as the conditioner of personality traits. Everywhere throughout this book there are signs of the limitations of the author's training and outlook upon his work. He is strictly a psychologist and therefore misses the flood of light which a thorough understanding of sociology would throw upon the personality integrating process. Although the scope of his volume is wider, its insight is distinctly narrower and less penetrating than that of Bagby. His citations to the literature are invariably to psychological writers. To him personality is an integration within, and the factors from without are largely unexplored.

The Lure of Superiority by Vaughan illustrates once more (as do the volumes by Burrow, Bagby, and Myerson) the growing influence of psychoanalytic theory upon social psychology. But it is a much chastened and refined psychoanalytic psychology which is being taken over by the writers on personality. The crude Freudian metaphysics and mythology have as effectually disappeared from it as has the metaphysics of the mediaeval theologians and neo-Platonists from our modern (scientific) psychology. But much of the psychoanalytic terminology is here, and also its basic concepts. The thesis of this book is that of Adler, that inferiority feeling stimulates to compensation and thus arrives at superiority. Various compensatory mechanisms, including anger, learning, eccentricity, religiosity, mysticism, are analyzed. The working out of the compensatory devices among certain classes, like the workers, radicals, subject classes (women), and discriminated types (Jews) is discussed. The personalities of Schopenhauer and Lincoln are studied with a view to the discovery of the operation of compensatory motivation. The style is delightful, and the analysis is good, though

not profound. It should be a popular book.

VI

One of the most interesting documents of the year is undoubtedly Henry de Man's *The Psychology of Socialism*. It is a document, rather than a treatise, and it is as revealing as one of the analyses of Freud, and possibly more trustworthy. De Man was a socialist—an intellectual and an internationalist—before the great war. Yet he found himself (a Belgian) fighting and hating the Germans, just as the German internationalists found themselves fighting and hating his Belgians. What did it mean? This volume is a huge rationalization. To the author Marxist intellectualism or rationalism was a religion. Apparently he, like so many more of the old Marxists, had depended on magic, had expected the walls of capitalism to crumble when the socialist cycle had been completed and the magic blasts had been sounded on the Marxian trumpet. He is a disillusioned man. After the war he wandered in America, lectured, did many things, trying to figure it all out. Now he has the truth. Here it is in 500 pages. It is this. Proletarian Marxism was a selfish movement, its philosophy of brotherhood and internationalism a compensation for the inferiority feeling of the working classes. It won't work. All movements are essentially local and relative to their environments. Hence even the socialists are intensely nationalistic in the last analysis. They have mistaken hatred of the capitalists for hatred of national units. In the future the problem must be worked out within nationality lines. The new compensation for inferiority must be found in the intellectualization of the masses. This will remove cultural barriers, but it will take time. There is no short cut. In the

mean time the religious yearnings of the masses must be satisfied—rationally—by giving them a hope in their social hereafter—the old coöperative commonwealth done over again. Thus is Marxism restored to its pristine simplicity. It is most revealing that the author apologizes repeatedly for his criticism of Marx himself. The gods are inviolable. Thus rationalization goes on apace and radicalism is tempered to the cruel facts of experience. But this disease has affected millions.

If the author of the above volume had read Edwards' *The Natural History of Revolution* he would have understood himself better. Edwards understands revolutions pretty well. They are not periods of anarchy, but of despotism. They do not represent the rule of radicals, but the capture or retention of power by the conservatives on the basis of a new pretext or a new formula which the radicals will accept. The radicals are about the only ones who never rule, at least until they cease to be very radical. It is their business to stir up revolts or to threaten with revolts. In this way they gradually educate the masses to demand a new order of things which is put into effect by the milder conservatives. This is the revolution, in spite of a few spasmodic flurries of violence. We are due for a new revolution in about three generations, to establish industrial democracy on a par with political and social democracy. This theory of revolutions is much less negativistic and appeals less to the facts of abnormal psychology than does the theory of E. D. Martin in his *The Behavior of Crowds*, but at times one is reminded of this book.

VII

Six general trends stand out conspicuously from the preceding books on psycho-

logical subjects. There is an attempt at integration of the subject by relating the field and its findings up to the general principles and methods of science. The tendency is definitely toward the study of behavior rather than the analysis and literary exploitation of concepts. The sociological background, especially in the form of an analysis of the social environment and its incidence, it being increasingly recognized and applied. This is manifested specifically in the growth of social psychology and in the emphasis upon the psychology of personality within the field of social psychology. The present tendency is to account for personality in terms of the dominance and conditioning of individual traits by environmental factors. There is also a strong tendency to explain collective behavior in terms of individual responses to conditioning environmental factors, as in the cases here reviewed of socialistic theory and revolutionary philosophy. Finally, the saner theories of the psychoanalysts are taking root effectively in the field of social psychology, especially as an aid to the explanation of personality development.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES. By Pitirim Sorokin. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1928. 785 pp. \$4.00.

In his *Introduction* Professor Sorokin explains that the reason for the writing of this book was the lack of any single volume giving a concise survey of the principal sociological theories of the last sixty or seventy years, which might be used as a text book for graduate students in a course in Contemporary Sociological Theories. This lack the author has sought to remedy, and the resulting volume bears evidence of competent and broad scholarship, and of much painstaking labor. The graduate students who take Professor Sorokin's course in contemporary socio-

logical theories in the future will undoubtedly have in hand a valuable manual and compendium of materials to guide their efforts, and it is to be presumed that other instructors will be glad to avail themselves of the aid which this book can render.

The most obtrusive feature of this book is the classification of sociological theories which provides the main framework for the author's treatment of his subject-matter. This classification is too elaborate, and is couched in too unfamiliar a terminology, to be profitably reproduced here. It may be said, however, to display on the whole some of the advantages and limitations which must characterize any such classification; it will no doubt be an aid to the graduate student, but will not increase the attractiveness of the book to the mythical "general reader." The contributions to a science of sociology which have been made by various outstanding writers do not readily lend themselves to pigeon-holing without some sacrifice of their vitality. Yet to write a book of this character one must have some orderly plan for presenting his material. The danger is that the graduate student may confuse Sorokin's classificatory terms, such as "sociological school," "bio-social school," and the like, with the real and substantial insights into the factors and processes of social phenomena which some of the writers so classified have been able to develop.

Professor Sorokin has rendered an important service to contemporary students of sociology through his summaries of the work of European writers more or less unknown to those of lesser linguistic abilities. Particularly deserving of mention in this connection are his summaries of the contributions of Pareto, Gini, Carli, and other Italians, and of Winiarsky, Kovalevsky, and other Russians.

Each type of sociological theory reviewed is also subjected to an elaborate criticism, and in these criticisms there is discernible a note of arbitrariness which will be familiar to readers of Sorokin's previously published writings. His own viewpoint might be characterized as "behavioristic," in a rather narrow sense of the term, and it will seem to some readers that his treatment of theories based on subjective and introspective data is less appreciative and adequate than is his discussion of contributions based on physiological and statistical data. Psychologically inclined sociologists will find food for

thought, however, in his searching criticisms of the sociologists whom he classifies as representatives of the "psychological" and "psycho-sociological" schools.

This volume should be of great value to those who most disagree with the author's opinions as to the relative merits of various writers. To those who read it most sympathetically, the book may render an actual disservice if it leads them to mistake the forms of sociological theories for their substance.

FLOYD N. HOUSE.

University of Virginia.

COMMUNITY CHURCHES

LEROY E. BOWMAN

THE COMMUNITY CHURCH MOVEMENT. By David R. Piper. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Colby, 1928. 157 pp.

Six years ago Albert C. Zumbrunnen wrote a description of the *Community Church* and gave something of the background of the movement. In the same year the "handbook" of community churches appeared in which it was estimated that there were 831 community churches as of April that year. The present book states that in April, 1926 there were 1170 community churches and in April, 1927, there were 1296, more than there were Friends churches or more than Universalist and Unitarians churches combined. 1066 of these churches are in villages of less than 2500 or in the open country; 114 are in towns of 2500 to 25,000 population. In this category fall most of the type known as federated churches. There were 116 community churches in cities of over 25,000; of these 116, 69 are in suburban communities.

The causes lying back of the community church movement are described as: tend-

encies toward democracy, tightening of the denominational hand, forcing some churches to renounce denominational control, the influence of business men and men of affairs who become interested in the church and wish it to serve in a broad fashion, women with an enlarged vision who wish to see social service carried on for the community through the church; and the newer mission of the church, viz.: the job of serving "the whole community in spiritual action." The types of community churches most prevalent are: (1) The denominational community church distinguished in that it treats the denominational organization as a service agency rather than as a control body; (2) the federated church in which there are two or more denominations, and (3) the undenominational community church. The author stresses the importance of religious education and of recreation as activities in the new type of church.

The book is but slightly partisan. It is an excellent description of the community movement from the standpoint of one

engaged in this rapidly developing religious phenomenon.

THE NEW ENGLAND CLERGY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A STUDY OF ECCLESIASTICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE IN ITS RELATION TO POLITICAL THEORY AND ACTION IN THE NEW ENGLAND OF REVOLUTIONARY TIMES. By Alice M. Baldwin. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1928. 222 pp. \$3.50.

Although written in the style of the historian, this scholarly study will be of no little interest to political scientists and sociologists. It may be considered, in fact, a case-study in public opinion. The author has marshalled masses of documentary evidence to show that the ideas of constitutional government, the right of resistance to unconstitutional exercise of authority, the natural rights of man, and the derivation of governmental authority from the consent of the governed were not exotic conceptions, brought from abroad at the time of the Revolution by a few doctrinaire leaders, as has sometimes been asserted, but that in fact these ideas had been generally advocated by large numbers of the New England clergy for a half-century before the Revolution, and had by their teaching become thoroughly familiar to the mass of the people in the New England colonies. She argues that these conceptions had become so habitual to the northern colonists that their participation in the revolt against Great Britain and their insistence upon the incorporation of certain principles into the new state and federal constitutions was quite inevitable.

The candor with which Dr. Baldwin has called attention to the limitations upon the conclusions which may be drawn from her evidence, as regards, for instance, the extent to which the clergy were true initiators of the doctrines which they espoused, and the extent to which, on the other hand, they merely followed the known

sentiments of their parishioners, is such as to make it clear that other studies in the same field are needed to reveal more fully the mechanism by which public opinion and collective action are determined.

FLOYD N. HOUSE.

University of Virginia.

GROWING INTO LIFE: A MAGNA CHARTA OF YOUTH. By David Seabury. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1928. 715 pp. \$5.00.

This book is a presentation at some length in popular style of the principles of general psychology which have a bearing on the practical problems of child-rearing and the relations of parents and young people generally. The author makes no pretence at the announcement of novel psychological discoveries; on the contrary it is evidently his general plan to base his practical advice upon theories which find general acceptance among contemporary psychologists. Those who are familiar with the more technical literature of psychology which has appeared, say, in the past ten years will be well aware how easily one could make out a case in support of the proposition that there are no generally accepted psychological theories. In the face of this state of affairs, it is of no little interest to observe how much Mr. Seabury has found to say on his subject to which his academic colleagues will probably raise very little objection.

The author places little emphasis upon the idea that the forces conditioning the growth and formation of human personality are so largely those which arise in the course of the individual's interaction with other people, though it must be said in justice to him that the detailed considerations which may be cited in support of such a proposition are by no means suppressed in this volume.

FLOYD N. HOUSE.

University of Virginia.

A SYSTEM OF BEHAVIORISM

READ BAIN

A THEORETIC BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR. By Albert Paul Weiss. Columbus, Ohio: R. G. Adams & Co., 1925. 425 pp. \$2.50.

Although published two years ago, this book has not had the attention which the reviewer believes it warrants. The author is a "psychological behaviorist," but his work is fully as important for sociology as the work of Child, Herrick, and Watson.

But Professor Weiss' views are not greatly different from those of the behavioristic sociologist. He states that "human behavior is concerned primarily with those movements made by man which establish the social status of the individual in some ethnic or social group." (page 35). This would satisfy most of the younger social psychologists and sociologists as a working definition of their fields.

He says behaviorism is a convenient term for separating those who believe that the so-called mental states are types of physical states from those who believe they are not (page 5). The implications of this are very important. The psychologist, for the sake of logical consistency, must take a stand on some theory of reality. For the behaviorist, this theory must be a physical monism. When he undertakes to explain human responses in terms of motion, he has no material to deal with other than electron-proton systems of varying degrees of complexity and stability, viz.: inorganic structures, albumins, protoplasms, unicellular organisms, multicellular organisms, and in the case of man, compound multicellular organizations such as human groups (pages, 47-50).

Weiss emphasizes the fact that all so-called psychic laws finally have to depend upon physical data for their validity,

i.e., they always imply a sensory-cerebromotor system, and hence "psychic states" are mere useless baggage. "No psychical law which is contradictory to physics has ever been adopted" (page 68). This is the thorn of contention and the refusal to accept the point of view implied seems to the reviewer much the same as the refusal to accept the Copernican and evolutionary doctrines. The behaviorist view of man requires a complete reformulation of our views of the human universe. Men want "psychic entities" and "mental realities" much as they used to want geocentrism and fixed species. A logically consistent behaviorism denies to human vanity these hypothetical sugar plums. Hence men try to exercise behaviorism with cries of "materialism," and "absurdity." But here is a man who gladly accepts the charge of materialism and proves that the "psychic stuff views" are the real absurdity.

One of his fundamental distinctions is that between the bio-physical, or neuromuscular, and the bio-social, or stimulus (meaning), phases of human response (page 57). The individual is defined as the "sum total of his educational, vocational, administrative, recreational, and personal activities from birth to death (page 83). This view, together with the conception of the environment as all the antecedents for the sensori-motor functions that establish the individual's social status, is practically synonymous with the sociologist's concept of personality. Both depend upon a denial of the uniqueness of individual, environment, or society, and an emphasis upon their essential organic unity.

He continues with the analysis of human

behavior, following Child's ideas regarding the bio-physical responses as the determinants of dominant gradients, organic regulating mechanisms, and cerebral integration. The chapters on "The Biosocial Responses," "The Social Status," and "Consciousness" are of especial interest to the sociologist. In the first, he discusses the "recording responses" as stimuli that are equivalents for others. "Elementary" discriminations turn out to be language habits, chiefly defined by abstractions, or relational responses (pp. 196-8). "The Social Status" reemphasizes the social nature of individual responses. The value of mental tests is to establish behavior classifications and not to determine any hypothetical "mental functions." Volition, thinking, etc., are merely forms of movement and hence have no experimental value (page 219). "Consciousness" belongs in the same category. It and mind are merely "terms used as substitutes for any real knowledge of the events to which they refer" (page 234). He does hold, however, that introspection has a value when the "consciousness" involved is regarded as laboratory-learned speech habits, and introspection as one's "response to his own responses" (pp. 240-1).

Part III is taken up with a searching analysis of "Specific Response Categories:" language, thinking, desire, purpose, volition, motivation, emotions. These are all treated with the acid of the author's point of view and reduced to biophysical and biosocial responses: implicit, delayed, partial, anticipatory, preparatory, etc. When he has finished, there is very little of the classical psychology left intact. The final chapter on "Postulates, Measurement, Ethics" serves as a good summary of the whole treatise.

A Theoretic Basis of Human Behavior is a challenging and stimulating book which

ought to be in the library of every modern-minded social scientist.

THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN. By Paul Radin. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1927. 371 pp. Illus.

The author of this book has for many years been identified with the ethnological study of the American Indian. The researches of Dr. Radin and other ethnologists have revealed the hidden records of a civilization that existed in the Western Hemisphere and rivals in interest the old Egyptian and Babylonian civilizations.

But very few people who live in America today know that such a wonderful civilization as the Maya formerly existed on this hemisphere. The average American's idea of the American Indian has been obtained from stories of the Indian of the plains and forests, and his knowledge of the Indian life of America dates from the early settlements of this country.

Dr. Radin has interestingly and instructively depicted the empires and civilizations that were built up by the Indians of the Western Hemisphere, of which but little remains as part of the life of the many Indian tribes of North, South and Central America. His story shows, however, to what extent this old civilization has influenced the life of all the American Indian tribes and what remnants still exist in the life of the present Indian.

From the first chapter on "The Glory that was Maya" to the last page of the book, the vivid descriptions of the rise and fall of the Indian civilizations in America and their influence in the life of the present Indian tribes is an absorbingly interesting story.

Dr. Radin is to be congratulated and commended for portraying the story of the American Indian in such a simple and yet concise and different style that the book

will appeal to the average reader as well as to the student of ethnology.

The reader who is really interested in knowing more about the life of the American Indian will be profoundly stirred in the accurate picture portrayed of this early American culture; and the story is told in such a marvelous manner that even the casual reader will read every page instead of simply scanning the book.

For the first time the whole life story of the Indians in the Western Hemisphere has been written and the fascinating history of the great empires they created, of their wars, trading and cultural activities, their strange native customs, is now available to all readers and not, as previously, confined to ethnologists.

JOSEPH HYDE PRATT.

Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

THE FARMER AND COÖPERATION

SYDNEY D. FRISSELL

FARM RELIEF: A BRIEF ON THE McNARY-HAUGEN PLAN. By James E. Boyle. New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1928.

WHAT IS COÖPERATION? By James Peter Wabasse. New York: Vanguard Press, 1927. 170 pp. 50 cents.

A timely discussion of the problem of farm relief and particularly that proposed measure for relief which has been the storm center of agricultural legislation and discussion at Washington during the Coolidge administration. Many will welcome this opportunity to gain a more detailed knowledge of the bill which was passed by both houses of Congress, vetoed by President Coolidge and at the present writing is being urged upon Congress for passage, with slight modifications. Dr. Boyle's discussion of the farm problem has interest for students of economics and agriculture. His proposals for farm relief are not sufficiently clear and constructive, however, to satisfy many of the latter.

"Dedicated to the individual in the hope that he may preserve himself from being swallowed up by the complications of the political and economic life" this thought provoking book describes the method of coöperation which has led many millions of consumers in England and Europe to

perform for themselves the useful functions that are otherwise performed by profit-business or the State. The author, one of America's foremost authorities on this subject urges coöperation as an antidote to the constant encroachments of government and big business upon the liberties of the individual, pointing out how it can succeed where socialism, syndicalism and communism fail, in alleviating the ills of the capitalistic regime. Although the author states his doubts as to the rapid growth of consumer coöperation in the United States, he neglects wholly to describe the recent, rapid growth of producer coöperation as exemplified by the farmers' coöperatives in this country, an omission which is disappointing to the American student of coöperation.

IMMIGRANT BACKGROUNDS. Ed. by Henry Pratt Fairchild. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1927. 269 pp. \$2.75.

This small book, written by fifteen authors, contains sixteen chapters on the different racial, national, or cultural groups, whose life they endeavor briefly to picture to us. After the first chapter, devoted to "What is an Immigrant Background?" the order is as follows: British,

French-Canadians, Germans, Greeks, Hungarians, Irish, Italians, Jews, Jugo Slavs and Czechoslovaks, Latin-Americans, Orientals, Poles, Russians and Baltic Peoples, Scandinavians, Other Peoples. Although Professor Fairchild asserts that "Race is a purely biological factor" and interprets cultural situations as biological, he follows neither the biological, cultural nor historical method in his outline. From neither the historical, numerical, or cultural influences upon the United States, nor the viewpoint of present problems caused by any immigrant group, does it seem logical to sandwich the French-Canadians in between the British and Germans. The peculiar grouping of the different Slavic peoples in three chapters and the separation of the Jugo Slavs and Czechoslovaks from their Slavic brethren by the Latin-Americans and Orientals; the separation of the Scandinavians from their German kindred by ten other groups are indicative of other illogical groupings. Since the Jews are to a certain extent religiously and otherwise strongly a cultural, and partially a biological part of the peoples among whom they dwell, one wonders whether or not their background is of sufficient importance to warrant separate treatment in this small volume. The lumping of the Albanians, Armenians, Belgians, Dutch, French, Portuguese, Romanians, Spanish, Swiss Syrians, and Turks in the last chapter certainly presents a mosaic.

Although no logical or satisfactory grouping of the diverse racial elements from which we have received and are receiving our immigrants has been evolved, it appears that either a biological or cultural grouping would have been more satisfactory than merely following the alphabet. Realizing that any arrangement presents difficulties, the reviewer believes the book would have been much better if the different racial elements had been grouped under Teutonic, Latin, Slavic, and Oriental.

Anyone who has given much time to teaching courses in immigration or Americanization, and realizing the dearth of books dealing with immigrant backgrounds, will welcome any volume filling even partially the need. This book lacks clear analyses but contains much valuable descriptive material. While some of the chapters are excellent, especially those dealing with the Italians, Greeks, Hungarians, and Jugo Slavs and Czechoslovaks, others are not so good. Some of the authors are apparently either not familiar with their subject matter or not being aware of what is essential for a book of this nature, seek to magnify the good points and minimize the bad, rather than bring us face to face with facts which are essential for us to know in dealing with immigrants.

H. G. DUNCAN.

University of North Carolina.

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

PROVINCIAL SOCIETY, 1690-1763. By James Truslow Adams. New York: Macmillan, 1927. 374 pp. (Volume III of *A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LIFE* edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger and Dixon Ryan Fox.)

MODERN JAPAN AND ITS PROBLEMS. By G. C. Allen. New York: Dutton, 1928. 226 pp. \$3.00.

SERVICE RECORD. By An Artilleryman (L. V. Jacks). New York: Scribner, 1928. 303 pp. \$2.00.

THE DAWES PLAN AND THE NEW ECONOMICS. By G. P. Auld. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1928.

VIRGINIA AND THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR. By Hayes Baker-Crothers. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1928. 179 pp. \$2.00.

THE WAGES OF PERIL. By Jack Bechdolt. Philadelphia: Altemus, 1927. 285 pp.

THE SAVIOUR OF LIFE. By Arnold Bennett. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. 313 pp. \$2.50.

COTTON. By Jack Bethea. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1928. 316 pp. \$2.00.

ON THE SIXTH DAY. By Giuseppe Bianco. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1928. 313 pp. \$2.50.

THE REMEDY FOR OVERPRODUCTION AND UNEMPLOYMENT. By Hugo Bilgram. New York: Vanguard Press, 1928. 113 pp. 50 cents.

THE CHILD AND SOCIETY. By Phyllis Blanchard. New York: Longmans, Green, 1928. 369 pp.

IMMIGRATION AND RACE ATTITUDES. By Emory S. Bogardus. Boston: Heath, 1928. 268 pp. \$1.80.

MEDICAL SOCIAL CASE RECORDS. (Submitted in the 1927 Case Competition of the American Association of Hospital Social Workers.) Introduction by Sophonisba P. Breckinridge. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1928. 176 pp. \$1.50.

THE LOGIC OF MODERN PHYSICS. By P. W. Bridgman. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 228 pp. \$2.50.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. By Albert Perry Brigham. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1927. 308 pp. \$3.00.

HIGH GROUND. By Jonathan Brooks. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1928. 318 pp. \$2.00.

IN SEARCH OF OUR ANCESTORS. By Mary E. Boyle. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1928. 287 pp. \$3.50.

LIFE AND I. By Gamaliel Bradford. New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1928. 307 pp. \$3.50.

A STATE MOVEMENT IN RAILROAD DEVELOPMENT. (The story of North Carolina's first efforts to establish an East and West Trunk Line Railroad.) By Cecil Kenneth Brown. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1928. 300 pp. \$5.00.

WORKING WITH THE WORLD. By Irving T. Bush. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. 315 pp. \$2.50.

APPLIED ECONOMICS. (The Application of Economic Principles to the Problems of Economic Life.) By Raymond T. Bye and William H. Hewett. New York: Knopf, 1928. 655 pp.

BUSINESS THE CIVILIZER. By Ernest Elmo Calkins. Introduction by John Cotton Dana. Decorations by Rene Clarke. Boston: Little, Brown (An Atlantic Monthly Press Publication), 1928. 309 pp. \$3.00.

THE ESCAPE FROM THE PRIMITIVE. By Horace Carnross. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926. 348 pp. \$2.50.

THIS ECONOMIC WORLD. By Thomas Nixon Carver. Chicago and New York: Shaw, 1928. 432 pp.

A WORK BOOK SYLLABUS IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION. By Orlie M. Clem. Baltimore: Warwick & York, 1928. 170 pp. \$1.80.

THE NEW LEAVEN. (Progressive Education and Its Effect upon the Child and Society.) By Stanwood Cobb. New York: The John Day Co., 1928. 340 pp. \$2.50.

CONFessions OF A NEGRO PREACHER. Chicago: The Canterbury Press, 1928. 297 pp.

FLORIAN SLAPPEY GOES ABROAD. By Octavus Roy Cohen. Boston: Little, Brown, 1928. 311 pp. \$2.00.

SPRING TIDE. By Octavus Roy Cohen. New York: Appleton, 1928. 262 pp. \$2.00.

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC. By J. B. Condliffe. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1928. 630 pp. \$3.00.

A MAN OF LEARNING. By Nelson Antrim Crawford. Boston: Little, Brown, 1928. 270 pp. \$2.50.

GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS. By Earl Willis Crecraft. Yonkers-On-Hudson: World Book Company, 1928. 508 pp.

AN AFRICA FOR THE AFRICANS. By A. S. Cripps. New York: Longmans, Green. 1927.

TEACHING THE SOCIAL STUDIES. By Edgar Dawson. New York: Macmillan, 1927. 405 pp.

THE BEST BOOKS OF OUR TIME. (A clue to the Literary Labyrinth for home library builders, booksellers, and librarians, consisting of a list of one thousand best books selected by the best authorities accompanied by critical descriptions.) Written and compiled by Asa Don Dickinson. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. 405 pp. \$5.00.

THE PORTRAIT OF A MAN AS GOVERNOR. By Thomas H. Dickinson. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928. 37 pp. \$1.00.

HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Horatio W. Dresser. New York: Crowell, 1928. 471 pp. \$3.00.

HEALTH AND WEALTH. By Louis I. Dublin. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1928. 361 pp. \$3.00.

THESE CHANGING TIMES. By E. R. Eastman. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 257 pp. \$2.50.

CAPITAL AND FINANCE IN THE AGE OF THE RENAISSANCE. By Richard Ehrenberg. Tr. by H. M. Lucas. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1928. 390 pp. \$4.50.

THE PRAGMATIC REVOLT IN POLITICS. (Syndicalism, Fascism, and the Constitutional State.) By W. Y. Elliott. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 540 pp.

THE BONDWOMAN. By G. U. Ellis. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. 314 pp. \$2.00.

A STUDY OF BRITISH GENIUS. By Havlock Ellis. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926. 396 pp. \$3.50.

THE DELIGHT OF GREAT BOOKS. By John Erskine. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1928. 314 pp. \$2.50.

UNFORBIDDEN FRUIT. By Warner Fabian. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1928. 319 pp. \$2.00.

WHY MEN FAIL. Ed. by Morris Fishbein and William A. White. New York and London: Century, 1928. 344 pp. \$2.00.

CULTURE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS. By Joseph Kirk Folsom. New York: Longmans, Green, 1928. 558 pp. \$3.00.

LIVING WITH OUR CHILDREN. By Lillian M. Gilbreth. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1928. 309 pp. \$2.50.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS. By J. L. Gillin, C. G. Dittmer, R. J. Colbert. New York: Century, 1928. 534 pp.

SCHOOL TRAINING OF GIFTED CHILDREN. By Henry Herbert Goddard. Yonkers-on-Hudson: World Book Company, 1928. 226 pp. \$2.00.

STRANGERS AND LOVERS. By Edwin Granberry. New York: The Macaulay Co., 1928. 320 pp. \$2.00.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY. By Coleman R. Griffith. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 607 pp., rev. ed.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY. By Ernest R. Groves. New York: Longmans, Green, 1928. 568 pp.

GUIDANCE OF CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH. (Readings in Child Study.) Ed. by Benjamin C. Gruenberg. Compiled by Child Study Association of America. New York: Macmillan, 1927. 324 pp.

OUTLINES OF CHILD STUDY. (A Manual for Parents and Teachers.) Ed. by Benjamin C. Gruenberg for the Child Study Association of America. Introduction by Edward L. Thorndike. Revised Ed. New York: Macmillan, 1927. 289 pp.

MEN ARE LIKE THAT. By Leonard Ramsden Hartill. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1928. 305 pp. \$3.00.

CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC THOUGHT. By Paul T. Homan. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1928. 475 pp. \$2.50.

LET FREEDOM RING. By Arthur Garfield Hays. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1928. 341 pp. \$2.50.

RACE AND CIVILIZATION. By Friedrich Hertz. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 328 pp.

MIND IN EVOLUTION. By L. T. Hobhouse. London: Macmillan and Company, 1926. 483 pp.

GINGER ELLA. By Ethel Hueston. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928. 322 pp. \$2.00.

PROPER STUDIES. By Aldous Huxley. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. 349 pp. \$2.50.

SOLDIER OF THE SOUTH. (War letters of General Pickett to his wife.) Ed. by Arthur Crewe Inman. New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1928. 158 pp. \$2.50.

OUT OF DARKNESS. (A Drama of Flanders.) By Kenneth Ingram. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1928. 316 pp.

INTERVIEWS. By a Committee of the Chicago Chapter of the American Association of Social Workers. New York: American Association of Social Workers, 1928. 75 pp. \$1.00.

THE SIMPLE STORY OF MUSIC. By Charles D. Isaacson. New York: Macy-Masius, 1928. 336 pp. \$3.00.

CONSTRUCTIVE CITIZENSHIP. By L. P. Jacks. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. 300 pp. \$2.00.

INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY. By Walter W. Jennings. New York: Crowell, 1928. 546 pp. \$3.00.

PROBATION FOR JUVENILES AND ADULTS. (A Study of Principles and Methods.) By Fred R. Johnson. New York and London: Century, 1928. 242 pp. \$2.25.

CHILDREN IN THE NURSERY SCHOOL. By Harriet M. Johnson. New York: The John Day Co., 1928. 325 pp. \$3.00.

BIOGRAPHY. (The Literature of Personality.) By James C. Johnston. New York and London: Century, 1928. 312 pp. \$2.50.

THE CRIMINAL AND HIS ALLIES. By Marcus Kavanagh. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928. 432 pp. \$3.00.

CROSSROADS IN THE MIND OF MAN. By Truman L. Kelley. California: Stanford University Press, 1928. 238 pp. \$4.00.

THE SCIENCE OF PUBLIC WELFARE. By Robert W. Kelso. New York: Holt, 1928. 428 pp. \$3.50 (Student's Edition, \$2.80).

EUROPE. By Count Hermann Keyserling. Tr. by

Maurice Samuel. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1928. 399 pp. \$5.00.

ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE. (In Modern Times.) By Melvin M. Knight, Harry Elmer Barnes, and Felix Flügel. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928. 808 pp. \$3.75.

JUSTICE FIRST. By John A. Lapp. New York: The Century Company, 1928. 185 pp. \$2.25.

OLD FATHER OF WATERS. By Alan Le May. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. 329 pp. \$2.00.

THE NATION'S HISTORY. By Arthur R. Leonard and Bertha E. Jacobs. Maps by Max Mayer. New York: Henry Holt, 1928 (new ed.). 740 pp. \$1.80.

THE SKULL OF SWIFT. By Shave Leslie. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1928. 347 pp. \$3.50.

THE MAN WHO KNEW COOLIDGE. By Sinclair Lewis. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1928. 275 pp. \$2.00.

PARTY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL POLITICS. By Stuart Lewis. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1928. 523 pp. \$5.00.

AMERICAN INQUISITORS. (A Commentary on Dayton and Chicago.) By Walter Lippmann. New York: Macmillan, 120 pp. \$1.25.

RECENT WAR LYRICS. By Leona Whitworth Logue. New York: The Grafton Press, 1928. 65 pp.

THE ROAD TO BUENOS AIRES. By Albert Londres. Tr. by Eric Sutton. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1928. 251 pp. \$2.50.

CORRECTIVE PHYSICAL EDUCATION FOR GROUPS. By C. L. Lowman, Claire Colestock, and Hazel Cooper. New York: Barnes, 1928. 511 pp. \$4.50.

FEDERAL AID. (A Study of the American Subsidy System.) By Austin F. Macdonald. New York: Crowell, 1928. 285 pp. \$2.75.

MEMOIRS OF A WHITE CROW INDIAN. By Thomas B. Marquis. New York and London: Century, 1928. 336 pp. Illus. \$3.00.

CREATION BY EVOLUTION. (A concensus of present-day knowledge as set forth by leading authorities in non-technical language that all may understand.) Ed. by Frances Mason. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 392 pp. \$5.00.

IN TUNE WITH THE FINITE. By Thomas L. Masson. New York: The Century Company, 1928. 266 pp. \$2.50.

AMERICAN PROSPERITY. By Paul M. Mazur. New York: The Viking Press, 1928. 268 pp. \$2.50.

PREJUDICES, FIFTH SERIES. By H. L. Mencken. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926. 307 pp. \$2.50.

THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION. By Lewis Merriam and Associates. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1928. 872 pp.

THE GREAT AMERICAN BAND-WAGON. (A Study of Exaggerations) By Charles Merz. Decorations by Howard W. Willard. New York: The John Day Co., 1928. 263 pp. \$3.00.

TOWN AND COUNTRY. By Elva E. Miller. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1928. 212 pp. \$2.00.

AN ARTIST IN THE FAMILY. By Sarah Gertrude Millin. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1928. 280 pp. \$2.50.

UP EEL RIVER. By Margaret Prescott Montague. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 224 pp. \$2.50.

THE DREAMS OF YOUTH. By Walter Amos Morgan. New York: The Century Company, 1928. 246 pp. \$2.00.

A SON OF MOTHER INDIA ANSWERS. By Dhan Gopal Mukerji. New York: Dutton, 1928. 114 pp. \$1.50.

THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT. By William Bennett Munro. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928. 169 pp. \$1.75.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF L. T. HOBHOUSE. By J. A. Nicholson. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois, 1928. 85 pp. \$1.00.

CONDEMNED. By Blair Niles. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1928. 376 pp. \$3.00.

THE ILLINOIS ADOPTION LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION. By Elinor Nims. Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1928. 127 pp.

BOLSHEVISM, FASCISM AND DEMOCRACY. By Francesco Nitti. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927. 223 pp. \$2.75.

BACK OF WAR. By Henry Kittredge Norton. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. 356 pp. \$2.50.

NOVEMBER NIGHT. By the Author of *Miss Tiverton Goes Out* and *This Day's Madness*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928. 325 pp. \$2.50.

RAINBOW ROUND MY SHOULDER. By Howard W. Odum. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928. 323 pp. \$3.00.

STRANGE INTERLUDE. By Eugene O'Neill. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1928. 352 pp. \$2.50.

BIRD OF FREEDOM. By Hugh Pendexter. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1928. 349 pp. \$2.00.

A THEORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT. By Selig Perlman. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 311 pp.

NICOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE FLORENTINE. By Giuseppe Prezzolini. New York: Brentano's, 1928. 257 pp. \$3.50.

EDUCATIONAL AND VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE. By William Martin Proctor. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925. 352 pp. \$2.00.

WE HAVE CHANGED ALL THAT. By Herbert Quick and Elena Stepanoff Macmahon. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928. 263 pp. \$2.00.

NOTES ON MALTHUS. By David Ricardo. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1928. 246 pp. \$5.00.

QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN POLITICS. By Stuart A. Rice. New York: Knopf, 1928. 331 pp.

MORALS IN REVIEW. By A. K. Rogers. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927. 456 pp. \$3.50.

THE STUMP FARM. (A Chronicle of Pioneering.) By Hilda Rose. Boston: Little, Brown, 1928. 178 pp. \$2.00.

STANDING ROOM ONLY? By Edward Alsworth Ross. New York: Century, 1927. 368 pp. \$3.00.

PUBLICITY FOR SOCIAL WORK. By Mary Swain Routzahn and Evart G. Routzahn. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1928. 392 pp. \$3.00.

WAR DRUMS. By Herbert Ravenel Sass. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1928. 293 pp. \$2.00.

GROWING INTO LIFE. By David Seabury. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1928. 715 pp. \$5.00.

THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY. By Max G. Schlapp and Edward H. Smith. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1928. 325 pp. \$4.00.

THE WORKERS' (COMMUNIST) PARTY AND AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS. By David M. Schneider. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1928. 115 pp. \$1.25.

WHITE FOX. By C. E. Scoggins. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1928. 170 pp.

INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL ECONOMY. By Nassau W. Senior. (Original MSS arranged and edited by S. Leon Levy) New York: Holt, 1928. Two vol., 797 pp. \$8.50.

ETHICS. By Frank Chapman Sharp. New York and London: Century, 1928. 566 pp.

STATE AND FEDERAL CORRUPT-PRACTICES LEGISLATION. By Earl R. Sikes. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University, 1928. 321 pp. \$3.00.

THE SPLENDID CALIFORNIANS. By Sidney Herschel Small. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1928. 323 pp. \$2.50.

THE BORDERLAND IN THE CIVIL WAR. By Edward Conrad Smith. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 412 pp. \$3.50.

CULTURE. (The Diffusion Controversy). By G. Elliott Smith, Bronislaw Malinowski, Herbert J. Spinden, Alex. Goldenweiser. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1927. 106 pp. \$1.00.

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF EQUALITY. By T. V. Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1927.

PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY. By Walter Robinson Smith. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1928. 773 pp. \$3.00.

LEAVE ME WITH A SMILE. By Elliott White Springs. Garden City: Doubleday, Dorn, 1928. 288 pp. \$2.50.

PREVENTIVE AND CORRECTIVE PHYSICAL EDUCATION. By George T. Stafford. New York: Barnes, 1928. 328 pp. \$3.00.

MIRRORS OF THE YEAR. Edited by Horace Winston Stokes. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1928. 387 pp. \$4.00.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES. By Graham H. Stuart. New York and London: Century, 1928. 465 pp. 2d ed. revised. \$3.75.

HOW WE GOT OUR LIBERTIES. By Lucius B. Swift. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1928. 304 pp. \$2.50.

TOUCOUTOU. By Edward Larocque Tinker. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1928. 312 pp. \$2.50.

THE TOP DRAWER. By "One Who Was Born in It." Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. 250 pp. \$2.50.

ME AND HENRY AND THE ARTILLERY. By William Hazlett Upson. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. 271 pp. \$2.00.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONALITY. By P. F. Valentine. New York and London: Appleton, 1927. 393 pp. \$2.50.

WAGES (AND LABOR'S SHARE IN THE VALUE ADDED BY MANUFACTURE). Washington, D. C.: American Federation of Labor, 1928. 224 pp. 50 cents.

THE SQUEALER. By Edgar Wallace. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. 312 pp. \$2.00.

THE FALL OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE. By Edmund A. Walsh. Boston: Little, Brown, 1928. 357 pp. \$3.50.

SOVEREIGNTY. By Paul W. Ward. Syracuse: The Hill Bookstall, 1928. 201 pp.

BETTER SCHOOLS. By Carleton Washburne and Myron M. Stearns. New York: John Day and Co., 1928. 342 pp. \$2.50.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CARE OF INFANT AND CHILD. By John B. Watson. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1928. 195 pp. \$2.00.

AMERICA'S HUMAN WEALTH. (The money value of human life.) By Edward A. Woods and Clarence B. Metzger. New York: Crofts, 1927. 193 pp. \$2.00.

THE CLOCK STRIKES TWO. By Henry Kitchell Webster. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928. 322 pp. \$2.00.

THE MISBEHAVIORISTS. (Pseudo-Science and the Modern Temper.) By Harvey Wickham. New York: Longmans, Green, 1928. 294 pp. \$3.50.

THE BRIDGE OF SAN LUIS REY. By Thornton Wilder. Illustrated by Amy Drenstedt. New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1928. 235 pp. \$2.50.